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Commentators have frequently suggested that India is going through an “age of 
intolerance” as writers, artists, filmmakers, scholars and journalists among others have 
been targeted by institutions of the state as well as political parties and interest groups 
for hurting the sentiments of some section of Indian society. However, this age of 
intolerance has coincided with a period that has also been characterized by the 
“deepening” of Indian democracy, as previously subordinated groups have begun to 
participate more actively and substantively in democratic politics. This project is an 
attempt to understand the reasons for the persistence of illiberalism in Indian politics, 
particularly as manifest in censorship practices. It argues that one of the reasons why 
censorship has persisted in India is that having the “right to censor” has come be 
established in the Indian constitutional order’s negotiation of multiculturalism as a 
symbol of a cultural group’s substantive political empowerment. This feature of the 
Indian constitutional order has made the strategy of “seeking offense” readily 
available to India’s politicians, who understand it to be an efficacious way to discredit 
their competitors’ claims of group representativeness within the context of democratic 
identity politics. The findings of the project have important implications for theories of 
ethnic party politics and the literature on the relationship between democracy, 
liberalism and the accommodation of cultural diversity. It also points to the need to 
rethink the relationship between India’s past and present.  
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THE CONSTITUTION OF DEMOCRATIC POLITICS IN INDIA 
 
On October 5, 1988, India became the first country in the world to ban Salman 
Rushdie‟s now infamous novel, The Satanic Verses. The decision came in the wake of 
some members of Parliament belonging to the Muslim community warning the Prime 
Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, about the likelihood that the book would incite India‟s 
Muslim minority to violent protest. It turned out that banning the book didn‟t prevent 
rioting: the disputed Muslim-majority region of Indian-administered Kashmir erupted 
in violent protest on February 13, 1989, followed by rioting in Bombay (now 
Mumbai) city on February 24, with both events ostensibly incited by Rushdie‟s 
blasphemous novel. Meanwhile, on January 14, 1989, the United Kingdom saw its 
first anti-Rusdhie protests setting off a chain of violence that included bomb blasts and 
large protests in London. The United States too saw its share of protests and violence 
against the book: a large protest of “thousands of Muslims” took place in New York 
City on February 26, 1989, and two bookstores stocking the book in Berkeley, 
California were firebombed two days later. However, of these three democracies, it 
was only in India that the book was banned. It continues to be banned until today.
1
 
The Satanic Verses has not been the only book to face the ire of India‟s 
censors. In recent years, the work of noted artist M.F. Husain has been routinely 
targeted by Hindu nationalist groups, ostensibly for his “insulting” and “offensive” 
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 This discussion draws exclusively on Appignanesi and Maitland, eds. 1990. The Rushdie File. 




depictions of Hindu goddesses. It was these very groups who burned down the set of 
Deepa Mehta‟s film Water when it first began filming in the northern Indian city of 
Varanasi, in what some writers have referred to as evidence of a growing tendency 
toward mob censorship.
2
 However, it is not just mobs of religious nationalists playing 
the leading role in India‟s “age of intolerance”. The work of controversial Bangladeshi 
novelist Taslima Nasreen has routinely been censored by the Communist government 
in the state of West Bengal and the author was physically attacked in the southern 
Indian city of Hyderabad by members of the state legislative assembly.
3
 A noted 
actress in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu was targeted for “insulting Tamil 
pride” when she responded to the results of a national survey of Indian women‟s 
sexual habits by suggesting that Indian men ought to stop expecting their brides to be 
virgins.
4
 Arundhati Roy‟s Booker Prize winning novel The God of Small Things was 
targeted for censorship in the socially progressive state of Kerala, ostensibly for 
injuring public morality.
5
 And more recently, a film titled Aaja Nachle [Come, Let‟s 
Dance] was banned in three states because one line in one of the films songs was 
deemed to be offensive to the Dalit community, former “untouchables” in the Hindu 
caste hierarchy.  
What makes the practice of censorship in contemporary India particularly 
interesting is that all the events cited above have taken place during a period in which 
Indian democracy has been said to be “deepening”; a time when previously 
                                                          
2
 See “Water hangs fire in Varanasi as Mehta awaits Jaitley” in The Indian Express, February 2, 2000. 
Available online at: http://www.indianexpress.com/ie/daily/20000202/ina02057.html. Last Accessed 
on: July 9, 2009.  
3
 See “Taslima Nasreen: Controversy‟s Child” on BBC News Online, November 23, 2007. Available 
online at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7108880.stm. Last Accessed on July 9, 2009.  
4
 See “The Khushboo Case File: Reverse Culture Jamming” by  Tushar Dhara in The Sarai Reader 
2006: Turbulence, pp 388-400. Available online at: http://www.sarai.net/publications/readers/06-
turbulence/04_tushar_dhara.pdf. Last accessed on: March 20, 2009.   
5
 See “Under Fire, but India is in my blood” by Peter Popham in The Independent, September 21, 1997. 
Available online at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/under-fire-but-india-is-in-my-blood-
1240454.html. Last Accessed on: July 9, 2009.  
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subordinated social groups have come to participate more actively in politics (Jaffrelot 
2003; Frankel 2000). The apparent disconnect between democracy and liberal 
philosophical precepts in Indian politics would not strike most political theorists and 
historians of ideas and particularly puzzling. “Democracy” has historically been 
understood as the “rule of the many” (often interpreted as the majority) while the 
freedom of expression, understood as part of a larger liberal political project, is 
concerned with the protection of the individual from tyranny, whether of arbitrary 
government or the majority. In the realm of ideas, then, liberalism and democracy 
seem to be in fundamental tension with each other.  
However, it is hard to imagine democratic institutions functioning effectively 
in the absence of the freedom of speech. This particular civil liberty is consequently 
deemed to be essential to the emergence and entrenchment of political pluralism or 
“polyarchy” as conceptualized by theorists like Robert Dahl (1971). It is for precisely 
this reason that even minimalist conceptions of democracy in empirical political 
science include the freedom of speech and expression as a key indicator of democratic 
consolidation (See Diamond 1999; Reuschemeyer, Stevens and Stevens 1992; Collier 
and Levitsky 1997; Diamond and Plattner 2001). A growing body of work by scholars 
like Fareed Zakaria (1997; 2003), Russel Bova (2001), and Larry Diamond (1999) has 
concerned itself with the reasons for the rise of “illiberal democracy”. The question of 
the conditions under which plural democracies or established “polyarchies” do or do 
not protect the freedom of speech is therefore of significance to anyone concerned 
with the larger question of the conditions under which the “liberal-democratic project” 
may begin to unravel. 
4 
 
Commentators frequently suggest that India is going through an “Age of 
Intolerance”. As prominent political columnist, Vir Sanghvi, noted in a column in the 
English language daily, Hindustan Times:  
“such is the climate of intolerance in today‟s India that it is almost impossible 
to write a book or make a movie without having to cope with a mob of 
protestors who claim that you have offended their 
community/caste/religion/region/ city/ grandparents/favourite pets.”6 
There is a dearth of good data on censorship in India, but over the approximately 15 
months that this author was in the field, there were 69 censorship events reported in 
four Mumbai newspapers alone. That is an average of just over one censorship event a 
week.
7
 The lack of data suggests the use of caution when making any trend statements, 
although suggestions have been made that the country is witnessing a “growing 
tendency of intolerance”, a sense which is heightened in light of a large number of 
instances of “mob censorship” in recent years. 8 But regardless of whether the 
incidence of censorship and intolerance is increasing or not, what is evident is that 
deepening democracy has certainly not led to the repeal of the numerous laws in India 
                                                          
6
 “Age of Intolerance” by Vir Sanghvi in Sunday Hindustan Times, Mumbai, February 17, 2008, page 
10. 
7
 See Appendix A for a list of events. A “censorship event” is defined as either a government or state 
agency placing an official ban on a book or film; or mob action such as an attack either on individuals 
like authors, journalists or artists, or on movie halls, newspaper offices, etc. It is important to note that 
this is likely to be a conservative estimate for two reasons: First, the data was collected from only four 
newspapers in the city of Mumbai: The Times of India; The Hindustan Times; The Mumbai Mirror; and 
The Sunday Express. A lot of events taking place in other parts of the country may well have been 
ignored by the Mumbai press. Second, “censorship” has been very narrowly defined here as attacks on 
creative expression. The appendix does not include cases of laws in states restricting religious 
conversions; mob attacks on couples in inter-faith marriages or on individuals converting their religion; 
legal restrictions on women working “night shifts”; attacks on “Dalits” or former untouchables in the 
Hindu caste hierarchy; and numerous laws restricting nightlife in cities like Mumbai and Bangalore, all 
of which were instituted between May 2007 and July 2008. Needless to say, a more expansive 
definition of censorship would increase the length of the list considerably.  
8
 Supreme Court of India Justice Markandey Katju, quoted in “Growing Intolerance” by Soli Sorabjee, 
in the Sunday Express, pg. 7, March 30, 2008. Also, see Zakaria (2003), page 106.  
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that facilitate state censorship, many of which date from the colonial era.
9
 In fact, 
since the 1980s, new censorship rules and laws have been formulated, such as the 
Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act of 1986 which expanded the 
censorship powers of the state, this time to prevent “insults” to “the dignity of women” 
from the publication of “obscene” images.   
Controversies around the alleged offensiveness of books or films in India 
sometimes elicit the quip: “it‟s all politics”. This project is an attempt to understand 
how claims of offense and censorship came to be such an integral part of Indian 
politics. How can we explain the apparent persistence of illiberalism in the wake of 
India‟s deepening democracy?  
In the pages that follow, it will be argued that the reason why censorship has 
persisted (and possibly even broadened its scope) in India is that having the “right to 
censor” has been established as a sign of a cultural group‟s substantive political 
empowerment in the Indian constitutional order‟s particular negotiation of socio-
cultural diversity. Consequently, seeking offense has come to be seen by political 
entrepreneurs as a particularly efficacious strategy through which to demonstrate the 




                                                          
9
 These are Sections of the Indian Penal Code, in particular S.144, dealing with seditious materials; 
S.153A, dealing with speech or written materials with the tendency to incite hatred or violence; S. 292, 
dealing with obscenity; and 295A dealing with the the incitement of religious hatred. Also, Section 95 
of the Criminal Procedure Code, which authorizes the state to preemptively impound materials that it 
thinks are likely to disrupt public order and morality. These will all be discussed in greater detail in later 
chapters.   
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The Role of Censorship in Identity Politics: A Quest for Explanations 
It is one of the contentions of this project that one of the reasons why 
censorship has persisted in India despite deepening democracy is that demanding 
censorship of offensive materials has come to be an important strategy for political 
entrepreneurs seeking to make a mark in an increasingly competitive electoral arena. 
To the extent that one accepts the argument that censorship in India is an integral part 
of democratic identity politics, the notion that India may be going through an “age of 
intolerance” would not strike many scholars of Indian politics as particularly 
surprising. As Peter de Souza and E. Sridharan put it: “The tendency toward centrism 
no longer exists as strongly as it did earlier. Parties are no longer shy of being 
explicitly based on ascriptive identities…more „ethnicized‟ and more „extreme‟ in 
terms of ethnic outbidding or upping the ante …” (de Souza and Sridharan 2006, 26). 
Political extremism in India is frequently attributed to the proliferation of weakly 
organized political parties, increasing political competition, and the inability of the 
state to meet the growing demands on its limited resources (Kohli 1990). However, 
this literature is relatively silent on the question of why ethnic appeals with a 
particularly illiberal content – namely, the demand for the restriction of free 
expression – would come to be deployed as part of political strategy in democratic 
politics.  
This question is significant given the apparent variation across democratic 
countries with respect to the use of illiberal electoral appeals in the wake of political 
competition. For instance, Michael Coppedge (1993) has noted that increasing 
electoral competition in countries like Mexico led local political strongmen to show 
far greater respect for individual rights. Similarly, writing about indigenous political 
parties in Latin America, Donna Lee Van Cott (2005) notes that these parties have 
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brought new issues such as “the value of recognizing and respecting cultural diversity” 
onto the agenda, even as they have tended to moderate their demands over time (Van 
Cott 2005, 228-229). The association between increasing political competition, 
identity politics, and illiberal political appeals is consequently not as obvious as one 
might expect. So how can we explain the deployment of illiberal political demands in 
democratic identity politics in India?  
The search for a satisfactory answer to this question is complicated further by 
the fact that identity politics in India, as in most poor democracies, is often described 
as being organized along clientelistic exchanges of material resources. India is 
frequently described as an example of “patronage democracy”, a type of democratic 
regime in which politicians and voters engage in an exchange of favors: voters elect 
“patrons” into office on the condition that they will provide them with access to 
“patronage” –  jobs, services, or other material resources – in return (See Kitschelt and 
Wilkinson 2007; and Chandra 2004). Such “clientelistic” relationships are deemed to 
be particularly conducive to ethnic mobilization as, under conditions of incomplete 
information, an individual‟s ascriptive identity becomes a basis upon which to 
establish trust. In such contexts, as competition for office increases, political 
entrepreneurs are expected to “employ every imaginable strategy of attracting 
constituencies, subject to a general budget constraint” (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, 
32-33).  
And yet, this association between clientelistic patterns of politics and ethnic 
extremism does not appear to be so obvious when we look at the broader literature in 
comparative politics. For instance, J.K. Birnir (2007) suggests that identity-based 
politics may serve to stabilize democracy in the longer-term by serving to socialize 
new citizens into the democratic political process. Similarly, Eric McLaughlin (2007) 
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notes that although voting in South Africa frequently takes place along ethnic 
cleavages, it is, more often than not, “ethnically benign” taking place without the 
active generation or fanning of animosities (McLauglin 2007, 451).   
Further, even if one were to assume that the relationship between clientelism 
and extremism was everywhere evident, this does not tell us very much about why 
particular kinds of ethnic demands – namely, symbolic or emotional appeals rather 
than material appeals – come to be deployed in the arena of identity politics over 
others. It is significant that the literature on ethnic clientelism and patronage 
democracy assumes that ethnic identification on the part of both voters as well as 
politicians in primarily instrumental. As Kanchan Chandra notes, identity is 
“not…valuable in itself” (Chandra 2004, 11). Ethnic appeals are expected to “work” 
only when they include explicit references to distributive issues (Wantchekon 2003) 
and voters are expected to identify with groups strategically, based upon calculations 
of which particular grouping is likely to reap the largest material benefits (Posner 
2007). In such a context, making a demand for the censorship of an offensive book or 
film is not expected to be particularly efficacious, given that it does not contain any 
explicit reference to distributive issues.  
Although the phenomenon of censorship in India has received relatively scant 
attention in the literature on Indian politics, a spate of high-profile censorship events 
since the 1990s has led some scholars to pay attention to the issue. The first and most 
widely accepted explanation for the contemporary incidence of censorship in India is 
the rise of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party [Indian People‟s Party (BJP)] 
since the mid 1980s. For instance, Nandana Bose (2009) notes that “The 1990s was 
marked by a gradual alignment of the right-wing nationalist agenda with the 
historically existing regulatory concerns of the state over the deleterious „effects‟ of 
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cinema on vulnerable audience, resulting in an unprecedented „censor wave‟” (Bose 
2009, 22). However, such accounts ignore the fact that it is not only Hindu nationalist 
groups who demand censorship in India. As the opening section of this chapter 
showed, the ideological range of the actors who demand censorship in the wake of 
offense is broad indeed, suggesting the need for a more encompassing explanation of 
the phenomenon. 
Arguments such as those made by Bose are part of a larger body of work that 
tie the rise of the “right-wing nationalist agenda” to contemporary social and 
economic trends associated with globalization, such as the spread of satellite television 
(For example, see Oza 2006). So Ratna Kapur (2001), for instance, notes that 
“contemporary cultural controversies” precipitated by women‟s “sexual assertion” are 
the reason why “hysteria about culture is sweeping the country. Everywhere cries of 
Indian cultural values being in danger are heard” (Kapur 2001, 337). But such 
accounts ignore the fact that what qualifies in policymakers‟ minds as “sexual 
assertion” has changed drastically over time; for instance, many of India‟s first 
parliamentarians in 1953 condemned the depiction of “village belles…going round the 
well singing love songs” in Hindi language movies at the time as being “obscene” and 
against Indian cultural values.
10
 In short, scholars like Kapur neglect the fact that what 
qualifies as “sexual assertion” is, in effect, entirely relative and time-dependent and 
cannot be said to be a feature of the contemporary era alone.  
However, the biggest problem with existing studies of censorship is the 
relatively scant attention they pay to the history of the phenomenon in India. For 
instance, they neglect the work by scholars like Charu Gupta (2000) who have 
demonstrated that similar “moral panics” and demands for censorship took place quite 
                                                          
10
 Violet Alva, Member of the Rajya Sabha [the Upper House of Parliament], in Council of States. 
Official Report. Vol III No. 37. Tuesday, April 28, 1953, pp 4265-4266. 
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frequently in India as early as the 19
th
 century. Even when scholars do acknowledge 
the long-standing practice of censorship in India, their focus has generally been on 
censorship in the contemporary era, thereby neglecting the larger questions of how and 
why the censorship demand came to be a part democratic political strategizing in 
India. The long history of censorship in India‟s democratic history is significant 
because it points to the need for a more deep-rooted explanation that an exclusive 
focus on the contemporary manifestations of the phenomenon cannot adequately 
address. Although the contemporary incidence of censorship demands may well be 
precipitated by proximate factors, the fact that these demands are regularly 
acknowledged by incumbent elites as worthy of redress suggests that they enjoy a 
degree of political legitimacy and resonance in democratic politics that cannot be 
explained merely with reference to proximate factors alone.  
 
From Political Culture to Political Strategy: The Strategic Uses of Illiberalism  
Scholars like Bova (2001), Zakaria (1997) and Diamond (1999) who study 
questions relating to the correspondence between liberalism and democracy cross-
nationally, have tended to explain persistent illiberalism in younger democracies by 
referring to some version of arguments about their “political culture”. In his “large-N” 
analysis, for instance, Bova finds that the association of political pluralism with the 
protection of individual liberty is contextual, dependent upon “the specific cultural 
context of the West”, where “the Enlightenment emphasis on natural rights, the 
individual and liberty” is most highly developed and entrenched (Bova 2001, 66-67).  
But Bova‟s argument displays a long-standing weakness of cultural arguments 
more broadly in that it does not explicitly point to where one ought to look to find a 
11 
 
country‟s political culture. His argument appears to refer to relatively enduring 
psychological proclivities held by all (or at least a majority of) individuals within a 
particular polity. However, as the work of scholars like Rogers Smith (1993) amply 
demonstrates with respect to that most “liberal” of states, the United States, such an 
assumption is extremely problematic. Indeed, a historically sensitive analysis of the 
process by which Enlightenment ideas arose in Europe would likely find that these 
ideas have never gone unchallenged or uncontested and, till today, coexist with strong 
communitarian tendencies in many European countries. Notably, Bova refers 
specifically to India as exemplifying the liberal shortfall in a consolidated democracy 
in the non-Western world and attributes this primarily to its “deeply rooted culture” 
(Bova 2001, 73). And yet as Amartya Sen (2005) has demonstrated, India has had a 
long tradition of tolerance and respect for cultural dissent.  
A blanket assumption about the illiberalism of Indian political culture on issues 
relating to free expression also glosses over the significant intra-country variation on 
the issue in the contemporary era. Censorship in India frequently appears to be random 
and arbitrary, rather than a manifestation of a uniformly and systematically illiberal 
political culture. So a Hindi language film titled Lajja [Shame], released in 2001, 
which contained a number of dialogues and scenes with which Hindu nationalists 
would be expected to take substantial issue with only elicited a protest in one city in 
India, Bhopal, even as prominent members of the Hindu nationalist government in 
New Delhi at the time were reported to be making plans to attend a screening of the 
film to celebrate the end of the parliamentary session.
11
 Similarly, the Shiv Sena 
                                                          
11
 Lajja included a scathing critique of the character of the Hindu deity Ram and his behavior towards 
his wife Sita in the epic Ramayana. Ram has been an important symbol around which the Hindu 
nationalists have mobilized violent agitations since the 1980s. See “Cake with the icing” in The 
Telegraph online, September 2, 2001. Available online at: 
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1010902/editoria.htm. Last accessed on: April 17, 2009. Also, “Protest 
against Lajja” in The Hindu, September 4, 2001. Available online at: 
http://www.hindu.com/2001/09/04/stories/0104000g.htm. Last accessed on: April 17, 2009.  
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[Shivaji‟s Army], a neo-fascist party based primarily in the western state of 
Maharashtra vandalized a movie theater screening the Oscar winning film Slumdog 
Millionaire for its apparent insult to Hindus in early 2009 only in the small 
neighboring state of Goa.
12
 Further, some censorship events such as the arrest of a 
student-artist in the city of Vadodara in 2007
13
 and the more recent attack on the home 
of a prominent journalist in the city of Thane near Mumbai spurred some high profile 
protests in the city.
14
 
This is not to suggest that Bova‟s argument is wrong. Indeed, a number of 
scholars have pointed to India as an “outlier” among “consolidated” democracies 
when it comes to the protection of liberal freedoms.
15
 But this is to suggest that rather 
than relying on essentialist arguments about a society‟s political culture, closer 
attention needs to be paid to the conditions under which liberal (or illiberal) strands of 
a country‟s political culture are more or less likely to triumph in politics. 
One of the most significant shortcomings of political cultural arguments is that 
a society‟s cultural-psychological proclivities are often described ex-post, imputed 
from political outcomes and policies, thereby neglecting the politics and the process 
by which governments come to adopt illiberal (or liberal) policies. Analyses like 
                                                          
12
 See “Shiv Sena protests screening of Slumdog Millionaire” in Daily News and Analysis online, 
January 23, 2009. Available online at: http://www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?newsid=1224434. Last 
accessed on: April 17, 2009.  
13
 See “Moral Police Hit Vadodara, Art Student Lands in Jail” in Hindustan Times, May 11, 2007. 
Available online at: http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/StoryPage.aspx?id=8f2213c7-4b12-
4e48-9b7c-40302cd7a968&&Headline=Vadodara+art+student+lands+in+jail. Last Accessed on: July 9, 
2009. 
14
 See “Scribes protest sedition charge against editor, Loksatta attack” in The Indian Express, June 13, 
2008. Available online at: http://www.expressindia.com/latest-news/Scribes-protest-sedition-charge-
against-editor-Loksatta-attack/322379/. Last Accessed on: July 9, 2009.  
15
 The country‟s relatively weak performance with respect to the protection of individual liberties has 
been noted by a number of scholars such as Diamond (1999) and Beer and Mitchell (2006), although 
this body of work tends to attribute this to human rights abuses in politically unstable parts of the 




Bova‟s, in effect, assume that non-western democracies lack any substantive pluralism 
because all individuals and groups within these countries are assumed to agree on 
some underlying less-than-liberal principles; an assumption that is neither theoretically 
sound nor empirically substantiated.  
It would be entirely unrealistic to assume that all groups within a plural society 
share liberal (or illiberal) values. Indeed, nothing in the literature on pluralism would 
lead us to this assumption. Theories of political pluralism assume that groups, both 
liberal and illiberal, compete for political influence within the context of democratic 
institutions. The question, however, is when and why particular kinds of groups and 
particular kinds of political demands are more likely to dictate policy than others. 
Why, for instance, did pro-censorship feminists in India manage to get parliament to 
pass a stricter censorship law in the mid 1980s, while their anti-censorship 
counterparts failed to get a hearing?  Answering such questions does not require that 
we dismiss political culture arguments altogether. However, it does require that we 
add nuance to such arguments by being more sensitive to the question of why 
particular kinds of demands and causes acquire greater political potency in particular 
democratic contexts than others.  
A growing body of literature has begun to look at “cultures of rights” across 
different democratic countries, seeking to understand “why certain actors and frames 
are more prominent in public discourse than others” (Ferrée, Gamson et al 2002, pp 
62). Scholars like Manfred Berg and Martin Geyer (2002) and Ian Shapiro (1986) 
have suggested that “rights talk” has to appeal to “„an objective moral order‟ that 
confers legitimacy on the claims made by individuals or social groups” (Berg and 
Geyer 2002, 4) and that questions inherent in such “rights talk” such as who is entitled 
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to what and on what basis all depend upon making an appeal to “some conception of 
the good” (Shapiro 1986, 16-17).  
The idea that certain kinds of appeals carry more political currency than others, 
and may therefore be drawn on strategically by actors seeking access to the corridors 
of power, builds upon arguments made by authors like Ann Swidler (1989) who 
conceived of “culture” as providing political actors with a “tool kit” of “strategies of 
action” rather than merely defining the ends they pursue. For Swidler, according to 
this conceptualization, (political) culture “does not influence how groups organize 
action via enduring psychological proclivities implanted in individuals by their 
socialization.  Instead, publicly available meanings facilitate certain patterns of action, 
making them readily available, while discouraging others” (Swidler 1989, 283). For 
instance, when a women‟s rights activist in Mumbai was asked why she thought pro-
censorship feminists won out against their anti-censorship counterparts in the 1980s, 
she noted that in Indian politics appeals to morality always triumph.
16
 
This reconceptualization of (political) culture as a source of strategies of 
political action rather than an enduring psychological proclivity gets us away from the 
essentializing tendencies of much of the literature on political culture more broadly 
conceived. But it still leaves us with questions about where we ought to begin our 
search for these “cultures of rights.” Even if one was to agree that different states 
evolve different “cultures of rights” which provide political actors with different 
“strategies of action”, where might these “tool kits” of strategies come from?  
 
Constitutions and Cultures of Rights: The Rushdie Puzzle  
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There is a consensus within the literature in comparative politics that 
democratic institutions and in particular formal constitutional arrangements contribute 
to long-term democratic stability (For instance, see Reynolds 2002; Lijphart 1999; 
Weingast 1997). Specific electoral institutions for power sharing, for instance, are 
thought to create incentives for politicians in ethnically divided societies to be more 
willing to work within the democratic framework. Building on this literature, this 
project argues that, in a long-standing democracy, the “culture of rights” underlying 
these constitutions may also shape the content of demands or electoral appeals that 
appear in democratic politics; that is, the philosophical principles embodied in 
constitutional documents may shape the praxes of politics in long-standing, or 
“consolidated” democracies. 
It is useful here to go back to the pattern of protest and censorship of The 
Satanic Verses with which this chapter began. It was noted that India, Britain and the 
United States all witnessed extensive protest by Muslim groups against the book‟s 
blasphemy. However, this apparent cross-country demonstration of Muslim anger 
against Rushdie‟s blasphemy masks at least one important and under-appreciated 
difference in the way the controversy played out in these three democracies. This 
refers in particular to the demands that Muslims voiced across these cases. While 
Muslims in the UK and India had demanded that their respective governments impose 
a blanket ban on the book, the Muslims who protested in New York City had a very 
different set of demands. One of the organizers of the protests said that the protesters 
had three basic demands:  
''We want to recall the book from the market. We want an unqualified public 
apology from the author and publisher to the Muslim community. And we 
16 
 




Why did offended Muslim minorities demand government action in the United 
Kingdom and India to protect their faith from blasphemous writings, while only 
directing their demands to publishers and bookstores in the United States? This 
question, reframed, asks why one particular minority group that wanted one particular 
blasphemous book to disappear, articulated this demand very differently across 
national borders.  
The different articulations of censorship demands across the United States, the 
United Kingdom and India align in interesting ways with these countries‟ particular 
constitutional prescriptions regarding free expression and protection of religious 
groups from blasphemy. It is, of course, well known that that the Constitution of the 
United States strictly prohibits government restrictions on free speech and, as Stephen 
Feldman (2008) has noted, the Supreme Court has itself taken an increasingly liberal 
position on the issue since the 1940s.
18
 Censorship of books and works of art in the 
United States has typically been local and has tended to take the form of community 
exclusion of offensive works from local public libraries.  In contrast, Muslim demands 
for government intervention in the United Kingdom can only be understood in light of 
the fact that the country had a common law statute that gave the state the power to 
prosecute blasphemy against the Anglican Church until as late as 2008, one that had 
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last been upheld in a court case as late as 1977.
19
 There were no equivalent protections 
granted to minority religions in the United Kingdom. For Muslims, the demand for a 
ban quickly became part of a larger demand for the creation of a similar law protecting 
Islam from blasphemy.  
Similarly, India, as this project will demonstrate, has had a long tradition of 
state action in the proscription of offensive writings and films.
20
 This is manifest in 
laws like Section 295 of the Indian Penal Code, which makes any speech, writing or 
representation that is intended to “outrage the religious feelings of a group” by 
“insulting its religion or religious beliefs” punishable with up to three years in prison. 
It is also more broadly evident in the expansive Article 29 of the Indian Constitution 
which grants to “any section of citizens…having a distinct language, script, or culture 
of its own…the right to conserve the same”.21 Echoing these constitutional norms, 
Syed Shahabuddin, the Indian Member of Parliament who had first demanded a ban 
on The Satanic Verses noted in an open letter to Rusdhie that the government in India 
was “the custodian of the dignity of all our people”.22  
What this cursory, cross-country examination suggests is that the ways in 
which Muslims within these different countries understood the role of the state in the 
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proscription of offensive writings, as well as the ways in which the elites in control of 
the states in question understood these roles, are mirrored in each country‟s 
constitutional ideas regarding the protection of free expression, the protection of 
religious groups and the role of the state in their realization, pointing to the potential 
utility of a closer analysis of how the ideas embodied in democratic constitutions may 
shape patterns of political action. The pattern of Muslim protest against The Satanic 
Verses suggests that in established democracies, constitutions and constitutional law 
may be good places to begin our search for  “cultures of rights” and may serve as the 
source of what Swidler (1989, 283) called “publicly available meanings [which] 
facilitate certain patterns of action, making them readily available, while discouraging 
others.” 
 
Multicultural Arrangements as Tool-Kits of Strategies  
The Rushdie affair is merely one manifestation of a broader challenge that 
confronts the vast majority of democracies in the world today, namely, the need to 
accommodate socio-cultural diversity. In the decades since the end of World War II, 
democracies all over the world have been forced to confront the challenges posed by 
growing social and cultural diversity within states that were created for the purpose of 
giving expression to the political will of allegedly distinct and homogeneous nations. 
Demands for civil rights, equal status before the law, and cultural sensitivity made by 
groups that were not traditionally defined as a part of the “nation” have featured 
prominently in the politics of countries across the western world. For liberal 
democratic regimes in the advanced industrial countries of Europe and North America, 
the negotiation of difference required a fundamental re-thinking of the liberal 
philosophical foundations that these polities were ostensibly built upon. Increasing 
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diversity has forced countries like France, for instance, to confront questions 
concerning the extent to which this “liberal” state actually supports its citizens‟ 
freedom of religion or genuinely views its citizens as equal regardless of race.   
The Rushdie Affair embodies precisely this tension, illustrating the ways in 
which different liberal democracies go to different lengths to accommodate the 
demands of religious and cultural minorities, particularly when it comes to placing 
restrictions on the freedom of expression of their citizens. Karen Bird (2000), for 
instance, notes that the United States and France have gone to very different lengths to 
limit “hate speech” targeted at minority groups, depending upon whether the states 
have a history of the promotion of substantive equality. Ruud Koopmans and Paul 
Statham (1999), in a more broadly conceived study, classify European democracies 
according to their particular “citizenship regimes,” based on whether citizenship rights 
in the polities concerned are based on blood or territory and whether they are 
assimilationist or pluralist in their responses to cultural diversity (Koopmans and 
Statham 1999, 660-661).   
However, as Will Kymlicka (1996, 6) notes, western democracies, in which 
socio-cultural diversity was at least in part the result of voluntary immigration, may 
not feel as compelled to accommodate cultural demands, as many of the world‟s 
younger democracies that emerged out of colonialism in the wake of World War II as 
“multinational states” with high levels of diversity already existent within their 
borders. These new polities were, from their very inception, socially and culturally 
diverse, a fact that posed a number of challenges to the political stability of states that 
often already faced organizational and financial weaknesses. Needless to say, these 
countries have had a very different negotiation with cultural diversity. The challenges 
that diversity posed to political stability were multiplied in those countries which 
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attempted to institute democratic regimes as they transitioned out of colonial rule. The 
resulting rarity of democracy in the post-colonial world led scholars like Dahl to note 
that “sub-cultural pluralism” or socio-cultural heterogeneity poses one of the greatest 
challenges to long-term stability of polyarchy (Dahl 1971, 108), and has fostered a 
large body of literature that seeks to provide “models” for new polities seeking to 
establish democratic regimes in the face of social and cultural diversity (Lijphart 1999; 
Reynolds 2002).  
Much of the literature has concluded that a lot hinges on the ways in which 
democratic states “manage” their diversity, with some institutional arrangements being 
thought to be more conducive to democratic stability and consolidation than others 
(For instance, see Dahl 1971, Lijphart 1999, Reynolds 2002, etc). But, institutional 
stability is, in its turn, likely to produce a particular kind of “rights talk” and a 
particular “tool kit” of strategies as certain norms come to be established as having the 
“authority of habit, normality and common sense” (Swidler 1989, 281). The longer a 
culturally diverse polyarchy survives with a particular institutional arrangement, the 
more likely it is that its constitutional order will give rise to a particular kind of “rights 
talk.” In line with such arguments, this project argues that the censorship demand that 
is deployed so frequently as a strategy in Indian politics is a manifestation of the 
country‟s particular response to its socio-cultural diversity. 
Democratic regimes have tended to be classified as either “liberal” or 
“consociational”, depending upon whether, as in the latter category, constitutional 
arrangements explicitly decentralize authority to constituent ethnic or cultural groups 
within state borders. However, scholars have acknowledged that the reality is 
significantly messier, with some, like Sammy Smooha (2001) recommending the 
addition of two new categories: the first is the “multicultural democracy”, in which 
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“minorities are granted minimal collective rights to preserve their cultural heritage and 
to use their languages in schools and other public bodies” (Smooha 2001, 16) with the 
United Kingdom, South Africa and the Netherlands as examples; the second is the 
“ethnic democracy” which institutionalizes the dominance of one ethnic group, with 
Israel and some of the Baltic states like Latvia and Estonia being examples. 
The current project‟s concern with questions of censorship leads to a particular 
focus on the classification of democracies based on the relative prioritization of the 
rights of groups and those of individuals in their negotiation of diversity: to what 
extent are cultural groups permitted to place restrictions on individual liberties in the 
interest of group preservation within any given multicultural arrangement?  
This project draws on a distinction made by Andrea Baumeister (2000) 
between thin and thick forms of multiculturalism. According to Baumeister, thin 
multiculturalism is an arrangement under which cultural groups are granted rights to 
cultural preservation, but are not allowed to coerce individual members in order to do 
so. That is to say, individual must acquiesce voluntarily to a group‟s cultural norms 
and always have the option to leave or defect. By contrast, thick multiculturalism is an 
arrangement under which cultural groups are entitled to place restrictions on the 
autonomy of their members in the interest of the groups‟ cultural protection, with 
direct or indirect facilitation by the state.  This project argues that India‟s multicultural 
arrangement is primarily thick multicultural. This thick multiculturalism is embodied 
in Article 29 of India‟s Constitution which grants extensive group rights to cultural 
protection to “any section of citizens…with a language, script or culture of its own.” 
As will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five, there is strong evidence to 
suggest that India‟s founders conceived of these cultural rights as entitling minority 
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cultural groups to restrict the autonomy of individual members in the interest of 
cultural preservation.  
However, Baumeister‟s distinction between thin and thick multiculturalism 
does not capture another aspect of India‟s multicultural arrangement. More 
specifically, India‟s negotiation of cultural diversity also contains elements of what 
this project will refer to as “Gandhian multiculturalism”: the notion that all 
individuals, regardless of group membership, ought to accept limits on their autonomy 
out of respect for all groups‟ cultural sentiments.  It is probably best to quote Gandhi 
himself when thinking about what exactly Gandhian multiculturalism entailed: 
“The unity we all desire will only last if we cultivate a yielding and a 
charitable disposition towards one another. The cow is as dear as life to a 
Hindu; the Mussalman [Muslim] should, therefore, voluntarily accommodate 
his Hindu brother. Silence at his prayer is a precious thing for a 
Mussalman.Every Hindu should voluntarily respect his brother‟s sentiment. 
This, however, is a counsel for perfection. There are nasty Hindus as there are 
nasty Mussalmans who would pick a quarrel for nothing. For these, we must 
provide Panchayats [village governments] of unimpeachable probity and 
imperturbability whose decisions must be binding on both parties. Public 
opinion should be cultivated in favour of the decisions of such Panchayats so 
that no one would question them”23 
Notably, however, Gandhian multicultural entitlements were not granted to all groups 
equally. What is particularly interesting about the preceding quote from Gandhi is that 
it granted these rights to the respect of group sentiment only to Hindus and Muslims. 
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This is partly because of the context in which Gandhi wrote these words, given the 
increasing tensions at the time between India‟s two largest religious groups and 
Gandhi‟s own attempts to build a cross-religious coalition to challenge British 
authority. One of Gandhi‟s earliest articulations of a multicultural accommodation of 
cultural sentiment for Indian society was, therefore, shaped decisively by his own 
political interests, as well as his perceptions about which groups posed the greatest 
threat to peace and unity in India. In short, the Gandhian multicultural arrangement 
was inherently informal, based on particularlistic and contextual accommodations of 
difference rather than universalist precepts.   
It is one of the contentions of this project that this particularistic 
accommodation of groups‟ cultural concerns has had significant effects for democratic 
politics in the country since independence. However, the informality of the Gandhian 
multicultural arrangement does not make it unique. For scholars like Pierre van den 
Berghe (2002), “multicultural democracy” is by definition an informal negotiation 
between state elites and cultural groups and what sets it apart from the consociational 
model is the fact that it seeks to accommodate cultural differences “without making it 
official” (van den Berghe 2002, 438). A growing body of literature in comparative 
politics has begun to distinguish between formal and informal institutions, arguing that 
informal institutional arrangements, conceived of as particularistic arrangements 
(O‟Donnell 2001) and “socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, 
communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels” (Helmke and 
Levitsky 2004, 727), often play a decisive role in shaping political outcomes.
24
 This 
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distinction between the formal and the informal is relevant and decisive for the 
argument being made in this project.   
This disjunction between formal principles and informal practice that is a 
feature of India‟s multicultural negotiation was particularly evident in the country‟s 
censorship policy. As will be demonstrated in Chapter Six, the Gandhian multicultural 
“right to censor” was not granted equally to all groups in practice. Rather, in the early 
years after India‟s independence this right was reserved for the politically dominant 
Hindu revivalist elites, who sought to preserve and rejuvenate India’s “superior” 
culture and civilization through the creation of censorship rules consistent with their 
“cultural sentiments”. The fact that censorship was, in principle, conducted in the 
name of Indian, rather than Hindu, cultural sentiment is significant. It meant that 
politically dominant groups were granted the right to determine what was and was not 
consistent with “Indian culture”.  
Consequently, in India, censorship out of respect for a group‟s cultural 
sentiment in effect is a manifestation of that group‟s substantive political 
empowerment and the acceptance as an equal stakeholder in the “Indian” cultural 
community. Neglect of a group‟s cultural sentiment, on the other hand, could be taken 
as a mark of their disempowerment and political marginalization. In sum, although the 
claim of offense does not contain any direct reference to material or distributional 
issues – those driving forces, according to the literature, of voter choice – it does imply 
that the offended group has been neglected by those in power. It is precisely for this 
reason that seeking offense has come to be seen as a particularly potent political 




Methodology and Chapter Outlines 
India forms the focus of this project primarily because it is frequently referred 
to in the relevant literature as either representative of the liberal shortfall among non-
western democracies or as an “outlier” among established or consolidated democracies 
on its human rights record (Beer and Mitchell 2006; Diamond 1999; Bova 2001). The 
nature of the questions being asked as well as the lack of well-kept records of bans 
across India‟s states has meant that this project uses an exclusively qualitative 
methodological strategy. The sources of data and evidence include electoral data, 
archival materials dealing with the constitution-making process, debates within India‟s 
parliament, judgments of India‟s Supreme Court on civil liberties cases, newspaper 
reports about particular censorship events, the writings, personal recollections and 
biographies of important political figures, and thirty eight one-on-one interviews with 
members of political parties, journalists, filmmakers, social activists and members of 
India‟s “censor board” among others collected during fourteen months of fieldwork. 
The ways in which these data sources have been used will be discussed in greater 
length in the chapter outlines below.  
As was mentioned previously, the regular deployment of symbolic appeals in 
the Indian electoral arena poses a particular puzzle for theories of patronage 
democracy, given that voting patterns in these models are understood to be determined 
exclusively by material considerations. But if that is the case, why do politicians in 
India deploy the claim of offense so frequently? Chapter Two titled “The Role of 
Symbolism in Patronage Democracy” draws on interview data with politicians and 
activists to understand their own reasons for the deployment of the claim of offense in 
the political arena. Based on one-on-one interviews and an examination of media 
reports of two censorship cases, the chapter proposes four “hypotheses” regarding the 
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political uses of the symbolic demand in a patronage democracy: In particular, it 
argues that symbolic appeals serve as substitutes as well as complements for the 
disbursal of patronage, useful to all political parties to signal their credibility as future 
providers of patronage to their clients. Second, the chapter argues that mobilizing 
party cadres around emotional issues provides India‟s personalistic political parties 
with a way to maintain their attachment to the party despite weak internal 
organizations. Finally, it argues that for under-represented groups seeking to enter into 
a clientelistic relationship, mobilizing against offensive materials allows them to 
signal their credibility as a vote bank for politicians.  
Chapter Three titled “Uncovering the Patterns of Offensiveness: The Case of 
Aaja Nachle” is an attempt to see whether the hypotheses developed in the previous 
chapter can shed some light on the patterns of censorship in the controversy 
surrounding the Bollywood musical Aaja Nachle in late 2007. Notably, the film was 
only banned in three of India‟s thirty two states and Union Territories, raising 
questions about the reasons for this variation. Through an examination of electoral 
data and media reports, this chapter argues that the pattern of variation appears to be 
largely consistent with the hypotheses in Chapter Two. However, contrary to 
expectations, high levels of anti-incumbency alone do not determine incumbent action. 
Rather, the intensity of competition for the vote of the offended group appears to be 
decisive.  
The rest of the chapters address the larger concern of the project with the 
question of how a particular kind of symbolic appeal, namely the claim of offense, has 
come to be a part of the available tool-kit of strategies in democratic identity politics 
in India. As was mentioned previously, it is one of the contentions of this project that a 
long-standing democracy‟s negotiation of diversity, as manifest in its constitutional 
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order, is an ideal place to begin an examination of its praxes of identity politics. 
However, constitutions are themselves products of particular historical, social, and 
political contexts and are not objectively determined statements of principle.  
Chapter Four, therefore, seeks to place India‟s constitutional order in a broader 
political historical perspective. In particular, it traces the development of India‟s 
national movement and its political strategies over the sixty years of active politics 
that preceded Indian independence in 1947. The chapter argues that as early as the first 
decade of the twentieth century, the anti-colonial political space came to be 
monopolized by cultural revivalists and the social orthodoxy. By 1947, Hindu cultural 
revivalism, a set of ideas which sought to reclaim a lost authentic Hindu past through 
the moral regeneration of Hindu society, had come to be entrenched in Indian politics. 
This was buttressed by strategies used by Congress leaders like Mahatma Gandhi 
which explicitly subordinated the freedoms of individuals to broader cultural and 
spiritual concerns with the revival of Indian civilization as well as the “sentiments” of 
religious groups, in line with the emerging discourse of “Indian secularism”. By the 
time of Indian independence, Congress strategies of appealing to cultural revivalist 
sentiment seem to be so firmly entrenched that even its class competitors, such as the 
Communist Party of India and the regionally concentrated Justice Party began to adopt 
and adapt these strategies in their attempts to compete with the Congress juggernaut. 
Strategies that are in evidence in contemporary Indian politics were also in evidence in 
the pre-independence era, demonstrating one of the broader areas of continuity across 
these periods. 
Chapter Five, titled “Revivalism, Riot and Realpolitik: Negotiating Diversity 
at India‟s Founding” is an attempt to understand the source of India‟s particular 
multicultural arrangement as manifest in the proceedings, documents and 
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communications of the Constituent Assembly of India, which met between May 1946 
and December 1949. The chapter suggests that the partition of the subcontinent had a 
profound impact of the content of India‟s constitution, leading India‟s founders to 
place tougher restrictions of individual liberties while also making them more cautious 
and pragmatic in their dealings with religious minorities. In particular, it makes the 
following arguments: First, in the wake of partition, individual liberties were severely 
compromised and made subject to law as laid out by legislative majorities. Second, for 
precisely the same reasons, minority cultural rights were relatively expansive in 
principle and, in particular, allowed for the state facilitation of intra-group coercion or 
what Baumeister called “thick multiculturalism”. However, these group rights were 
granted selectively, depending upon the extent of the threat that the group was deemed 
to pose to public order and to the legitimacy of the Assembly in its claims to represent 
all strands of Indian opinion. Finally, the chapter argues that the most expansive rights 
to cultural preservation were granted to Hindu revivalists, who were entitled to impose 
Hindu religious concerns with the banning of cow slaughter, for instance, on all 
individuals in society in a sign of the constitutional order‟s incipient “Gandhian 
multiculturalism”.   
Chapter Six, titled “Whose Sentiment Counts? Realizing the Potential of 
Gandhian Multiculturalism,” demonstrates the ways in which the hierarchy of 
multicultural entitlements in the Indian founding order manifested themselves in the 
state‟s censorship policy. In particular it argues that early censorship policy was 
dominated by the concerns of a small, and primarily Hindu revivalist, national elite 
that used the censor board to impose its concerns with re-shaping individuals into 
“moral” beings. Notably, however, censorship policy was frequently framed in terms 
of the needs of “Indian” – rather than “Hindu” – culture and society. This disjuncture 
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between official policy and informal practice is significant because it meant that the 
right to censor, although claimed by a formally a-political state, was in practice 
appropriated by politically powerful cultural groups. As the Indian state began to 
accommodate diversity during the mid-to-late 1950s, this “right to censor” was 
subsequently demanded by newly mobilized cultural groups, thereby perpetuating the 
notion that the right to censor is a vital component of a group‟s broader political 
empowerment.  
Finally, in conclusion, after recapping the primary arguments made in the 
project, Chapter Seven speculates on the sources of continuity and change between 
India‟s past and present, while also suggesting the ways in which the findings 
contribute to the larger theoretical and empirical literature in comparative politics. In 
particular, it argues that this project‟s re-reading of India‟s founding order allows for 
the development of an appreciation for the significant continuities between the so-
called “Nehruvian” era of the early 1950s and the contemporary “Hindutva” era 




THE ROLE OF SYMBOLISM IN PATRONAGE DEMOCRACY 
 
On January 5, 2004 a mob of over 150 “activists” of the Sambhaji Brigade 
attacked the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute (BORI) in the city of Pune in the 
state of Maharashtra, destroying reams of historical manuscripts and archival materials 
in the process.
1
  The research institute had been targeted because American historian, 
James Laine, had acknowledged the institute and some scholars associated with it for 
aiding him in his research for his latest book project. The book in question, Shivaji: 
Hindu King in Islamic India, had created a furor among local intellectuals of the 
Maratha caste for revealing the motivations behind official histories of the life of the 
local medieval emperor. The Sambhaji Brigade is led by a (then) member of the Hindu 
Nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party [Indian People‟s Party](BJP), Mr. Udayanraje 
Bhonsale, a losing candidate in the 1999 elections, whose position within the BJP was 
precarious given his alleged involvement in the  murder of a political opponent and his 
dalliances with other parties, in particular the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) a 
member of the ruling coalition government in the state.
2
  
The leaders of the Sambhaji Brigade alleged that Laine‟s book was an attempt 
to defame and insult the emperor who members of the Maratha caste, the most 
politically influential caste group in Maharashtra, regard as a local hero and cult 
figure. However, Bhonsale‟s organization wasn‟t the first to defend Shivaji‟s honor. 
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Less than two weeks before the incident, on December 22 2003, activists in Pune 
belonging to the Shiv Sena [Shivaji‟s Army], a regional chauvinist party, had 
physically assaulted a prominent Sanskrit scholar who had been acknowledged in 
Laine‟s book.3 But even the Shiv Sena had been beaten to the cause. As early as 
November 2003, many prominent local historians and the local BJP Member of 
Parliament, Mr. Pradeep Rawat had issued statements demanding the withdrawal of 
the book on the grounds of its “offensiveness”.4 In fact, on November 21, 2003 and 
over a month before the first physical attack by the Shiv Sena, Oxford University 
Press had apologized and withdrawn the book from the Indian market.
5
 
In response to the protests, politicians across the political spectrum and 
prominent ministers in the ruling coalition government, while condemning the 
violence, justified the actions by issuing statements such as: “We condemn the attack 
and also distorting of the history of Chhatrapati Shivaji. The government is seeking 
legal opinion to ascertain if any action can be taken against the author and also 
whether the book can be banned.”6 Despite Oxford University Press having 
                                                          
3
 See “Scholar destroys own work on Shivaji” by Manjiri Damle, in The Times of India, December 27, 
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Interestingly enough, in the run up to Valentine‟s Day in 2003, Mr. Rawat had participated in a show in 
which he spoke out against “cultural police” who have routinely attempted to disrupt Valentine‟s Day 
celebrations in cities like Mumbai. Mr. Rawat is reported to have said, “„„I truly believe that nobody 
needs to take the burden of preserving one‟s culture and nobody has the right to decide the „limits‟. 
What comes out of this kind of discipline is hypocrisy and a compulsion for people to wear a mask.‟‟ 
Clearly, Mr. Rawat‟s beliefs about personal liberty are not quite so firmly held. See “Struck by 
Valentine, this BJP MP hails love” by Vinita Deshmukh, in The Indian Express, February 13, 2003. 
Available online at: http://www.indianexpress.com/oldstory.php?storyid=18403 
5
 Ibid.  
6
 Statement at a press conference by Home Minister in the State of Maharashtra and member of the 
NCP, Mr. R.R. Patil, reported in: “MSS chief‟s clout keeps govt away” by Shailesh Gaikwad, in The 




voluntarily withdrawn the book, the Congress-NCP coalition government proceeded to 
impose an official ban while also initiating criminal proceedings against James Laine 
for “Wantonly giving provocation with intent to cause riot…” and “Promoting enmity 
between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, 
language, etc., and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony”7. And as 
elections of May 2004 approached, the Congerss-led government‟s tirades peaked 




The unfolding of events in the James Laine case would probably not surprise 
most scholars of Indian politics who have come to identify the arena of party 
competition with ethnic extremism. However, the fact that ethnic politics so frequently 
takes the form of symbolic appeals to emotional causes does raise some questions for 
theories of “patronage democracy” and ethnic clientelism.  
As discussed briefly in Chapter One, the term “patronage democracy” refers to 
a pattern of electoral politics particularly evident in poorer democracies in which 
politicians provide their “clients” with access to resources such as jobs in state-run 
enterprises or government bureaucracies in exchange for their votes. Political 
clientelism is deemed to be complementary to ethnocultural mobilization. As Kitschelt 
and Wilkinson (2007) note, ties of shared ethnicity are particularly conducive to 
clientelistic political arrangements, and increases in democratic political competition 
in the context of clientelistic or patronage democracy go hand-in-hand with 
ethnocultural mobilization (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, 32-34). The authors note 
                                                          
7
 Sections 153 and 153A of the Indian Penal Code. The vast majority of censorship cases are tried under 
these two sections.  
8
 See “India seeks to arrest US Scholar” on BBC News. Accessed on February 11, 2009. Available 
online at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3561499.stm   
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that as competition for the vote increases, “politicians will move to employ every 
imaginable strategy of attracting constituencies, subject to a general budget constraint” 
(Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, 32-33). Scholars of ethnic clientelism tend to 
emphasize the instrumentality of ethnic identification, arguing that identification with 
a particular ethnic group merely provides voters with a way to secure material 
benefits, rather than having any value in itself (Chandra 2004, 11), and consequently 
expect ethnocultural mobilization to revolve around issues relating to jobs and the 
distribution of material resources.  
Models of patronage democracy suggest that ethnicity matters in these contexts 
only because voters in such electoral contexts are likely to see “co-ethnic” candidates 
as more credible sources of future patronage (Chandra 2004). Given information 
shortages, a candidate‟s ethnicity becomes a signal of her reliability as a source of 
material resources or patronage after the election. All else being equal, therefore, 
voters in such contexts are expected to vote for their “co-ethnics”. However, the 
instrumental nature of ethnic identification means that, when given a choice between 
two or more candidates belonging to the same ethnic group, voters will always vote 
for the candidate with greater resources at her disposal. Given this understanding of 
the dynamics of identity politics in patronage democracies, the regular deployment of 
symbolic appeals in Indian politics, as illustrated in the example above, poses a bit of a 
puzzle. This is because such appeals, such as claims of “offense” and demands for 
censorship, do not contain any explicit reference to material or distributive issues and 
consequently would not be expected to be particularly efficacious in the context of a 
patronage democracy.  
Scholars of political parties‟ strategies have tended to differentiate between 
symbolic and material appeals. While the broader comparative literature does not 
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argue for the ineffectiveness of the symbolic appeal, it does tend to focus on material 
or distributive appeals given that so much of the literature emphasizes the importance 
of “economic voting” – the idea that voters tend to be attentive to economic or 
material issues when casting their vote (see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000). 
Symbolic appeals in electoral politics – to the extent that they are studied at all – tend 
to be seen as “also ran” strategies, functioning, if at all, as appeals to less 
“sophisticated” and less rational voters (Brader 2006, 3).  The literature, consequently, 
says very little about the role that symbolic appeals play in patronage democracies, 
reflecting Weeden‟s (2002) observation that “existing political science frameworks 
either fail to take notice of rhetoric and symbols, which means they have no account of 
the work symbols do, or make claims about symbols that are unwarranted or untested 
empirically (that they generate “legitimacy” for example)” (Weeden 2002, 724) 
However, it is not only the regular deployment of the symbolic appeal in 
democracies like India that poses a puzzle for theories of ethnic clientelism. It is also 
the fact that these appeals are frequently deployed even by patronage-rich candidates 
and parties, actors who, according to these models, ought to have no need to deploy 
these marginal strategies. Yet, as the unfolding of events in the James Laine case 
suggest, the incumbent Congress party felt the need, not just to respond to its 
opponents‟ symbolic appeals, but also to up the ante, going so far as to demand that 
Laine be extradited to India to be tried on criminal charges. This suggests that 
symbolic appeals may play a more significant role in patronage democracies than 
existing theories would lead us to expect.  
This chapter consequently takes Weeden‟s criticisms seriously and seeks to 
understand the role that symbolic appeals play in the context of a patronage 
democracy, as articulated by the political players who actually deploy them.  What 
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role do the political actors who make demands for censorship ascribe to these 
symbolic demands?   
The chapter argues that political elites, both established and aspiring, 
understand symbolic appeals to “emotional” issues as having high levels of political 
efficacy even in the context of patronage democracy. The precise role that these 
symbolic appeals play, however, depends on who is deploying them. In particular, 
symbolic appeals serve two functions: First, for parties without access to significant 
channels of patronage, they are understood to function as substitutes for the provision 
of material incentives to potential voters. However, the evidence also suggests that 
symbolic appeals may serve as substitutes for another important weakness of some 
political parties. More precisely, they allow personalistic political parties to maintain 
cadre loyalty and attachment to the party. In this internal arena, the symbolic appeal 
serves as a substitute, not for material incentives, but for participatory linkages 
between party elites and lower level party members, thereby compensating for 
political parties‟ internal organizational weaknesses.  
Theories of patronage democracy assume that ethnicity matters in clientelist 
politics because it serves as an information shortcut in situations in which voters are 
uncertain of a candidate‟s trustworthiness or credibility as a future source of 
patronage. This credibility is assumed to be established by incumbents‟ past records of 
resource distribution. However, if this is the case, the regular deployment of symbolic 
appeals by patronage-rich political incumbents poses a particular puzzle, because 
patronage-rich incumbents have the opportunity to establish themselves as reliable 
sources of material resources prior to an election. Indian incumbents‟ frequent 
accommodation of claims of offense therefore points to the possibility that symbolic 
appeals may serve, not just as a substitute, but also as a complement to the distribution 
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of material resources within the context of a patronage democracy. More specifically, 
they may perform a signaling function, allowing candidates to signal their credibility 
as reliable sources of patronage to voters after the election by demonstrating their 
emotional attachment to the ethnic group in question.  
The question of how actors establish their credibility is important in the 
context of patronage democracy. As Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) note, the 
clientelistic relationship involves a non-simultaneous exchange of favors: voters have 
to be reasonably certain that if they vote for a candidate today, s/he will uphold her 
end of the bargain and provide them with access to patronage in the future. Similarly, 
candidates have to be reasonably certain that incorporating a particular ethnic group 
into her patronage network today will translate into a strong show of support at the 
ballot box at the next election. The question of how candidates may establish their 
credibility has been addressed above. However, the literature does not provide us with 
many suggestions of how voters – the recipients of candidate‟s patronage – may 
establish their credibility in the political arena. Through an examination of the 
mobilization of Christian groups in Mumbai against the film The Da Vinci Code, this 
chapter argues that for groups that are under-represented in the electoral arena, 
mobilizing around symbolic issues such as an “offensive” film allows them to 
demonstrate their ability to act as a group. They are consequently able to signal their 
credibility as a reliable “vote bank” for politicians, one that is likely to respond 






The Function of the Symbolic Appeal in Patronage Democracy 
In April 2007, when the Bombay High Court stayed all criminal proceedings 
against Laine and ordered that the ban on his book be lifted, the Shiv Sena once again 
took up arms and vandalized a branch of the Oxford Bookstore in the city of Mumbai, 
claiming that legislatures had the power to overturn judicial decisions and had done so 
in the past.
9
 The leader of the Shiv Sena, Mr. Bal Thackeray, reportedly ordered party 
members to “burn all copies of James Laine‟s book.”10 When asked why his party 
chooses to routinely organize violent protests around issues relating to the insult of the 
emperor Shivaji, a Shiv Sena Member of Parliament (MP) replied that “we have to 
keep party workers engaged”, adding that cultural controversies are “emotional issues” 
and that “voters respond to emotional issues”11 This suggests that leaders of political 
parties, see symbolic appeals to “emotional” issues as valuable tools with which to 
keep party members occupied as well as to galvanize their support bases, particularly 
as elections approach.  
The Shiv Sena MP‟s explanation for why his party needed to rely on these 
strategies is significant. He said that leaders of other parties like the Congress and the 
NCP have strong rural roots and a consequent hold on agricultural industries in rural 
                                                          
9
 See “Bookshop owners under Thackeray threat” in, The Tribune, April 30, 2007. Available online at: 
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2007/20070501/nation.htm#11 . Accessed on: February 11, 2009. Also 
see “Sena against Court intervention” in The Times of India, April 29, 2007. Available online at: 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1974279.cms. Last accessed on: April 19, 2009. The 
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 See “Burn Liane‟s Book, says Shiv Sena” by Neeta Kolhatkar in DNA. Daily News and Analysis 
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 Interview with BKR, Mumbai, May 26, 2008. This explanation for the use of cultural strategies backs 
up the findings of Thomas Blom Hansen who saw benefits accruing to parties like the Shiv Sena 
through what he calls “the politics of permanent performance” (Hansen 2001). 
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areas through which they are able to channel money from state subsidies into jobs for 
their political supporters. He argued that the Shiv Sena, being a primarily urban party, 
does not have the same degree of access to channels of patronage with which party 
workers could be “kept occupied” during non-election years.12 This frank admission of 
the compulsions of maintaining political support are informative because they point to 
one important function that symbolic appeals serve in the context of a patronage 
democracy: symbolic appeals are understood to function as effective substitutes to 
material appeals for political parties and candidates that do not have access to 
extensive resources, thereby allowing smaller parties to remain competitive despite 
their budgetary constraints. 
The Shiv Sena leader‟s stated belief in the efficacy of symbolic appeals to the 
wider electorate poses a particular challenge for theories of patronage democracy. 
Although the potential for ideational or emotional issues such as concerns with “self-
respect” and “group status” to matter in politics is often brought up in studies of ethnic 
politics more broadly (Horowitz 1985, 143; Van Cott 2005), it is curiously absent 
from much of the literature on ethnic clientelism and patronage democracy. Notably, 
much of this literature allows almost no room for the efficacy of emotional appeals, 
emphasizing the fact that voters vote for co-ethnic candidates either with the intention 
of gaining access to state resources or, if at all, out of concerns with individual status 
that may be derived from an association with a powerful patron-politician (Chandra 
2004 11). In such a situation, when there are two or more co-ethnic candidates 
competing for the vote, voters would be expected to vote consistently for the one with 
the most established and abundant patronage network (Chandra 2004).  
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 Interview with BKR, Mumbai,  May 26, 2008.  
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The consequences for smaller ethnic parties of such a conceptualization are 
relatively obvious: the minute mainstream parties begin to field co-ethnic candidates, 
the resource-poor ethnic party is likely to fail and, presumably, eventually disappear 
altogether.
13
 The Shiv Sena MP‟s explanation for his party‟s deployment of symbolic 
electoral appeals points to the possibility that these form part of a counter-strategy by 
which newer or smaller parties may continue to remain competitive, despite the 
attempts made by larger parties to field co-ethnic candidates.  
However, the possibility that the symbolic appeal is intended only as a 
substitute for the disbursal of material incentives comes up against an important 
“hole” in the Shiv Sena MP‟s explanation for his party‟s deployment of the symbolic 
appeal. Although his assertion of the Shiv Sena‟s lack of patronage resources in rural 
areas might explain the party‟s frequent appeals to emotional causes, it is important to 
note that much of the Shiv Sena‟s most extreme censorship activities are concentrated 
in Mumbai, a city in which it has long established itself in electoral politics, 
particularly at the local level.
14
 In fact, the Shiv Sena has dominated the Greater 
Mumbai Municipal Corporation, the richest municipality in the country, for over a 
decade. It would not be difficult to imagine that this provides extensive opportunities 
for the party‟s candidates to distribute patronage to potential supporters. But how, 
then, can we account for the party‟s continued deployment of the symbolic appeal?  
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 One of the challenges facing this body of literature is the question of how party failure ought to be 
gauged. Indeed many studies devise their own measures of this crucial variable (See, for instance, 
Chandra 2004, Meguid 2008).  
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 The description of the Shiv Sena as an “urban party” was used by the interviewee himself. Interview 
with BKR, Mumbai, May 26, 2008. 
40 
 
The Internal Uses of Symbolic Appeals: Overcoming Organizational Challenges  
It is significant that the MP explicitly noted that the symbolic appeal to 
emotional issues was important not only to sway voters in the run up to elections, but 
also to keep “party workers” “engaged” with the party. This statement draws our 
attention to a crucial missing element in much of the literature on ethnic parties, 
namely, their internal organization. Scholars like Chandra (2004) and Meguid (2008) 
do pay attention to the internal organization of mainstream parties when trying to 
assess their ability and willingness to adopt a smaller ethnic party‟s platform. 
However, the internal organization of smaller ethnic parties themselves is almost 
entirely ignored. Although Chandra (2004) does acknowledge the importance of 
internal party democracy for all parties seeking to accommodate newly emergent 
groups, she doesn‟t say very much about how the internal organizational compulsions 
of parties may determine their behavior in the broader political arena.  
Paying attention to the internal organization of parties is particularly important 
given that scholars like Lawson (1990) have long suggested that “what parties do 
within the broader arena is determined at least in part by what they have been doing – 
and how they have been doing it – in the relative privacy of their own houses” 
(Lawson 1990, 108). De Souza and Sridharan (2006) note that most political parties in 
India are notoriously internally undemocratic, and this is particularly true of smaller 
regional parties like the Shiv Sena which tend to be little more than personality-
dependent family organizations (de Souza and Sridharan 2006, 25, 31).  
The broader literature on party-constituent links has coalesced around the 
assertion that a party‟s internal organization is a strong influence on members‟ 
attachment to it. For instance, party structures which encourage substantive grassroots 
participation in decision-making, through what Lawson (1976) calls “participatory 
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linkages,” are believed to create strong party identification even if the party in 
question lacks coherent stands on policy issues (Roberts, manuscript, 25). It appears 
then that party identification is closely tied to the type of linkage a party offers, which 
is in turn dependent upon the nature of internal party organization.  
According to Roberts, parties built around personal loyalties are often “highly 
inorganic or uninstitutionalized…[and] lack an organizational life or purpose 
independent of their leader, and the role of adherents is more plebiscitary than 
participatory” (Roberts manuscript, 30). If participatory linkages are likely to generate 
strong party identification, the superficial linkage mechanisms provided by 
personalistic political parties in India could be expected to generate what could at best 
be classified as weak and volatile party identification, an expectation that is confirmed 
by a number of interviewees with respect to parties like the Shiv Sena.
15
  
For the personality-driven political parties in India – both patronage-rich and 
patronage-poor – the ethnic linkage strategy has proven to be a readily available 
substitute. Ethnic parties would fall under what Lawson (1988) refers to as 
communitarian organizations – organizations that explicitly claim to represent one 
particular group. Since the communitarian organization‟s raison d’etre lies in its 
claims to represent that one group, Lawson (1988, 25) suggests that party elites will 
talk of little else. Without constantly re-affirming this ethnic link, the party will most 
likely lose its relevance. Ultimately, communitarian organizations are based on the 
politicization of a particular social cleavage. According to Roberts (manuscript 16), 
“the manner in which…political agents cleave the electorate is intimately related to 
the ways they attract and organize social constituencies…Different cleavage structures 
have corresponding modes of political association and social linkage.” Following from 
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 Interview with BKR, Mumbai,  May 26, 2008; Interview with JK, Mumbai, August 27, 2007; 
Interview with SA, Mumbai, August 27, 2007; Interview with KA, Mumbai, October 14, 2007.  
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this, one could argue that for ethnic parties that mobilize individuals along ethnic 
cleavages, an individual‟s partisan identification is little more than her ethnic 
identification.  
As the Shiv Sena MP‟s arguments suggest, ethnic party responses to the 
instability of partisan identification in India have resulted in (among other things) the 
use of direct mobilization of constituents, often targeting individual freedoms in the 
course of making “emotional appeals” to group sentiment. Lower-level members of 
the Shiv Sena themselves noted that they felt a particularly strong bond with co-
workers in the course of participating in protests and rallies.
16
 This echoes Hansen‟s 
(2001, 62) argument that “the Shiv Sena needed, and still needs, populist and violent 
street politics to attract its human capital”. In a sense, the performance of the act of 
vandalizing a bookstore or movie theater becomes a goal in itself, creating a cause 
around which potentially distracted party workers may reassert their ties to each other 
as well as to the party. In these situations, the deployment of symbolic appeals may 
allow political parties with weak internal organizations to maintain the loyalty of their 
cadre even in the wake of political competition.  
This suggests that, rather than merely being substitutes to the disbursal of 
material resources in the wider electoral arena, symbolic appeals against “offensive” 
materials may well serve as substitutes for internal democracy within personalistic 
political parties. Indeed, the longevity of the Shiv Sena – the party has survived for 
over four decades, despite being little more than a family-run firm – suggests that this 
is likely to be the case. The apparent efficacy of the symbolic appeal, however, 
suggests that, contrary to the assumptions of theories of patronage democracy, identity 
may well have value in itself.  Scholars have long argued for the importance of “moral 
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outrage” as a motivation to action (Moore 1959; Herring 1988), and the identification 
of an “insulting” or “offensive” book or film seems to have proven to be an invaluable 
tactic for political parties in India. As one lower level member of the Shiv Sena 
asserted, “no Marathi person can tolerate an insult to Shivaji”.17  
 
Emotions and Voting Decisions: Symbolic Appeals and Mainstream Party 
Incumbents 
However, if identity does have some value to members of political parties, is it 
possible that it has no innate value for voters, as theories of patronage democracy 
would lead us to expect? Although it is beyond the scope of this project to determine 
whether emotional issues have an effect on voter choice, the available evidence does 
suggest that political elites believe that emotions matter even within the context of 
patronage democracy. This is particularly evident in the fact that even well-
established, catch-all, and patronage-rich parties like the Congress and NCP felt the 
need to match the Sena as it raised the heat on the issue of Laine‟s book on Shivaji, 
despite their joint control over both the state and national governments at the time. As 
mentioned before, the government went so far as to officially ban Laine‟s book even 
after the publishers had voluntarily withdrawn it from the market, and even demanded 
Laine‟s extradition from the United States to India.18  
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18
 In fact, Mr. Bhosale, one of the leaders of the Sambhaji Brigade which was behind the attack on 
BORI, was officially inducted into the Congress Party‟s Maharashtra Unit in April 2006. Possibly in 
anticipation of his switch in parties, the Congress led coalition government in the state of Maharashtra 
banned another one of Laine‟s books titled The Epic of Shivaji earlier that year in January, 2006. 
Incidentally, this particular book was published as early as 2001, two years before Shivaji: Hindu 
King…, and a full 5 years before it was eventually deemed to be “offensive”. Further, there are no 
reports of any protests against The Epic of Shivaji, suggesting that this was a unilateral move on the part 
of the “mainstream” Congress-led government in the state.  See “In the name of Shivaji – Udayanraje 
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If emotional appeals to symbolic issues serve only as a substitute for the lack 
of material resources, what purpose do they serve for patronage-rich incumbents?
19
 
The question of why incumbents would deploy these symbolic strategies poses a 
particular challenge for the literature on ethnic clientelism. The clientelist relationship 
is a two-way street: the candidate promising patronage and the target group promising 
to vote for the candidate in exchange for material benefits. As Kitschelt and Wilkinson 
(2007) have noted, clientelistic accountability represents a transaction, the exchange of 
a citizen‟s vote in exchange for direct payments or access to employment, goods, and 
services (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, 2). As democracy becomes more competitive, 
clients or voters have more options of political patrons, increasing their bargaining 
power vis-à-vis candidates. However, even in such situations, incumbents with a 
previous record of patronage disbursal are expected to be far more secure in their 
positions, given that voters already know that they are reliable patrons (Kitschelt and 
Wilkinson 2007, 8).
 20
 The incumbents‟ tendency to match weaker competitors‟ 
symbolic appeals, therefore, poses a particular puzzle for such theories: If they already 
have an advantage in the form of an established record of patronage distribution, why 
would an incumbent need to deploy this “substitute” strategy?   
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 Of course, these patronage-rich parties are acknowledged to have many of the same internal 
organizational weaknesses as smaller ethnic parties like the Shiv Sena (Hasan 2006). It is, therefore, 
likely that accommodating emotional issues serves an internal function for these parties too. However, 
the statutory nature of many these responses – instituting official bans rather than mobilizing party 
members to vandalize bookstores – appear to be designed to appeal to a wider audience as well. 
20
 This, of course, assumes that incumbents actually lived up to their end of the bargain during their 
tenure in office. As Nooruddin and Chhibber (2008) note, incumbents who do not prove to be reliable 
sources of patronage are more likely to be voted out of office than those who do. The question of the 
effect of an unreliable incumbent will be addressed in greater detail in the following chapter.  
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One possible answer is provided by the growing literature on “economic 
voting” and the effects of incumbency in Indian elections. The question of whether 
incumbents have any electoral advantage over non-incumbents in elections in India 
has produced a large body of work. Of particular relevance to the question being asked 
here is the conclusion in this literature that incumbents appear to face a particular 
disadvantage in Indian elections (Nooruddin and Chhibber 2008; Uppal 2009). In 
short, incumbents, despite their extensive resources, are faced with the reality that the 
disbursal of patronage today does not guarantee a vote in the election tomorrow. This 
is likely to be particularly so in contexts of increasing competition for the vote, as a 
number of resource-rich candidates enter the political fray. This implies that, at every 
election, both incumbents and non-incumbents may be in the same boat, with all 
parties and candidates having to assure voters of their reliability as future patrons.  
In his study of ethnic clientelism in Benin, Wantchekon (2003) argues that 
voters only vote for co-ethnic candidates when these candidates‟ make credible 
commitments for the disbursal of patronage after the election (Wantchekon 2003, 401, 
421). However, Wantchekon does not say very much about how a candidate‟s 
credibility may be established, particularly in contexts in which her past record does 
not appear to guarantee continued support or reelection. In such situations, upping the 
ante on a symbolic issue may provide even patronage-rich incumbents with a way to 
signal that credibility, by emphasizing their emotional bond to their target ethnic 
group. In such a situation, the symbolic appeal, particularly given the belief in its 
political efficacy, appears to serve as an important complement to the provision of 
material incentives. In particular, it serves as a signal to highly mobilized groups of 
voters of a candidates commitment to the group and, consequently, the likelihood that 




While the dynamic laid out above would explain why political parties may find 
it politically advantageous to demand the censorship of offensive materials, it does not 
tell us the whole story. Indeed, many claims of offense and demands for censorship 
seem to emerge from within “civil society”. For instance, in February 2009, the Salon 
and Beauty Parlour Association based in the city of Mumbai demanded that the name 
of the Bollywood film Billoo Barber [Billoo the Barber] be changed to “Billoo 
Hairdresser” because it was claimed that the word “barber” is a derogatory term.21 The 
film‟s producer, Bollywood superstar Shah Rukh Khan agreed to change the film‟s 
title to Billoo, although he held that he did not believe that the word “barber” was 
offensive.
22
 The absurdity of the controversy led many to suggest that it was a 
publicity stunt by the superstar who is known to be particularly media savvy. 
However, as the following discussion with respect to the controversy around the 2006 
film The Da Vinci Code suggests, claims of offense by civil society groups may often 
have deeper seated political motivations. 
  
The Utility of Symbolic Appeals for Under-represented Groups: Mumbai’s 
Christians against The Da Vinci Code 
The James Laine controversy unfolded in a situation in which a number of 
parties were competing for the vote of a single ethnic group. That is, in a situation in 
which political parties, rather than voters, were under pressure to prove their 
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 See “Controversy over Billoo Barber”. Available online at: http://in.movies.yahoo.com/news-
detail.html?news_id=44342. Last Accessed on: June 12, 2009.  
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credibility as future sources of patronage. However, in cases in which a “new” or 
previously politically under-represented group seeks to gain membership into a 
clientelistic network, the balance of power is reversed. It is now the group that needs 
to establish itself in the political arena as a credible source of votes for the candidate 
or party willing to include it in a clientelist/patronage network. As will be illustrated 
below in an example of Christian protests against the film The Da Vinci Code in 
Mumbai, mobilization around symbolic issues such as “offense” or “insult” allows a 
group to signal its ability to act politically as a group, thereby signaling their own 
credibility as reliable vote banks for potential political patrons.  
Christians in India have come under increasing attack from the Hindu right in 
recent years. The organized violence against the small religious minority community 
in states like Orissa and Karnataka in 2008 is only the most recent manifestation of a 
more deep-seated hostility, particularly due to missionaries‟ attempts to convert lower-
caste Hindus to the Christian faith. Christians have the highest literacy rate among all 
India‟s religious groups, partly due to the vibrant social role played by the Church and 
its affiliated institutions. However, the community remains relatively politically 
disempowered in a number of states, as the unresponsiveness of state governments to 
recent violent attacks against the community amply demonstrate. It is in this context of 
Christians‟ political disempowerment that The Da Vinci Code, Ron Howard‟s movie 
based on Dan Brown‟s novel, was readied for an all-India release in May 2006. 
Even before the movie was approved for release, India‟s Censor Board had 
invited representatives of the Christian community to a pre-release screening of the 
movie in order to determine whether or not any parts of the film were likely to offend 
India‟s roughly 25 million Christians, reflecting a long-standing policy of the 
government which has routinely been upheld by the judiciary. Fortunately for the 
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country‟s movie-goers, the invitees decided that the movie was fit for release so long 
as the distributors, Sony Pictures, placed a prominent disclaimer at the beginning of 
the movie stating the film was a work of fiction.
23
 However, despite the Censor Board 
subsequently green-lighting the film, there were murmurs within the Christian 
community about a mere disclaimer not being a sufficient measure, and a number of 
states placed outright bans on the film in a pattern that activists claimed corresponded 




In the city of Mumbai in Maharashtra, a group called the Catholic Secular 
Forum (CSF) staged a prolonged and extended hunger strike against the film, claiming 
that it was offensive and defamed the Christian faith. A founding member of the CSF, 
Mr. Joseph Dias, was at the forefront of the protests and had gone on record at the 
time demanding nothing less than a nation-wide ban on the film.
25
 Catholics in the city 
had staged two demonstrations in a week making similar demands. However, the 
government of Maharashtra after first reporting that it was “studying the issue”,26 
remained curiously silent and the film continued to be screened in the city and the 
state as usual. When asked about his assessment of the reasons for the failure of his 
protest, Mr Dias commented that the Christian community has tended to be “taken for 
granted by left, right, and everything in between”.27 The reasons for Christians‟ lack of 
political efficacy were understood as being due at least in part to their general 
                                                          
23
 Interview with Fr. M.P., Mumbai,  December 22, 2008. 
24
 Interview with Fr. M.P., Mumbai, December 22, 2008; Interview with J Dias, Mumbai, December 23, 
2008. Many state High Courts eventually overturned the bans citing the Censor Board‟s prior approval. 
However, informal censorship continued in some states like Andhra Pradesh, Kerala and Tamil Nadu. 
25
 Mr. Dias is quoted on the BBC World Service news as saying “The film must not be screened in 
India. It is a gross misrepresentation of the Church and Faith”.  BBC News.  Available online at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4759111.stm . Accessed on February 10, 2009. 
26
 “Maharashtra govt examining demand seeking ban on „Da Vinci Code‟” in Outlook India¸ June , 
2006. http://www.outlookindia.com/pti_news.asp?id=390333. Accessed on February 10, 2009.  
27
 Interview with J. Dias. Mumbai, December 23, 2008.  
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unwillingness to use violence as a political strategy as well as the fact that the 




The way this relatively politically disempowered group understands the 
interests and calculations of government officials and what it takes to be politically 
efficacious in the context of Indian democracy are particularly telling. For Dias, 
mobilizing Christians against The Da Vinci Code had three larger goals that went well 
beyond the fact of the film‟s apparent offensiveness: the protest was a way to unite the 
community across denominational lines, to make members of the community more 
politically aware, and, perhaps most importantly, to make political parties aware that 
“we are a majority in some pockets [of the city] and so they should give us 
representation and tickets”.29  
The way to achieve this last goal was to show the political class the 
community‟s “utility and nuisance value”.30 By staging high profile agitations and 
“presenting issues in a non-traditional manner” which “creates controversy,” Christian 
lay groups and individual activists believe they will be able to establish themselves as 
important political actors who could be of use to political parties, and potentially tip 
the scales in close electoral races.
31
 These controversies therefore serve the dual 
purpose of galvanizing an internally divided community while also politicizing it, 




                                                          
28
 Interview with J. Dias, Mumbai , December 23, 2008. Interview with Fr. M.P., Mumbai, December 
22, 2008.  
29
 Ibid.  
30




 When asked about his subsequent attempts at having offensive movies banned, Mr. Dias couldn‟t 
think of a single campaign run by the CSF since the Da Vinci Code controversy that had not resulted in 
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The example of Christians‟ mobilization against the Da Vinci Code provides 
some indication of what the claim of offense has come to represent in Indian politics. 
Under-represented groups that claim offense seem to understand the strategy as 
drawing attention to their larger political marginalization and demonstrating their 
worthiness as clients for politicians willing to empower them more substantively. This 
idea, that the identification of the existence of offensive materials represents a group‟s 
political marginalization, appears to have been adapted by politicians. For aspirants to 
office, making a censorship demand may be a way to point to an incumbent‟s failure 
to substantively empower the target group. Similarly, for incumbents, responding pro-
actively to a censorship demand from society may be understood to be a way to make 
up for distribution short-falls or merely to demonstrate continuing representativeness 
in the wake of growing competition.  
 
“The Country Itself”: Understanding Mainstream Party Constraints  
But this larger symbolism of the censorship demand may also explain the often 
extreme nature of mainstream party responses to such controversies, particularly when 
the offended group is politically influential. This is a particularly important point to 
highlight because the literature on ethnic clientelism and ethnic party politics more 
generally has consistently argued that mainstream parties have an “upper hand” in 
what is conceived of as an unequal battle with smaller ethnic competitors (Chandra 
1999, Meguid 2008, Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). For instance, in her study of the 
unequal competition between niche and mainstream parties in Western Europe, 
                                                                                                                                                                       
either an outright ban, the cutting of “offensive” portions of movies, or the revoking of the Censor 
Board‟s certification. Among the movies that faced the CSF‟s ire were Sacred Evil, Sins, Elizabeth: The 
Golden Age, and Naughty Nun.  Most notable about the censorship of these other movies is that there 
was no need for the CSF to stage a public protest against them. Apparently, the Da Vinci Code protests 
had begun to have their desired effects. 
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Meguid (2008) notes that every mainstream party can choose from three potential 
responses to the raising of an “ethnic issue” by an ethnic party: accommodative, 
adversarial, or dismissive. All else being equal, an accommodative stance is expected 
to marginalize an ethnic party by transferring issue ownership to the mainstream party 
and reducing issue salience over time; an adversarial stance is expected to buttress an 
ethnic party by allowing it to retain issue ownership; finally a dismissive stance is 
expected to decrease issue salience by taking the ethnic issue out of broader political 
debate.  
All mainstream parties are expected to react strategically to the introduction of 
an ethnic party into the party system. If a mainstream party is electorally threatened by 
the ethnic party, it is likely to be accommodative, adopting the latter‟s issues and 
consequently marginalizing its new competitor; on the other hand, if a mainstream 
party does not feel threatened by the ethnic party in question, it could merely ignore 
the ethnic issue (adopt a dismissive stand), with the expectation that both the issue and 
the party will die a quiet death. But what if adopting a “dismissive strategy” with 
regard to an ethnic competitor‟s cause isn’t even an option for a mainstream party? 
The question is important in light of studies of the rise of the radical right in western 
European democracies which point to the selective accommodation (and dismissal) by 
mainstream parties of these new parties‟ issues. In particular, it has been found that 
mainstream parties in these countries have tended to accommodate causes linked with 
the preservation of national cultures (such as banning headscarves or curbing 
immigration, for instance) while dismissing the radical right‟s economic agenda 
(Minkenberg 1998; Schain 2002; Williams 2006).
33
 Similarly, in cases such as those 
discussed in Chapters Two and Three, India‟s Congress Party not only felt the need to 
                                                          
33
 Williams suggests that this may well be because “what people fear perhaps more than the economic 
conditions that confront them is the loss of their identity,…culture and values” (Williams 2006, 4-5).   
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“accommodate” the issues, but explicitly upped the ante. This dynamic suggests that 
there are some issue areas – which in the Indian case include claims of group offense 
and demands for censorship – that are seen by elites as more politically potent and 
therefore harder to dismiss without suffering political costs.  
Meguid points out that even when mainstream parties do have a real choice in 
terms of deciding which strategy to adopt, the strategy may not always lead to the 
conclusions as predicted in her model. In particular, she suggests that “the political 
and economic climate in which competition occurs cannot be ignored…Contextual 
factors can mitigate and even erase the effects of mainstream party behavior. In these 
instances, the likely culprits are not just the sociological characteristics of a country, 
but also the country itself.” (Meguid 2008, 81-2. Italics added).  Perhaps the apparent 
constraints faced by mainstream parties in India could similarly be explained with 
reference to these “contextual factors”. But this requires clarifying exactly what these 
contextual factors may be and what it may be about “the country itself” that explains 
the nature of these constraints. Meguid explains the inability of the Spanish case to fit 
her model as possibly being due to “unmeasured aspects of the Spanish political 
environment” (Meguid 2008, 81-2). Although it is difficult to argue with any certainty 
on issues such as these, one could imagine that the larger political symbolism of the 
claim of offense is one of these “unmeasured aspects” of the country‟s political 
environment; and one that may be particularly constraining for a “catch-all” 
mainstream party in power at the center.  
But if this is true, it points to another reason why seeking offense may be seen 
as such an efficacious strategy by smaller and resource-poor political parties. If 
mainstream parties like the Congress are constrained by the Indian “political 
environment” to accommodate a censorship demand, it may allow a small party to 
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claim the credit for “forcing” the mainstream party to accede to its demand, thereby 
raising its stature as a group representative, and possibly sending out a deliberately 
misleading signal to voters of the party‟s influence over its mainstream competitors 
and national politics. 
 
Conclusions 
The present chapter was an attempt to understand what role, if any, the 
symbolic claim of offense might play in political contexts in which voting is deemed 
to take place based primarily on material considerations. It argued that political elites, 
both established and aspiring, understand symbolic appeals to emotional issues like 
the offensiveness of a book or film to be efficacious political strategies even within the 
context of so-called patronage democracies. However, in addition to being merely a 
substitute, also-ran strategy for new or resource-poor political parties, the symbolic 
claim of offense serves an important role for internally weak political parties, whether 
patronage-rich or patronage poor seeking to maintain cadre loyalty and attachment.  
For patronage-rich incumbents, acceding to symbolic demands for censorship 
serves as a signal of their continuing commitment to their supporters, possibly being 
understood as a way to defeat anti-incumbency. And finally, for under-represented 
groups, mobilizing around claims of offense is understood as a way to demonstrate 
their ability and willingness to act as a group, thereby allowing them to signal their 
credibility as a vote-bank for politicians looking to expand their voter base.  
The preceding discussion suggests the following “hypotheses” regarding the 
emergence and redress of claims of offense: First, claims of offense and demands for 
censorship are likely to be made by resource-poor, and politically marginal political 
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parties and elites. Second, outside the realm of parties, they are likely to be made in 
contexts in which the “offended” group is relatively socially and politically 
marginalized. Third, given anti-incumbency effects across India‟s states, all 
incumbents would be expected to respond to censorship demands in their attempts to 
defeat anti-incumbency. However, we could expect incumbents to be particularly 
responsive to such claims when there is growing competition for the vote of the 
“offended” group, or when the group has been neglected economically and politically. 
The following chapter looks at the pattern of events in a controversy 
surrounding one film, a Bollywood musical titled Aaja Nachle [Come, Let‟s Dance]. 
The film was banned in only three of India‟s thirty two states for being offensive to 
the Dalit community, former “untouchables” in the Hindu caste system that have a 
presence in a vast majority of India‟s states, and consequently presents some 
interesting variation on both the emergence and redress of censorship demands. It 
therefore provides an opportunity to see if the hypotheses that have been laid out 





UNCOVERING PATTERNS OF OFFENSIVENESS:  
THE CASE OF AAJA NACHLE 
 
When Madhuri Dixit, the actress who had once held sway over Mumbai‟s 
“Bollywood” film industry in the 1980s and 1990s, announced her “comeback” in a 
musical entitled Aaja Nachle [Come, Let‟s Dance] after a  five-year hiatus, the Indian 
media were understandably a-buzz. “The Queen is Back” screamed the June 2007 
cover of Filmfare magazine as the date of the film‟s release approached. Once the 
soundtrack of the film was released in October 2007, the songs from the movie were 
playing practically around the clock on radio and television. In the run-up to the 
movie‟s release, the film‟s producers spearheaded a veritable media blitz during which 
India‟s proliferating news and entertainment channels seemed to be falling over 
themselves to get an interview with the star; and entertainment shows began to groom 
women to look and dance like Madhuri did in the movie‟s title song.  
However, on November 30, 2007, the day of the movie‟s nationwide release, a 
relatively unknown political party called The Indian Justice Party (IJP) staged a 
protest against the film. The party‟s leader, Mr. Udit Raj, claimed that one line in the 
movie‟s title song was deeply offensive to the Dalit community [formerly 
“Untouchables”] and demanded an immediate ban on the movie. The lyric in question 
went “There is tumult in the neighborhood; even the cobbler is calling himself a 
goldsmith” 1  
                                                          
1
 In Hindi: “Moholle mein kaise maara maar hai, bole mochi bhi khud ko sonaar hai.”  To put the line 
in context, in the verse in question, the female lead says that she had made the mistake of  standing on 
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In Hinduism‟s traditional caste hierarchy, professions were very closely tied to 
caste status, and cobblers, by virtue of working with the hides of dead animals and 
Hinduism‟s holy cow in particular, were deemed to be ritually unclean and therefore 
“untouchable”. The goldsmith, on the other hand, is considered to be ritually clean and 
enjoys a marginally higher caste status. Seen in this light, the lyric was understood to 
be mocking the Dalits‟ desire for upward mobility and was subsequently deemed to be 
offensive to the community.  
In response to Raj‟s protest, the state of Uttar Pradesh, ruled by prominent 
Dalit politician Ms. Mayawati, promptly instituted a state-wide ban on the film. 
Mayawati subsequently wrote a letter to the Prime Minister in New Delhi demanding 
that the film be banned across the country for “humiliating” the Dalit community.2 
Suddenly, over a month and a half after the release of the movie‟s soundtrack, it was 
almost impossible to find a Dalit politician who was not condemning the lyric and the 
filmmakers. “This is ill-informed, insulting and insensitive” said Member of 
Parliament and member of Mayawati‟s Bahujan Samaj Party [Oppressed People‟s 
Party](BSP) Mr. Rajesh Verma.
3
 The film was subsequently also banned in the 
neighboring states of Punjab and Haryana. However, none of India‟s 29 other States or 
Union Territories imposed a ban on the film.  
                                                                                                                                                                       
the terrace of her home wearing a gold nose ring [nathni], following which there was a line of suitors 
(there is tumult in the neighborhood), with even cobblers posing as goldsmiths. In India, the gold nose 
ring has been seen as enhancing seductiveness of a woman, and had been used in some communities‟ 
traditions to symbolize a new bride‟s virginity.  
 
2
 Mayawati‟s Bahujan Samaj Party [Oppressed People‟s Party] (BSP) is noted in much of the literature 
on Indian politics as the part responsible for rejuvenating the Dalit political movement in India (See 
Jaffrelot 2003 and Sudha Pai 2002). It is the foremost Dalit party in the country today, with its power 
concentrated in India‟s most populous state of Uttar Pradesh (U.P.) but with its presence expanding 
nation-wide. 
3
 Quoted in “Aaja Nachle almost trips – on a caste line” in The Sunday Express, December 2, 2007. 
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The preceding chapter drew on interviews with actors who have made claims 
of offense and demands for censorship to lay out some possible hypotheses of the 
conditions under which censorship demands are likely to emerge and be redressed. In 
particular it made three main conclusions: First, claims of offense and demands for 
censorship are likely to be made by resource-poor, and politically marginal political 
parties and elites. Second, outside the realm of parties, they are likely to be made in 
contexts in which the “offended” group is relatively socially and politically 
marginalized. Third, given anti-incumbency effects across India‟s states, all 
incumbents would be expected to respond to censorship demands in their attempts to 
defeat anti-incumbency. However, we could expect incumbents to be particularly 
responsive to such claims when there is growing competition for the vote of the 
“offended” group, or when the group has been neglected economically and politically. 
The case of Aaja Nachle presents us with some very interesting variation. First, 
as has already been mentioned, only three states in India deemed it to be necessary to 
impose a ban on the film. And second, of these three states, only two, Punjab and 
Uttar Pradesh, actually saw active protests against the film, while the government of 
Haryana banned the film preemptively. But there is also a curious lack of variation 
that becomes evident in that there is no instance of a state government not responding 
to a demand for censorship with a ban on the film.  
The present chapter is an attempt to see if the hypotheses about the dynamics 
of censorship politics in India developed in the Chapter Two fit with the evidence in 
the Aaja Nachle case. Given the methodological challenges of working with just one 
case, however, the following analysis is intended more as a search for patterns than a 
quest for explanations. In what ways do the states in which the film was banned differ 
from those in which it was not? Was the one state in which the film was banned 
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preemptively somehow different from India‟s other states? The chapter looks at 
structural features, electoral data, and media reports of official statements and events 
surrounding the banning of the film in order to get a sense of the conditions under 
which both the claim and redress of offense seem to emerge. In doing so, it is also an 
attempt to see whether the hypotheses derived from the preceding chapter can provide 
a deeper understanding of the unfolding of events.  
 
The Structure of Anti-Incumbency: Understanding Incumbent Responses to Aaja 
Nachle  
It has already been mentioned that only three of India‟s 32 states and Union 
Territories ever banned Aaja Nachle for being offensive to Dalits.  Given that the 
discussions in the previous chapter referred repeatedly to questions of electoral interest 
on the part of incumbent governments, the first question that needs to be asked is 
whether the size of the “offended” group is correlated with patterns of government 
bans across India‟s states. Table 1 lists the patterns of censorship of Aaja Nachle for 
all states in which Dalits comprise at least 10% of the population. Right at the outset it 
is evident that the mere fact that a state has a large proportion of Dalits is not enough 
to determine whether or not a state government decided to ban the film. So Himachal 
Pradesh, with Dalits comprising over 24% of the state‟s population, was curiously 
silent during the controversy. Although it is certainly true that all the states in which 
the movie was banned are at the higher end of the scale in terms of proportion of 
Dalits in their population, the fact remains that this structural variable alone cannot 
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explain variation in censorship patterns across “high Dalit population” states, pointing 





Table 3.1: States with at least 10% of their population belonging to the “Dalit” 
community in descending order of proportion (All Data as per the 2001 Census) 


























24.7% NO 70.31% 
(76.48) 
0.919 5.668 
                                                          
4
 States in which large proportions of the population do not speak Hindi (the language in which the 
movie was made) have been included in this table. This is partly because a large number of books and 
films have been banned across India‟s states in the past regardless of language. Additionally, Hindi 
language movies are frequently released in southern Indian states like Andhra Pradesh and Kerala, 
sometimes with subtitles.  
5
 The “Relative Literacy Index” is calculated as the ratio of the Dalit literacy rate to the average literacy 
rate in each state as per the 2001 census of India. As the value gets closer to 1, the assumption is that 
there is greater structural equality across caste groups, and more specifically between Dalits and the rest 
of a state‟s population. 
6
 The Rate of Atrocities against Dalits is calculated as the number of atrocities against Dalits per 
100,000 Dalits in each state for the year 2007. The values have been calculated based on data reported 
in the annual report “Crime in India 2007” published by the National Crime Records Bureau, Ministry 
of Home Affairs, New Delhi. The atrocity rate in the report was calculated as atrocities per 100,000 
individuals, but one could argue that this potentially lets states with larger populations and smaller 
proportions of Dalits off the hook. The values in the report were divided by the proportion of the state‟s 
population that were Dalits in order to get the “Rate of Atrocities” values listed here. 
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Table 3.1 (Continued) 
West Bengal 23.01% NO 59.04% 
(68.64) 
0.860 0.019 
Uttar Pradesh 21.14% YES 46.27% 
(56.27) 
0.822 15.61 
Haryana 19.3% YES 55.45% 
(67.91) 
0.816 5.181 
Tamil Nadu 19.00% NO 63.19% 
(73.45) 
0.860 13.684 
Uttaranchal 17.8% NO 63.40% 
(71.62) 
0.885 4.494 
Chandigarh 17.4% NO 67.66% 
(81.94) 
0.825 0 
Tripura 17.3% NO 74.68% 
(73.19) 
1.02 1.15 
Rajasthan 17.1% NO 52.24% 
(60.41) 
0.864 38.011 





Table 3.1 (Continued) 
Orissa 16.5% NO 55.53% 
(63.08) 
0.880 20.606 
Karnataka 16.2% NO 52.87% 
(66.64) 
0.793 19.753 
Pondicherry 16.1% NO 69.12% 
(81.24) 
0.850 14.906 








Madhya Pradesh 15.1% NO 58.57% 
(63.74) 
0.918 39.735 
Jharkhand 11.8% NO 37.56% 
(53.56) 
0.701 15.25 
Chhattisgarh 11.6% NO 63.96% 
(64.66) 
0.989 18.965 
                                                          
7
 Aaja Nachle was not released in Bihar at the same time as it was in the rest of the country. This was 
not because of an official ban on the film, although in the wake of the controversy, the government of 
Bihar did issue a notice to the film‟s distributors directing them to ensure that the offensive lyric was 
removed prior to its release in the state. See: “‟Aaja Nachle‟. Cut objectionable reference: Bihar” in The 
Tribune, December 5, 2007. Available online at:  
www.tribuneindia.com/2007/20071205/nation.htm#18. Last accessed on April 11, 2009.   
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Table 3.1 (Continued) 
Maharashtra 10.2% NO 71.90% 
(76.88) 
0.935 10.78 




To use the language of necessary and sufficient conditions, it appears that 
although a “high” proportion of Dalits seems to be a necessary condition for a ban to 
be instituted, it is certainly not a sufficient condition. A pattern does begin to emerge, 
however, when we consider relative literacy levels of the Dalit community in “high 
Dalit concentration” states. The variable “Dalit Relative Literacy Index”, calculated as 
the ratio of the Dalit literacy rate to the average literacy rate in each state, is intended 
as an admittedly imperfect measure of the degree of Dalits‟ socio-economic 
marginalization in individual states.
8
 As Figure 3.1 shows, among states with higher 
proportions of Dalits (approximately 19% emerges as a cut-off point here), Aaja 
Nachle was eventually banned in those states where Dalits tend to be relatively less 
literate than the average individual. That is, the states of Himachal Pradesh (H.P.) and 
West Bengal (W.B), despite being above the critical population level, have higher 
relative literacy rates than the other three states in the “high population” category, 
namely, Uttar Pradesh (U.P.), Punjab and Haryana.  The figure suggests that 
governments of states in which the size of the “offended” community exceeds some 
                                                          
8
 It should be noted here that the rate of atrocities against Dalits, another possible measure of Dalit 
exclusion which would connote a more actively anti-Dalit social/political environment, doesn‟t appear 
to correspond with either the proportion of Dalits or the patterns of censorship. This suggests that the 
relative literacy deprivation may be getting at something more substantive and subtle in the relationship 
between Dalits and the state apparatus in these states.  
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“critical value” (in this case, approximately 19%) and in which this community is 
relatively more deprived when compared to the rest of the state‟s population feel some 
structural pressures to implement bans when offense is taken.  
 
Figure 3.1: Dalits‟ Structural Position Across States (as per 2001 census). Black data 
points indicate states in which Aaja Nachle was banned.  
 
Such a pattern would make sense in light of the discussion in the previous 
chapter. It was suggested there that incumbent governments are likely to respond to 
emotional issues in order to overcome the strong anti-incumbency factor that is 
evident across the vast majority of India‟s states. That said, there is still unexplained 
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variation here. Although the anti-incumbency effect could explain why there is 
complete correspondence between the emergence of protest against the film and the 
implementation of a ban (this pattern occurred in two states: Uttar Pradesh and 
Punjab), it doesn‟t explain why the state of Haryana decided to ban the film 
preemptively, before any sign of protest, and why the state of West Bengal, for 
instance, did not. This points to the likelihood of variation in the pressure on 
incumbents across these states that a simple reference to the offended group‟s 
marginalization does not address. Notably, in none of these states are Dalits 
completely on par with the rest of the state‟s population; so why do incumbents in 
some states deploy the “banning strategy” to deflect from a group‟s marginalization 
while others do not?  
Nooruddin and Chhibber (2008) have pointed out that although at an all India 
level the anti-incumbency effect is quite substantial, the size of this effect varies 
considerably across India‟s states. Of direct concern for the present discussion, they 
note that West Bengal in particular appears to have regularly bucked the anti-
incumbency trend, with incumbents seeing, on average, a small increase in their share 
of the vote across elections (Nooruddin and Chhibber 2008, 1076). This is evident in 
the fact that, at the time of Aaja Nachle‟s release, the state had been under the rule of 
the Communist Party of India for an uninterrupted thirty years. As Yogendra Yadav 
has pointed out, “The Left Front has performed consistently well among Scheduled 
Caste constituencies and secured a higher vote share among Dalits than the rest of the 
population.”9 The government of West Bengal‟s decision to ignore the controversy 
altogether could, therefore, be understood in light of the fact that the Communist 
                                                          
9
 See “The many faces of Dalit politics” in The Hindu , May 7, 2009. Available online at: 




incumbents in the state were relatively secure in their belief in the continued support 
of their scheduled caste constituency. Further, as Yadav notes, the Communists‟ Dalit 
supporters in the state have been mobilized along class rather than caste lines, with the 
result that opposition parties have tended to focus their attention on trying to discredit 
the governments‟ economic policies or on mobilizing the state‟s substantial Muslim 
community, rather than around issues of Dalit caste identity.
10
 West Bengal‟s silence 
on the issue suggests that variations in anti-incumbency may influence government 
responsiveness, with incumbents in relatively stable states like West Bengal being less 
likely to be pro-active as these controversies unfold in the rest of the country.  
 
Variations in Incumbency Effects, Variations in Responsiveness  
The previous section has suggested that the lack of activity in West Bengal can 
be understood in light of the state‟s peculiar electoral dynamic when compared with 
most other states in India. The other four “high Dalit presence” states, on the other 
hand, are acknowledged to be significantly more electorally volatile, with incumbents 
being regularly voted out of office. Given this relatively high anti-incumbency factor 
in all the four states, one would expect governments in every one of these states to be 
particularly attentive to Dalit offense and therefore likely to implement a ban on Aaja 
Nachle. However, as Table 1 has already shown, only three of these four states banned 
the film, with Himachal Pradesh remaining curiously silent as the controversy 
unfolded. Furthermore, of the three states that did impose a ban Haryana imposed a 
preemptive ban on the film before any protest could take place in the state, while Uttar 
Pradesh and Punjab waited for protests to take place before taking a similar action . 
                                                          
10
 Indeed, the Communists in West Bengal have been very willing to target the work of authors like 
Bangladeshi novelist Taslima Nasreen, who is particularly outspoken in her criticism of Islam.  
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A pattern does begin to emerge when we take a closer look at the strength of 
anti-incumbency across these states. In particular, Haryana and Himachal Pradesh are 
acknowledged in the literature as being among the most electorally volatile states in 
the country, with consistently strong anti-incumbency effects (Nooruddin and 
Chhibber 2008, Yadav and Palshikar 2009). Uttar Pradesh and Punjab on the other 
hand are classified as having “moderate” anti-incumbency effects (Nooruddin and 
Chhibber 2008, 1075-1076). This classification by Nooruddin and Chhibber (2008) 
does begin to provide some perspective on the question of why incumbents in the 
states of Uttar Pradesh and Punjab may have waited for public protest to take place 
before imposing a ban on the film. Perhaps, given the “moderate” anti-incumbency 
effects in the two states, the governments may not have felt extensive pressure to place 
a pre-emptive ban on the film.  
However, it still leaves one puzzle unresolved. Haryana and Himachal Pradesh, 
two states with very high levels of electoral volatility, were both being ruled by the 
same party, the mainstream Congress Party at the time of Aaja Nachle‟s release. 
However, in Haryana, the Congress government chose to ban the film preemptively, 
without any sign of public protest, while the same party‟s government in Himachal 
Pradesh remained silent right through the controversy. The puzzle is heightened by the 
fact that Himachal Pradesh was due to go to the polls just a few weeks after the release 
of Aaja Nachle, a situation which ought to have made the Congress government 
particularly sensitive to offensive materials. This unresolved puzzle points to the need 
to take a closer look at whether there are features of the electoral environment in these 





Electoral Dynamics and Patterns of Censorship 
It was suggested in the previous chapter that incumbents may be particularly 
sensitive to symbolic appeals under conditions of increased political competition for 
the vote of the “offended” group. While it is usually difficult to measure the degree of 
competition for the vote of a particular ethnic group with any real accuracy, electoral 
rules in India make the degree of competition for the Dalit vote a little easier to assess.  
Electoral rules “reserve” a number of constituencies in every state exclusively for 
candidates belonging to the so-called “scheduled castes”, the official nomenclature for 
the Dalit community. This means that in these constituencies, every candidate in the 
electoral fray must be a member of a “scheduled caste”. Taking a look at the dynamics 
of electoral competition within these reserved constituencies is therefore an ideal way 
to get a sense of the extent of competition for the Dalit vote in a particular state.
11
 
However, since absolute values do not necessarily give us a good sense of how intense 
electoral competition in these constituencies has been over time, Table 3.2 lists the 
changes in competitiveness in reserved constituencies between the last two elections 
in these four states in order to get a sense of whether competition for the Dalit vote 





                                                          
11
 This is primarily because  constituencies are designated as “reserved” exclusively for candidates 
belonging to Scheduled Castes or Tribes based on the concentration of these groups. Of course, this is 
not a fool-proof measure, particularly because it is not entirely clear whether there is a particular 
concentration that serves as a cut-off point. That said, to the extent that all the candidates do belong to 
the Scheduled Castes, it serves as a relatively good proxy for intra-group electoral competition. 
12
 All the electoral data in this section has been drawn from the records of the Election Commission of 
India. Available online at: http://eci.nic.in/.  
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Table 3.2: Changes in Competition for the Dalit Vote in “High Dalit Presence” States 

















































Competition across the previous two state-level elections in each state is 
measured in two ways: First, the change in the average number of candidates 
competing per reserved constituency; and second, the change in the average number of 
competitive candidates per reserved constituency The “average number of candidates 
per constituency” value is more or less self explanatory and is calculated by dividing 
the total number of candidates running in all reserved constituencies in a state by the 
total number of reserved constituencies in that particular state.
13
 An increase in the 
average number of candidates per constituency over time suggests that more Dalits 
candidates are aspiring to political office over time.  
According to India‟s electoral rules, candidates have to pay a monetary deposit 
if they want to contest an election. If a candidate does not get at least one-sixth of the 
total vote polled, s/he has to forfeit the deposit. Forfeiture of a candidate‟s deposit, 
therefore, can be used as an indicator of her lack of competitiveness in an electoral 
race. In order to exclude such candidates who may not be much of an electoral threat, 
column 2 measures the change in “average number of competitive candidates,” still 
calculated as the average number of candidates per reserved constituency, but 
excluding candidates who forfeited their electoral deposits.
14
 Here, a positive value, 
implying an increase in the number of competitive candidates over time, suggests that 
competition has substantively increased over the last two elections, with the Dalit vote 
being spread more thinly among more candidates. A negative value, on the other hand, 
                                                          
13
 Assume a state has „C‟ reserved constituencies, a number which remains constant across two 
elections held at times t and (t-1), where t is the most recent election prior to the controversy and (t-1) is 
the previous election. If Nt and Nt-1 represent the total number of candidates who competed in reserved 
constituencies at times t and t-1, then the change in the average number of candidates per reserved 
constituency is calculated as: [Nt – Nt-1] / C.  
14
 Using the same symbols as before, if Xt and Xt-1 represent the total number of candidates in reserved 
constituencies who forfeited their deposits at times t and t-1, then the change in average number of 
competitive candidates per reserved constituency is calculated as: [ (Nt – Xt) – (Nt-1 – Xt-1) ] / C.  
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suggests that the Dalit vote in the state is becoming increasingly concentrated, 
distributed among fewer competitors.  
 
Electoral Competition and the Variations Across Congress-Ruled States 
As mentioned in the previous section, Haryana is unique among the four states 
in this analysis because it was the only state which imposed a ban on Aaja Nachle 
preemptively, that is, before any sign of public protest. Interestingly, Haryana is also 
the only state in Table 3.2 in which SC reserved constituencies have witnessed an 
increase in the number of competitive candidates over time. This suggests that in the 
run up the release of Aaja Nachle in Haryana, the vote in reserved constituencies was 
becoming more thinly distributed across candidates (See Column 2). One might 
surmise that in this context of tighter electoral contests, marginal gains and losses in 
voter support might be decisive in shaping electoral outcomes. Seen in this light, the 
government of Haryana‟s preemptive ban on the film could even be said to be 
expected. Presumably, it could not afford to let members of the opposition seize upon 
the issue.   
This reading of the electoral data is confirmed by a closer examination of the 
dynamics of politics in Haryana in the run up to Aaja Nachle‟s release.15 As has 
already been noted, Nooruddin and Chhibber (2008) have pointed out that Haryana is 
the second most electorally volatile among India‟s 15 “major” states. Adding a degree 
of complexity to this story is the fact that the Congress Party in the state is routinely 
faced with defections from dissident members who manage to compete successfully, 
                                                          
15
 This section draws heavily on “Lal‟s Last Gambit”  by Ramesh Vinayak in India Today, December 6, 
2007; and  “The many faces of Dalit politics” by Yogendra Yadav in The Hindu , May 7, 2009. 
Available online at: http://www.thehindu.com/2009/05/07/stories/2009050759971400.htm. Last 
Accessed on: June 11, 2009. 
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and later make hard bargains to form post-election coalitions with their former party 
organizations. For instance, in the run-up to the 2005 Assembly election in the state, it 
was reported that the Haryana state Congress organization “tops the list of faction-
ridden state units”, prompting a special visit by the Party‟s national leadership in an 
attempt to placate dissidents.
16
  
However, in the run-up to the release of Aaja Nachle, the State Party 
organization received a particularly worrying jolt. Merely a week before the release of 
the film, one of the most prominent lower caste leaders of the Congress Party, Mr. 
Bhajan Lal, decided to defect to form a new political party which he called the 
Haryana Janhit Congress [Haryana People‟s Welfare Congress]. Lal had a long-
standing rivalry with the Congress Chief Minister in the state, a upper-caste Jat named 
Bhupinder Singh Hooda after the latter was hand-picked by the Party‟s central 
leadership in New Delhi to head the state government in Haryana. Yadav notes that 
the majority of the Dalit vote in the state has remained steadily within the Congress 
fold, “without [the Party] having promoted a Dalit leadership or pro-Dalit policies.”17 
For instance, Hooda was widely perceived to be a pro-Jat leader, particularly in light 
of his equivocal response to a series of hate crimes against Dalits that took place 
earlier in 2007. The Party‟s electoral hold over Haryana‟s Dalits was consequently 
believed to be due to Bhajan Lal‟s influence and stature as a non-Jat leader in the state, 
rather than because of the party‟s pro-Dalit policies.  
As it turned out, it was in the week of Aaja Nachle‟s release that Lal formally 
announced the formation of his new party, declaring that he would hold a mammoth 
                                                          
16
 See “Sonia meets Haryana Candidates Today,” and “Cong Rebels ignore Bhajan‟s Warning” in The 
Tribune, January 19, 2005. Available online at: 
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2005/20050119/haryana.htm#3. Last Accessed on: June 12, 2009.   
17
 See “The many faces of Dalit politics” in The Hindu , May 7, 2009. Available online at: 




political rally in Chief Minister Hooda‟s home constituency on December 2, 2007, the 
Sunday of the film‟s opening weekend. One can imagine that, as far as Hooda and the 
Congress Party in Haryana were concerned, the release of Aaja Nachle was well-timed 
indeed. The banning of the film appears to have been used as a way to shore up the 
Party‟s credentials among their Dalit supporters in the wake of an internal 




Although it appears that proximate factors may have had a larger role to play 
in the censorship of Aaja Nachle in Haryana, it is important to recognize that Bhajan 
Lal‟s defection may well be representative of a larger trend in the state‟s politics in 
which defections mean that prominent former-Congressmen with established 
clientelist networks are able to remain competitive and erode incumbent vote share in 
the process. Furthermore, in contrast to Haryana‟s increasingly close electoral races in 
constituencies reserved for Scheduled Castes, Himachal Pradesh, the other Congress-
ruled state appears to have seen a decline in competitiveness over time (column 2). So 
despite high levels of anti-incumbency in both states, the closeness of the electoral 
race in Haryana may imply that incumbents do not lose elections by a particularly 
large margin, thereby making even small gains and losses in voter support potentially 
decisive factors in electoral outcomes.
19
  
                                                          
18
 Notably, the state government‟s official statement  said that there was “heavy resentment and anguish 
among the people belonging to Scheduled Caste community [sic] over some objectionable utterances in 
the film allegedly demeaning their caste and thereby hurting their sentiments. Therefore the possibility 
of violent protest and clashes leading to breach of peace and law and order situation in the state with 
resultant damage to public life and property could not be ruled out.”  See “Now, Haryana bans Aaja 
Nachle” in The Times of India online, December 1, 2007. Available at: 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/2587954.cms. Last accessed on: April 11, 2009. 
19
 Additionally, in contrast to the situation confronting the Congress Party organization in Haryana, the 
Congress in Himachal Pradesh appears to have been relatively internally coherent in 2007. It had been 
confronted with an internal crisis in the late 1990s when an important leader, Sukh Ram, was expelled 
from the party in the wake of a major corruption scandal. But he was later re-admitted into the Congress 




Electoral Competition and Protest  
If Haryana has witnessed increasingly close electoral races in reserved 
constituencies over time, the other three states in Table 3.2, Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, and 
Himachal Pradesh had not. On the contrary, reserved constituencies in each of these 
three states saw declines in competition over time. However, this masks an important 
difference across these three states. Notably, Uttar Pradesh and Punjab have witnessed 
increases in the average number of candidates running for election over time. Since 
only Dalit candidates are allowed to contest from reserved constituencies, this increase 
in the number of aspirants to power suggests that these two states have witnessed 
increasing levels of Dalit political activism over time. That is, Dalits in these two 
states have increasingly been attempting to compete in elections outside the fold of the 
major political parties. However, these attempts have tended to be unsuccessful. 
Yadav, for instance, notes that the Mayawati‟s Bahujan Samaj Party [BSP] in Uttar 
Pradesh has come to secure about three quarters of the state‟s Dalit vote, suggesting a 
dramatic concentration of electoral power with one party even as numerous aspirants 
make attempts to vie for the vote.
20
 
Under such circumstances, one can imagine that newer and resource-poor 
political outsiders use symbolic appeals to make up for their lack of resources and/or 
                                                                                                                                                                       
three years later, those divisions seem to have been settled; Sukh Ram had announced his retirement 
from active politics and his son was a member of the state legislative assembly on a Congress Party 
ticket. Finally, the comparatively higher socio-economic status of Dalits in Himachal Pradesh in 
comparison to that in Haryana may have led the Party to feel significantly more confident about the 
continued support from this group.  
 
20
 See “The Many Faces of Dalit Politics” by Yogendra Yadav in The Hindu, May 7, 2009. Available 
online at: http://www.thehindu.com/2009/05/07/stories/2009050759971400.htm. Last Accessed on: 
June 12, 2009.  
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experience. That is to say that such an electoral environment provides a strong 
incentive for a “disappointed aspirant” to actively seek out opportunities to raise her 
public profile, with extra-institutional mobilization being the only (and yet, possibly 
the ideal) avenue through which this can be achieved.  This can be illustrated most 
specifically in the Phagwara constituency in the state of Punjab; the location of the 
only protest against Aaja Nachle reported from the state. Here, the last two state 
elections were held early in 2007 and before that in 2002. In 2002, 70% of the 
candidates who contested in the constituency ended up forfeiting their deposits with 
the two biggest political parties, the Congress and the BJP together accounting for just 
under 72% of the vote. By 2007, these two parties had increased their joint tally to 
almost 85% of the vote, with 75% of the candidates forfeiting their deposits.
21
  
Such an admittedly simplistic analysis begins to throw light on some of the 
dynamics that were described in the previous chapter. First, it suggests that 
government responsiveness to claims of offense seems to be strongly correlated not 
just with the strength of anti-incumbency but also with the intensity of competition for 
the vote of the “offended” group. Second, it suggests that electoral contexts in which 
there are increasing numbers of “disappointed aspirants” for a group‟s vote are more 
likely to see protest against offensive materials. The rest of this chapter takes a closer 
look at the unfolding of events in the weeks following the release of Aaja Nachle in 
order to get a sense of how these dynamics play out on the ground.  
 
 
                                                          
21
 All data are from the records of the Election Commission of India.  
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Intra-Dalit Competition in Uttar Pradesh: The Systemic Compulsions of Ethnic 
Clientelism  
Uttar Pradesh is the only state in India where a party that was formed explicitly 
to further the cause of the Dalit community has actually gained political power. 
Although the first stirrings of Dalit mobilization began in India even before 
independence, it was only in the late 1980s that Dalits‟ political assertion is believed 
to have come of age when the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), founded by Kanshi Ram, 
achieved its first major electoral victories. As mentioned in the previous section, the 
BSP today has cornered roughly three quarters of the Dalit vote in the state, a sign of 
its dominant position as a Dalit party in Indian politics. 
A number of contemporary Dalit political leaders had their first taste of politics 
through Kanshi Ram‟s BSP, which is part of the reason why the party is often credited 
with generating a degree of political consciousness in the community (Chandra 2004; 
Ram 2008). Kanshi Ram had made it a point to form extra-party organizations, such as 
a trade union for government employees belonging to the religious minorities and 
Scheduled Castes and Tribes, upon which his party built its first electoral successes. 
However, even before Kanshi Ram‟s death in 2006, the party is noted to have been run 
relatively dictatorially, a trend that some have suggested has continued under his 
handpicked successor, a Dalit woman named Mayawati, who controlled the party 
when Aaja Nachle was released.
22
  
As chairperson of the National Federation of SC/ST Organizations, Udit Raj, 
the leader of the Indian Justice Party (IJP) is presumed to have access to a large 
network of Dalit activists who are believed to buttress his political standing, although 
                                                          
22
 See “Empowering Builder” by Yogendra Yadav in The Indian Express, October 10, 2006. Available 
at: http://www.indianexpress.com/news/empowering-builder/14344/1 Last Accessed on: June 11, 2009 
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this support network has not translated into major electoral successes. Raj has 
arguably spent his entire political career to date engaged in attempts to discredit 
Mayawati‟s claims of being the great “Dalit hope” and has been more than willing to 
use symbolic politics to do so.  The political rally at which he announced the 
formation of the Indian Justice Party was itself replete with political and religious 
symbolism as he publicly converted to Buddhism in New Delhi in November 2001. 
He has frequently argued that by refusing to repudiate Hinduism – the religion that 
was the cause of Dalits‟ marginalization – Mayawati was actually allowing for the 
persistence of the exploitative caste system, rather than working for its abolishment.
23
  
A connected but more damning critique has also been provided of Mayawati‟s 
readiness to form political alliances with more established and upper-caste dominated 
parties like the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Congress, with her political 
opponents within the Dalit movement suggesting that this demonstrates her desire for 
political power at any cost rather than her concern with Dalit emancipation. Notably, 
part of the reason for Mayawati‟s success in the 2007 elections in Uttar Pradesh was 
her willingness to form a “rainbow coalition” of caste and religious groups, cutting 
across many social and cultural boundaries in the state.  
That Mayawati believed the Indian Justice Party, and Udit Raj more 
specifically, to be a political threat was evidenced in the fact that she frequently took it 
upon herself to organize political rallies in parallel with Mr. Raj‟s planned public 
meetings, as in the city of Nagpur in October 2006, and has consistently felt the need 
to respond to his accusations regarding her conversion to Buddhism in order to justify 
                                                          
23
 See “Mass Conversion by Dalits” by V. Venkatesan in Frontline Vol. 18, Issue 23, November 10-23, 






 The banning of Aaja Nachle in Uttar Pradesh can only be understood 
as a part of this larger dynamic of competing claims for credibility among different 
Dalit parties and politicians. The protest by the Indian Justice Party appears to have 
been a part of Raj‟s larger political strategy to claim credibility as a leader who was 
genuinely concerned about the ending of discrimination of Dalits.  And the timing of 
Mayawati‟s ban as well as her subsequent letter to the Prime Minister demanding a 
nation-wide ban on the film can only be understood in light of the IJP‟s attempt to 
challenge her position as the most credible and promising Dalit political leader. 
The imperatives facing Udit Raj and the Indian Justice Party in their 
competition over the Dalit vote against Mayawati‟s BSP ought to be fairly clear. The 
analysis of electoral data in previous section has already pointed to the fact that it is 
increasingly difficult for new aspirants to power to make a mark in the state of Uttar 
Pradesh. Furthermore, as a relatively resource-poor party without direct access to state 
office or patronage, the Indian Justice Party faces a dilemma similar to any other 
resource-poor political formation in the context of a clientelist democracy. In a non-
ethnicized party system, the IJP would probably have disappeared just as quickly as it 
emerged on the Indian political scene. However, as discussed in chapter two, the 
ethnic dimensions of clientelistic democratic competition provide resource-poor 
parties with other ways in which to maintain the interest of their party cadre in the 
absence of access to political spoils. In particular, by re-affirming the ethnic 
dimensions of intra-party ties, these parties can go for longer periods without seeing 
the same rates of attrition of membership as one might expect.  
                                                          
24
 See “Won‟t Convert Till Made PM” in The Times of India, October 15, 2006. Available at: 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/2171934.cms . Last Accessed on: June 11, 2009. 
Conversion to Buddhism has been seen as a way for Dalits to escape the oppressive caste system while 
still owing their allegiance to an “Indian” religion. The practice of conversion to Buddhism was first 
used as a political tool  by prominent Dalit politician B.R. Ambedkar in the early years following 
India‟s independence.  
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In fact, as mentioned previously, symbolic politics on cultural issues has 
become the hallmark of the IJP, with the bulk of its mobilization taking place around 
the organization of rallies for the mass-conversion of Dalits, usually to either 
Buddhism or Christianity. In such a situation, a high profile target like Aaja Nachle 
may be viewed as a way to buttress the party in the wake of an electoral debacle in 
Uttar Pradesh earlier in 2007 in which 120 of the party‟s 121 candidates forfeited their 
deposits.
25
  When asked by a prominent television news channel about Mayawati‟s 
decision to ban the film in Uttar Pradesh in response to his protest, Mr. Raj responded, 
“Mayawati took up this issue this evening because she thought I could not get more 
publicity [sic].”26 
But in all this, it is important not to forget Mayawati‟s own organizational 
compulsions. In response to the IJP‟s protests and their own party government‟s ban, 
BSP workers in the city of Lucknow are reported to have gone on a rampage in movie 
theaters that had already been screening Aaja Nachle, assaulting customers and 
forcibly removing them in the midst of a showing. As was proposed in chapter two, 
this is likely due to Mayawati‟s own compulsions as the charismatic leader of a party 
that began as an explicitly Dalit party and gradually broadened its electoral base in an 
attempt to come to power. When called out on her Dalit credentials, she saw it fit to 
“mobilize the troops” to confront the challenge to her credibility.27  
                                                          
25
 The Indian Justice Party won just 1.47% of votes polled in the seats it contested and only 0.43% of 
votes polled in the state as a whole in 2007. Most of its candidates brought up the rear in a list of up to 
15 candidates per constituency. There were some notable exceptions such as Rakesh Kumar Verma in 
Dariyabad, Ram Gopal in Siddhaur (SC reserved), Rakesh Kumar Verma again in Masauli who lost to 
the winning BSP candidate by just 5000 votes. Some of his best-performing candidates have been 
poached from other parties in the state, such as the Samajwadi Party.  
26






This isn‟t to deny the possibility that offense may genuinely have been taken to 
the lyric in question. It is merely to suggest that ethnic parties with weak or faltering 
bases of support may have the incentive to actively seek offense to serve the dual 
purposes of rallying party workers, while also raising their own profile as credible 
representatives of the offended group. The potential consequences for free expression 
need not be spelled out.  
 
Epilogue: Facing the Music  
In response to Mayawati‟s ban, the producers of Aaja Nachle, Yashraj Films, 
issued a public apology on December 1, 2007, saying that no offense was intended by 
the lyric in question and that the lyricist had used the word “cobbler” to denote a 
profession rather than a caste group. Yashraj Films also agreed to edit all the prints of 
the movie and also to recall all music CDs so that the offensive lyric could be 
expunged.  
On the same day, the issue was raised in the Indian Parliament in New Delhi 
with Members of Parliament Ramdas Athavale belonging to the Republican Party of 
India (RPI) and Mohammed Salim of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI-
M) demanding the initiation of criminal proceedings against the producers and lyricist. 
The Congress-led coalition government declared that it was the prerogative of the 
states to decide whether or not the film deserved to be banned, but claimed that since 
the producers had apologized and agreed to expunge the offensive lyric from the song 
it did not appear necessary to pursue the issue any further. The Minister of Information 
and Broadcasting, Mr. Priya Ranjan Dasmunshi, however, did reiterate that “[The] 
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Government‟s policy is that nothing should be done in the country which will offend 
any community, caste or religion.”28 
Mayawati seemed to agree with the Congress‟s stand. She accepted the 
producers‟ apology and lifted the ban on December 2, 2007. Punjab and Haryana 
followed suit. However, one politician, Mr. Athavale, was not placated. On the very 
day that Mayawati accepted Yashraj Films‟ apology, he issued a statement saying that 
the apology and expunging of the line were not sufficient measures: “You cannot 
commit a crime and then apologize believing that the society will forgive you.  The 
law of the land has to be implemented and examples have to be set so that people 
refrain from hurting the sentiments of…communities in the name of artistic freedom.” 
Athavale demanded that the film‟s director, producer, and lyricist be booked under the 
Atrocities Act for “hurting the sentiments of 25 crore [250 million] Indian citizens 
from the weaker sections”. 29 Athavale also demanded that the Indian Censor Board be 
reformed so as to include representatives of a wider range of communities.  
As late as December 19, over two weeks after the much-hyped film had 
already been declared a box office debacle, Athavale‟s RPI staged a protest in his 
native state of Maharashtra demanding the dismissal of the chief of the Indian Censor 
Board as well the arrest and prosecution of the film-makers.
30
 Why was an 
unconditional apology enough for Mayawati and the Indian Justice Party, but not 
enough for Ramdas Athavale?
31
 This takes us back, once again, to the realm of intra-
group ethnic party competition. Mayawati‟s Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) had held 
                                                          
28
 Lok Sabha Debates. December 1, 2007.  
29
 Ramdas Athavale, quoted in “Lyrics row: RPI leader still upset” in The Times of India, December 3, 
2007.  
30
 “Ramdas Athavale Demands Tagore‟s Resignation” in Mumbai Mirror, page 2, December 20, 2007. 
31
 It is important to note that Indian intellectuals, although united in their belief that the lyric was, in 
fact, offensive to Dalits, were divided on whether the offense was intentional. As prominent Indian 
social scientist Yogendra Yadav remarked to the Times of India (December 2, 2007), “I am sure they 
did not mean to offend anyone. But we unconsciously use words that are casteist”. 
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what turned out to be a particularly successful rally in the city of Mumbai in 
Maharashtra as late as November 25, 2007. The faction-ridden RPI under Athavale‟s 
leadership had long been the only Dalit party of any (albeit minor) consequence in the 
state of Maharashtra, and Mayawati‟s entry into state politics was widely expected to 
eat into Athavale‟s already fractured support in the state. Given that Mayawati had 
already begun expanding her base in Maharashtra by poaching members of the RPI, 
Athavale could well have been in need of a cause with which to rejuvenate his party 
cadre. 
32
 It was therefore very much in his interest to up the ante in Maharashtra, the 
state in which he had the most to lose from Mayawati‟s apparently meteoric rise to 
power in Uttar Pradesh earlier that year.  
The RPI subsequently vandalized a movie theater in the city of Pune in January 
in the run up to Athavale‟s planned a rally in Mumbai city on February 17, 2008. 
Mayawati‟s entry into Maharashtra politics even stimulated talk with the RPI‟s 
seventeen factions to unite in the face of the BSP‟s electoral threat.33 Furthermore, 
later in the year, Athavale threatened the producer of an animated mythological film 
Dashavatar with “dire consequences” if a scene in which the Buddha was depicted as 
one of the incarnations of the Hindu deity Vishnu was not removed. The filmmakers 
were made to organize a “special screening” for the RPI, after which the party gave its 
“clearance” for the national release of the film.34 It didn‟t occur to anyone to ask why 
a political party which had only won a seat in one electoral constituency in the 
previous election had been allowed to claim extra-governmental authority as an 
informal censor.  
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 See “Maya‟s March” in The Sunday Express, page 5, January 6, 2008.  
33
 See “Dalit factions may join hands against Maya” in The Hindustan Times, March 4, 2008, page 7, 
Mumbai edition.  
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The Ethnic Mainstream: The Congress Party and Dalit Politics 
This case raises particular questions about a mainstream party‟s (in this case 
the Congress Party‟s) responses to censorship demands from newly mobilized identity 
groups. As discussed previously, the Party‟s governments in the states of Haryana and 
Himachal Pradesh reacted very differently when it came to imposing bans on Aaja 
Nachle. This variation in responses at the state level fits in with arguments made 
previously about the compulsions facing incumbents in contexts of increasing political 
competition. However, as it turned out, the “mainstream” Congress Party played a 
clever game at the national level as the Aaja Nachle controversy unfolded. In fact, it 
went even further than Ramdas Athavale, formally interrogating people associated 
with the film even after they offered their unconditional apology.  
On December 3, 2007, despite state bans being revoked across the country, the 
National Commission for Scheduled Castes (NCSC), a quasi-judicial body dealing 
with cases of atrocities against Scheduled Castes, decided to probe the incident 
further. In a notable expansion to the list of “accused” made by the RPI, the NCSC 
demanded to have a hearing with actress Madhuri Dixit, who Athavale had 
specifically let off the hook saying that “the controversy has nothing to do with her”.35 
As late as December 20, 2007, the NCSC demanded a written apology from the chief 
of the Censor Board and demanded that the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting 
“appoint an advisor in the [Censor Board] for censoring scripts.”36 As it happens, the 
                                                          
35
 It is interesting to note that the actress had apparently spoken to Athavale on the telephone and 
offered to hold a free public performance in his constituency on her next visit to India (the actress lives 
in the United States) as a quid pro quo for him withdrawing his opposition to the film. See “Mad about 
– not at – Madhuri. Actress dials, politicians fall head over heels” by Rashid Kidwai, in The Telegraph, 
December 4, 2007. http://www.telegraphindia.com/1071204/asp/frontpage/story_8626962.asp  
36
 “Sharmila Tagore told to give written apology over Aaja Nachle song” by Narendra Kaushik in 
Mumbai Mirror, December 20, 2007, page 2.  
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NCSC at the time was staffed by senior members of the Congress Party Mr. Buta 
Singh, a Dalit-Sikh leader from Punjab, and Mr. N.M. Kamble, the head of the 
Congress Party in the state of Maharashtra. It seems that it was the mainstream 





The present chapter was an attempt to assess whether the hypotheses derived 
from the previous chapter regarding the conditions under which censorship demands 
are likely to emerge and be redressed fit into the pattern of events in an unrelated case. 
The preceding discussion points to the following conclusions: First, claims of offense 
are likely to emerge in electoral environments in which there are an increasing number 
of patronage-poor parties and/or “disappointed aspirants”, especially in contexts in 
which the vote of the offended group is becoming increasingly concentrated with one 
or two political parties over time. Second, mobilizing around offense gives all parties, 
but especially personalistically organized ethnic parties, an opportunity to “rally the 
troops”, allowing them to maintain cadre loyalty despite organizational weaknesses. 
Finally, for patronage rich incumbents, acting on claims of offense serves two distinct 
strategies: it may serve as a substitute for the provision of material resources, allowing 
them to communicate their concern for the offended group even when the group has 
generally been neglected; and second, it may serve as a complement, signaling 
continued commitment to the group in the face of strong anti-incumbency effects.  
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 Notably, this occurred in parallel with the expansion of the Party‟s flagship National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREG) under which individual citizens are entitled to at least 100 
days  of work if they are unemployed. This was seen as an important program to buttress the party‟s 
support amongst poorer sections of Indian society, of which Dalits form the largest part. 
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However, this still leaves the larger question about how symbolic appeals with 
a particular content come to become a part of the praxis of identity politics. It was 
suggested in Chapter One that the answer may lie in the way in which a democracy 
negotiates its social and cultural diversity. It was also suggested that a long-standing 
democracy‟s constitution may be a good place to begin a search for its multicultural 
arrangement. However, even though Constitutions are believed to embody the 
principles that underlie a democratic polity, it is important to recognize that all 
Constitutions are also products of the particular historical, social, and political 
contexts in which they are formulated, with their content determined as much by 
historical and conjunctural factors as by principle. The following chapter, therefore, 
presents a history of Indian society and politics in the colonial era in order to provide a 





INDIAN POLITICS IN THE COLONIAL ERA:  
THE POLITICAL ENTRENCHMENT OF CULTURAL REVIVALISM 
 
The previous chapter suggested that looking at principles embodied within a 
democratic constitution is a potentially useful exercise when trying to discern how 
particular kinds of political strategies and symbolic appeals come to be deployed in the 
electoral arena. However, it also pointed out that a Constitution is as much a product 
of particular historical and conjunctural events as it is a statement of founding 
principles. Therefore, in order to understand the larger implications of a country‟s 
constitutional order, it is essential to place the matrix of constitutional principles in 
their historical context.  
The present chapter is an attempt to place the Indian constitutional order in 
historical perspective through a discussion of patterns of Indian politics under British 
colonial rule, beginning in roughly 1757, when the British East India Company made 
its first territorial conquest in Bengal with the Battle of Plassey, thereby making the 
transition from merchants to colonialists. The chapter will make the following main 
arguments: First, that the patterns of censorship politics evident today appear to have 
had deeper roots as a wide range of political partisans in the colonial era came to 
believe in the ability of cultural and religious revivalist appeals to elicit a positive 
response from both colonial India‟s restricted electorate as well as its mass public. 
Second, it argues that this consensus emerged partly out of developments in the socio-
cultural arena, but also by conscious strategizing as politicians “learned” from the 
experience of both their predecessors and their contemporaries about what kinds of 
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strategies were most likely to pay political dividends, subsequently deploying them in 
their contests for power and influence.  
Further, under the influence of Hindu revivalists who glorified ancient Hindu 
custom and tradition and influential leaders like Mahatma Gandhi, ideas about the 
importance of the moral regeneration of the individual and the protection of culture 
and tradition for the “national project” came to be widely disseminated as the Indian 
national movement began to acquire a mass character and incorporate broader sections 
of society into its agitations. By the time India became independent there was, in 
essence, a political consensus on the importance of these goals. It was a consensus 
which, as will be demonstrated in Chapter Five, came to be expressed in the country‟s 
constitutional order.  
 
British Policy and the Indian Response: Orientalism, Anglicism and the Birth of 
Hindu Revivalism  
The early years of the East India Company‟s rule in India beginning with the 
Battle of Plassey in 1757 were met with a marked ambiguity in Britain. Government 
and “public” opinion had reservations about the costs of building a new empire, 
particularly in a part of the world so different from their own.
1
 These reservations 
translated into a distinctive India policy referred to in the scholarly literature as 
“Orientalism”, whereby early colonial rulers cultivated bases of support among 
traditional social and religious elites in an attempt to overcome what they saw as 
important impediments to the establishment of British rule in India. The Orientalist era 
                                                          
1
 As late as the 1770s, a “Secret Committee” formed by the British government in the wake of 
expansionist tendencies of the Company representatives in India noted that “to pursue schemes of 
conquest and extent of dominion, are measures repugnant to the wish, the honour, and the policy of this 
nation” (Marshall 1993, 65).  
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was marked by British attempts to establish continuity with the past, with continued 
patronage to established social and religious leaders and institutions and the adoption 
of “native” languages and customs by the new rulers. However, it also incorporated 
some distinctively modern elements, such as formal government-sponsored 
educational systems and the establishment of British-style courts of law.  
But these “modern” features were also made to conform to Orientalist policy 
with education being provided to the social elite in languages like Persian, Arabic and 
Sanskrit and the study of religious scriptures like the Vedas and the Koran. Further, 
Company courts followed Hindu or Muslim religious laws, encoded for the British by 
traditional (and, more often than not, conservative) religious elites.  Orientalism, for 
all its essentialization of native culture and religion, was characterized by a particular 
respect for traditional Hindu philosophy especially as manifest in religious scriptures 
like the Vedas and Upanishads.  As Marshall has argued, even as the British saw 
Hindu society and its practices as being corrupt and depraved, “Hindu moral teaching 
was sometimes commended” (Marshall 1970, 20), with early influential writers like 
John Howell (1767) waxing eloquent about the “rational and sublime” teachings of 
Hindu scriptures and the “genuine piety” shown by the priestly Brahmin caste 
(Marshall 1970, 27). Further, and significantly, early writers also explicitly identified 
parallels between Hindu and Christian philosophy, thereby encouraging the British 
public to give a “sympathetic hearing” to Hindu philosophy and its teachings 
(Marhsall 1970, 38).  
For the early colonial administrators, then, a respect for religious custom and 
tradition was driven both by ideology as well as by practical politics. This was 
manifest in early government policies of “non-intervention” in religious affairs of their 
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Indian subjects and the explicit prohibition of missionary activity and government 
funding of English education in the decades immediately following 1757.
2
  
By the 1780s, however, the political environment in Britain was beginning to 
change. The rise to political prominence of Christian Evangelicals, and particularly the 
so-called “Clapham sect” led by members of the haute bourgeoisie like William 
Wilberforce, began to have a dramatic influence on the way the British public and 
parliament came to perceive both themselves as well as Indian custom and religion, 
with important implications for the British government‟s role in India. In Britain, the 
rise of the Evangelicals sparked movements for greater government probity and moral 
uprightness and these had spillover effects for the East India Company as news of 




The Evangelicals brought with them an alternative to the Government of 
India‟s Orientalist policies – referred to in the literature as “Anglicism” – arguing that 
the British government had a responsibility to spread Western knowledge, language 
and religion in order to enlighten its colonial subjects and thereby justify its presence 
in the subcontinent. The evangelical desire to save the souls of “natives” in India led 
to a growing demonization of Indian (and particular Hindu) custom and tradition, and 
                                                          
2
 Even though Orientalists saw the spread of Western knowledge among the “natives” as fundamentally 
desirable, they believed that this could only be achieved through the “grafting” of these ideas into the 
study of native language and tradition thereby making it more accessible and acceptable to traditional 
elites in India. 
 
3
 The moral dimension of British self-perception and purpose is evident in the impeachment trial of 
William Hastings, former Governor General of India, in 1785-86, on charges of corruption and the 
waging of “unjustified wars” in India. At the helm of the impeachment proceedings was conservative 
“Whig” parliamentarian Edmund Burke, a long-time critic of British colonialism in India.  
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the portrayal of Indians as being under the thumb of tyrannical local elites, thereby 
justifying both spiritual as well as physical “liberation” of the natives. 4 
As mentioned before, contemporary Hindu custom had always been deplored 
in Britain, but in the new political and social context, missionary reports of natives‟ 
moral depravity and ignorance put new pressures on the colonial government to act. 
For instance, Chairman of the East India Company, Member of Parliament and 
prominent Evangelist, Charles Grant (1746-1823), pointed to the practice of Sati  
[widow self-immolation] “as an indicator of the backwardness and degradation of 
Hindu society” and used the existence of the practice to demand a more far-reaching 
British colonial presence in the subcontinent (Major 2007, xxxiv). Similarly, 
missionaries spoke at length about the moral profligacy and sexual depravity of Indian 
society, as evidenced in things like works of art and women‟s dress, arguing that the 
spread of English language and Christianity would provide “an enabling and civilizing 
agency for the improvement of the natives” (Gupta 2000, 94-95; also see Metcalf 
1994).  Anglicists began to criticize the government‟s temerity when it came to the 
reform of native custom and tradition, advocating a more aggressive policy of social 
and cultural transformation. 
It was under Governor General William Bentinck (1828) when Anglicism 
finally triumphed over Orientalism in British colonial policy, in a period that saw a 
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 These ideas came to the fore in the 1790s, after the Third Mysore War, when the British under 
Governor General Cornwallis defeated the rebellious native ruler of Mysore, Tipu Sultan.  The 
portrayal, in the British press, of the vanquished Tipu as a fanatical tyrant supported by the French 
pushed public opinion in favor of the war effort and, according to Marshall, marked the beginnings of a 
shift in British receptivity to the idea of a British territorial empire in the sub-continent: “The effusions 
provoked by the Third Mysore War suggest that the British were coming to see themselves not only as a 
great military power in India, but as a people of justice and moderation.  Victory was a triumph for 




dramatic expansion of English language education at the cost of “Oriental studies”, 
and with important interventions in the religious life of Hindus in particular with the 
abolition of Sati in 1828. The growing importance of Anglicism in government policy 
was buttressed by the first stirrings of reformist impulses among sections of the Indian 
elite. The Sati Abolition Act of 1828, for instance, was the brainchild of Indian 
reformer Ram Mohun Ray, a Bengali Brahmin with an “Oriental” education who had 
acquired fluency in the English language through a private tutor.  
It is important to keep in mind that despite its increasingly Anglicist leanings 
the Government maintained that it followed a policy of non-intervention in religion 
and culture of the natives. Legal restrictions on religion and practice were permitted 
only in the event that the practice in question did not have scriptural sanction and that 
it was an infringement on the civil rights of colonial subjects. Early Hindu reformist 
discourse was, subsequently, shaped in peculiar ways both by its proponents‟ Oriental 
education as well as by the conditionality of Government intervention in tradition. For 
people like Ray, justifying legal reform and government intervention required making 
appeals to scriptural authority and by identifying the practice of Sati as a latter day 
perversion of a morally and ethically pure antecedent Hindu philosophy.
5
  
The adoption of these strategies is significant because they gave even 
ostensibly “reformist” or “progressive” movements within Hinduism a paradoxically 
conservative hue, legitimizing rather than challenging the authority of religious 
scriptures.
6
 This strategy was widely adopted by other “reformist movements” within 
Hindu society right through the 19
th
 century, often with an added element of cultural 
                                                          
5
 A similar strategy was used by local proponents of bans on other “popular” religious practices such as 
the predominantly southern Indian practice of “hookswinging” where a man was suspended from a 
height for close to an hour and a half by metal hooks inserted into his back in attempts to appease a 
local goddess (See Dirks 1997). 
6
 For example, Lata Mani (1998) argues that the debate between opponents and proponents of Sati was 
over tradition rather than the rights of women. 
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or religious revivalism, with Orientalist-inspired appeals to a glorious Hindu past that 
was in danger of being lost after centuries of internal rot and foreign domination.
7
 In 
effect, then, reform movements never actually critiqued Hindu philosophy per se, but 
merely labeled their targeted practices as perversions of classical Hinduism. 
Furthermore, and in stark contrast with developments during the Protestant 
Reformation, reform movements in 19
th
 century India did not seek to save individual 
souls, but sought to save the Hindu “religion” and “community” itself from enemies 





 century progressed and Anglicist educational policy began to 
produce its first native graduates, Hindu custom and tradition came in for more 
damning critiques, this time not so much from foreign missionaries as from Anglicized 
Hindus. Early graduates from Bombay University (instituted in 1858), for instance, 
became some of the foremost “reformers” of the time, pushing for reform on issues 
such as the rights of widows, property rights of women, and child marriage. The 
Hindu orthodoxy, which had already been marginalized by the Europeanization of the 
administration and saw their authority as the exclusive interpreters of Hindu religious 
texts being increasingly eroded, began to brace itself for a fight.
9
 It is particularly 
worth noting that even more than the British, Hindu elites began to focus on the 
                                                          
7
 This was true of almost the full range of early social reform movements among Hindus from Ram 
Mohun Ray to Swami Vivekananda to the Arya Samaj under Swami Dayananda Saraswati. See Jones 
1994. 
8
 For instance, the focus on the eradication of the caste system, a factor which lends movements like the 
Arya Samaj their “reformist” hue, wasn‟t due to any deeply held belief in the equality of all, but rather 
on the acknowledgment that caste divisions had weakened Hindu society from within, leaving it open to 
attrition through foreign conquest and missionary activity. 
9
 Under Anglicist policy, traditional elites came to be increasingly marginalized as government 
patronage began to be diverted to western educational initiatives, and government administration came 
to be staffed by Englishmen rather than Indian social elites. This latter policy was evolved under Lord 
Cornwallis, who understood the reasons for moral and financial depravity among Company officers as 
being the result of extended contact with immoral and depraved natives. He sought to reform the 
administration, insulating English officers from Indians by removing many of the traditional elites from 
government service (Viswanathan 1988, 89). 
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“betrayal” of their own members as the most important challenge facing the 
community. As one early conservative commentator argued, “Against foreign enemies 
we might contend with some hope of success, but what shall be done when traitors 
within set fire to the citadel?” (Tucker 1976, 326). 
The belief among the Hindu elite that internal “weaknesses” of Hinduism and 
the Hindu community had been responsible for the subjugation and corruption of 
Hindu society at the hands of Muslims and Europeans led to a growing recognition of 
the importance of “unity” and internal conformity for its regeneration. 10 Anglicized 
sections of the elite and the “debauched” lower classes represented the foremost 
threats to the survival of Hinduism, and revivalist doctrine sought to consolidate the 
faith by controlling these “traitors within”. By the last quarter of the 19th century, 
Hindu revivalist movements had come to be firmly entrenched, particularly in the 
northern and eastern parts of the subcontinent, and drew on almost all sections of 
Hindu society, and in particular, all sections of the Hindu elite for their support. As it 
turned out, it was only a matter of time before their ideas began to work their way into 




                                                          
10
 For instance, Gupta (2000) notes that Hindi literary movements in North India  in the mid-to-late 19
th
 
century increasingly adopted the missionary program for the eradication of immorality, often 
petitioning government to proscribe explicitly sexual and “obscene” pornographic materials and 
foreshadowing an important element of later pan-Indian nationalism. Moral (and particularly sexual) 
profligacy came to be understood as the cause of Hindu society‟s contemporary weakness, and 
revivalist movements at the time sought to channel the energies of the youth in more nationalist 
directions (Gupta 2000, 98). 
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Social Reform and Nationalist Politics: The Early Years of the Indian National 
Congress 
The previous section discussed how colonial policies shaped developments 
within the social and cultural realm in India both directly and indirectly. However, it is 
important to keep in mind that these developments had important political effects, 
creating what became the first generation of Indian politicians. Both Anglicized Hindu 
reformers as well as the Hindu orthodoxy that they targeted frequently drew the 
colonial state into their disputes, particularly to the extent that reformers sought an 
active role by the colonial state in legislating substantive social change in India. This 
made the process of social reform inherently political both in its genesis and its 
effects. However, there was a more broad-based move, particularly among urban 
Indian elites, reformist as well as conservative, toward political activity.  
By the early 1880s, English-educated Indian middle classes in the major port 
cities like Calcutta, Bombay and Madras were beginning to form regional political 
associations to agitate for greater rights, access to job opportunities, and equal 
treatment under the colonial administration. 
11
 The Indian National Congress, formed 
in 1885, conceived of itself as an essentially secular platform for the coordination and 
communication of Indian middle classes‟ economic and political demands to the 
colonial administrators and was committed to keeping questions of social and cultural 
reform out of the purview of the organization (Sisson 1988, 6).   
                                                          
11
 This appears to have been stimulated at least in part by the “Ilbert Bill controversy”: In 1883, Viceroy 
Lord Ripon proposed the progressive “Ilbert Bill” by which Indian justices in colonial courts of law 
would be permitted to have jurisdiction over Europeans. While urban Indians welcomed the Bill, it was 
bitterly opposed by the European community in India and was ultimately still-born (Shukla 1960, 79-
81). The events galvanized the Indian urban elites and led to a push for the creation of a pan-Indian 
organization to represent their interests and on December 28, 1885, the Indian National Congress met 
for the first time in the city of Bombay. 
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However, even as the Congress met in Bombay for the first time, a number of 
its members were beginning to get involved in an emerging controversy around the 
question of reform of Hindu marriage custom. According to orthodox Hindu custom, a 
girl had to be married before she reached puberty, often leading to premature 
widowhood and even death from childbirth or (often forced) sexual intercourse.  As 
early as 1878, a progressive-dominated organization in the city of Poona had raised 
the issue as part of a wider program of social reform. A push for the institution of a 
legal Age of Consent was thwarted by conservatives in 1884. However, after a lull in 
activity, a news report of the death of an 11 year old bride from injuries sustained on 
her wedding night reignited the controversy in 1890. Social progressives like Justice 
Ranade vigorously pursued the issue with the government which finally passed the 
Age of Consent Act of 1891 (Wolpert 1961, 46-50). 
The controversy not only widened the rifts between Anglicized social 
reformers and the Hindu orthodoxy, but it also began to create rifts within the 
Congress as differences emerged with respect to the organization‟s relationship with 
the colonial government. It is important to note that reformers themselves were not in 
agreement about the strategies that ought to be used in the pursuit of social reform. 
Some, like Gopal Krishna Gokhale and Justice Ranade believed that as long as the 
demand for reform came from within Indian society, it was legitimate to ask the 
British government to institutionalize the reform in the form of new legislation. 
Others, like Bal Gangadhar Tilak, believed that it was unacceptable to ask a foreign 
ruler to legislate reforms for Hindu society and that reforms should be adopted by 
individuals on a voluntary basis. These differences in their approaches to social reform 
had come to be mirrored in the Congress organization. The Congress soon came to be 
divided among “moderates” like Gokhale who sought to work with the government in 
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instituting both social change and political reform, and the “extremists” like Tilak who 
saw cooperation with the imperial government on any issue whatsoever as 
unacceptable and traitorous to the national cause (Wolpert 1961, 46-50).  
The emerging tensions within the Congress organization ushered in a new era 
of political competition and mobilization that, as will be demonstrated, proved to have 
a lasting impact on Indian politics well after independence.  
 
Intra-Congress Competition and Political Strategy: Recognizing the Value of 
Cultural Revivalism 
The Indian National Congress was, at first, only an annual forum which was 
attended by various regional organizations. Competition for influence was focused on 
the capture of these local organizations but with the ultimate goal of controlling the 
Congress itself. Up until the 1890s, the „moderates‟ – conservative as well as reformist 
–  dominated not only the National Congress, but also its various regional affiliates. 
Their dominance of the Congress organization‟s decision-making structure and the 
routine stonewalling of extremist demands on a wide range of issues led extremist 
leaders like Tilak, BC Pal, and Lajpat Rai to usher in an era of unprecedented public 
mobilization in a dual attempt to marginalize and delegitimize moderate leaders while 
also establishing themselves as influential political actors who enjoyed widespread 
public support. Given the relatively uncoordinated nature of the Congress 
„organization‟, the vast majority of this mobilization was regionally concentrated, 
aimed at regional political rivals and the capture of prominent regional organizations.  
In their attempts to wrest control over the Congress organization through mass 
mobilization, ostensibly “reformist” but staunchly anti-colonial leaders like Tilak and 
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Pal began to tap into the discourse of Hindu revivalism. But given their regionally 
concentrated political goals, the extremists began to “decentralize” Hindu revivalist 
discourse in their attempts to mobilize regional bases of political support, frequently 
pandering to local social orthodoxy. For instance, Tilak, focusing on the Bombay 
Presidency in western India, concentrated his efforts in trying to delegitimize the 
Bombay moderates, many of whom were Anglicized urban elites belonging to the 
Zorastrian religious community. Tilak‟s strategy began with referring to Zorastrians as 
“foreigners to Hindus” (Wolpert 1962, 49) and mobilizing public opinion around a 
regional Marathi-speaking identity glorifying regional culture and mythology, and 
creating cults around local historical figures like the medieval emperor Shivaji.
12
 
Further, particularly in the wake of the Age of Consent controversy, the 
moderate reformers‟ keenness to work with colonial rulers meant that the extremists‟ 
anti-colonial discourse found an invaluable ally in Hindu conservatives. By the early 
1890s, therefore, the anti-colonial political space came to be dominated by the social 
and religious orthodoxy and popular understandings of “self-rule” or swaraj came to 
be closely associated with a discourse of religious and cultural revivalism. The 
unwillingness (and inability) of moderate politicians to generate mass support for their 
stand meant that a new generation of young Indians had been socialized into politics 
by the extremists and their revivalism-infused anti-colonial discourse.  
In their attempts to gain control over the moderate-dominated Congress, the 
extremists, even those with reformist impulses, trained their guns on moderate social 
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 Tilak was able to capture the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha (PSS) from Bombay Presidency reformists like 
Ranade and Gokhale by 1895-1896. However, when the reformers left the organization to form their 
own Deccan Sabha in 1896, the government de-recognized the PSS as a “worthy political body”; It was 
in this context that Tilak inaugurated high profile public celebrations of the coronation of Shivaji, 
medieval regional emperor who had always been valorized regionally for stopping the advance of the 
Mughal empire during his reign. It was at this time that Shivaji became a central figure of regional 
Maratha cultural revivalism, a “cult” that political parties in the region frequently appeal to till this day. 
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reformers as a way to galvanize their conservative-revivalist bases of support, 
launching a systematic campaign of demonization and silencing. Moderate reformers‟ 
public meetings to garner support for the Age of Consent Bill were frequently broken 
up and vandalized by Tilak‟s supporters, even as Hindu policemen stood by (Wolpert 
1962, 56-57) and their annual meeting, the National Social Conference, which was 
always held in parallel with meetings of the Indian National Congress, became the 
target of “verbal and physical attacks” (Wolpert 1962 72). Significantly, appeals by 
social reformers like Ranade to “moderate” politicians within the Congress for greater 
support to the reformist cause were met with “tardy and equivocal” replies (Wolpert 
1962, 76). It appears that the moderates had also become increasingly aware of the 
political appeal of Hindu revivalist nationalism. Genuine liberal and reformist 
discourse, then, came to be sacrificed at the altar of politics by both extremists as well 
as moderates in their attempts to control the Congress organization.  
As is evident from the example above, many “moderate” politicians (excluding 
the social reformers) were also willing to pander to social orthodoxy and cultural 
revivalism as and when the need arose. In fact, even before the founding of the Indian 
National Congress, at least one future “moderate,” Surendra Nath Banerjea of Bengal, 
had explicitly created a cultural controversy around an issue that could easily have 
gone under the public radar. Banerjea first rose to political prominence in Bengal in 
1883, by instigating a large protest against a judge who had demanded that a Hindu 
idol be brought to court as evidence in a case. Through his newspaper, The Bengalee, 
Banerjea accused the judge of insulting the Hindu faith and was subsequently arrested 
and imprisoned for contempt of court. As early as 1883, Banerjea, who publicly 
acknowledged that he was not religiously orthodox, perceptively recognized the 
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political capital that could accrue to a politician who sided with the orthodoxy. As he 
noted in his autobiography regarding the mobilization around the issue: 
“These were demonstrations not confined to the upper ten thousand or 
educated classes: the masses joined them in their thousands. Hindu feeling had 
been touched. A Hindu god had been brought to a court of law; and whatever 
the legal merits of the case might have been (and with these the general public 
do not usually trouble themselves), the orthodox Hindu felt, rightly or wrongly, 
that there had been an act of desecration…I suffered as a „defender of the 
faith‟… That one with my views and convictions could stand forth in defence 
of the cherished feelings of my orthodox countrymen and should suffer for it, 
was deemed to be an act of no mean merit” (Banerjea 1925, 78-79, 82)  
The recognition of the value of religious sentiment to political entrepreneurs, then, had 
a long and well-established pedigree within the Congress organization, even as its 
most powerful leaders sought to keep the Congress free from intrusions of popular 
controversies relating to religion and social reform, to focus on ostensibly economic 
and governance issues.  
 
The 1905 Partition of Bengal and the Radicalization of Nationalist Sentiment  
Although both moderate and extremist politicians were willing to play on 
cultural revivalist sentiments for their political advantage, they continued to differ 
fundamentally on their underlying loyalty to the British crown. The moderates 
believed that they could appeal to British liberal sentiment to get the political reforms 
they desired, while the extremists believed that the moderates‟ strategy of making 
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petitions to the colonial authorities were worthless without backing them up with some 
credible threat of sanctions.  
However, the British government‟s move to partition the eastern province of 
Bengal along religious lines in 1905 radicalized both moderates and extremists and 
represents one the early “critical junctures” in the history of the Indian nationalist 
movement. It sparked what may well be the first mass-based political campaign in the 
country as politicians made a conscious decision to use the force of numbers to push 
for the reversal of government policy. Further, and more importantly, it was in the 
course of this campaign that the previously tacit acceptance of the use of religious and 
cultural appeals came tumbling out into the open, along with the strategy of the 
“boycott” and the coercion of individuals in the pursuit of collective causes.  
First, and possibly most importantly, the Bengali agitation appears also to have 
made the first articulation of what became known in Indian political circles as the 
“linguistic principle” when the predominantly “moderate” Indian Association in 
Calcutta passed a resolution accusing the government of “dividing the Bengalee-
speaking race” and attempting to “interfere with the social, intellectual, moral and 
industrial advancement of the vast population concerned” (Johnson 1973, 231-2). The 
appeal to linguistic nationalism was buttressed by explicit appeals to religious 
sentiment made by both moderates and extremists in Bengal during the anti-partition 
agitation.
13
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 For instance, Johnson (1973) notes that “Hindu audiences…were encouraged to support the 
movement by being told that English sugar was polluted with the bones and blood of cows in the course 
of its manufacture. The argument was taken up by the Amrita Bazaar Patrika [a prominent regional 
newspaper] which added Liverpool salt and English cloth to the list, and, for the benefit of its Muslim 
English-reading subscribers, included the guts of pigs in the process of manufacture. Religious authority 
was also invoked to support the agitation. [Attempts were made] to persuade Pundits [Hindu priestly 
caste] to preach swadeshi” (Johnson 1973, 232-233) 
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But what is interesting is that even leaders like Ashwini Kumar Dutt, who did 
not use religion in his campaigns, actively played with the idea of the social boycott  
and religious “excommunication” of individuals who “refuse to listen to the voice of 
reason and are determined to act against the wishes and sentiments of all their 
neighbors” (Johnson 1973, 247). As the “moderate” Banerjea notes of his own boycott 
campaign focused in the city of Calcutta:  
“Their enthusiasm was roused to a pitch such as I had never before witnessed. 
It was positively dangerous for a schoolboy or a college student to appear in a 
class or a lecture room in clothes made of foreign stuff…” (Banerjea 1925, 
196) 
This is particularly important to keep in mind, as much of the existing literature on the 
conflict between moderates and extremists portrays the extremists alone as being 
influenced by cultural and religious revivalism and indulging in mass mobilization 
along those lines. In reality, however, both “parties” made selective and opportunistic 
appeals to cultural revivalism and religious orthodoxy dictated primarily by their 
political needs and both were willing to use strategies of social coercion in order to 
achieve their goals and enforce conformity.  
As mentioned before, the partition of Bengal became a watershed moment in 
the Indian national movement by radicalizing at least the Bengali “moderates” like 
Banerjea, but also by radicalizing public opinion against the British. The agitation also 
provided younger extremist politicians from the province like Bipin Chandra Pal and 
Aurobindo Ghose who were looking to gain a foothold in the Congress organization 
with a valuable “cause” with which to marginalize more established regional 
politicians like Banerjea by exposing their compromises. As Johnson notes, “Bengali 
leaders had to keep pace with the extremists in order to retain some support” since “no 
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Bengali could be other than an extremist in his own province while it lay cut in two 
parts” (Johnson 1973, 261, 262).  
The partition of Bengal also provided an important cause to extremists in other 
parts of the country like Tilak, who gradually began to bring the strength of their 
public support to bear on Congress proceedings.
14
 The increasing rift between 
Bombay moderates and extremists, particularly in the wake of the 1905 partition, 
ultimately led to a split in the Congress in 1907, with the extremists leaving the 
organization en masse after incidents of violence at the annual meeting in the town of 
Surat.
15
 The politics of aggression had made its first explicit forays into the Congress 
organization.  
 
From the Split to Gandhi: The Institutionalization of Cultural Revivalism 
In the years following the „Surat split‟, the Congress organization appears to 
have stagnated under the dominance of the moderates, even as mass mobilization by 
some extremist leaders and new political entrants like Annie Besant continued and 
even expanded outside its organizational purview. The establishment of the activist 
and propagandist Home Rule Leagues by Besant and Tilak after 1914-15 further 
expanded the base of extremist or “nationalist” politicians into parts of British India 
that had remained largely untouched during the previous era of nationalist political 
activity.  
                                                          
14
 By 1906, even Congress old-timer and staunch loyalist and moderate, Dadabhai Naoroji was forced 
to make a call demanding “swaraj” or “self-rule”. In a strategic move aimed at maintaining Congress 
unity in the face of mounting pressure and dissent from extremist leaders, Naoroji kept his definition of 
“swaraj” fairly vague, allowing extremist leaders to interpret it as they pleased and to claim victory for 
their cause.  
15
 Apparently, a member of the audience threw a shoe at Surendranath Banerjea and Pherozeshah 
Mehta, and prominent “moderates” were shouted down by groups of extremists in the audience.  
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By 1915, with the death of prominent “moderates” like PM Mehta and 
Gokhale, the extremists came to be re-admitted into the Congress organization. The 
reunion was, however, tenuous and short-lived, and by 1918 it was the moderates who 
had quit the Congress in a dispute over whether the organization ought to cooperate 
with the government over new electoral reforms that were to be instituted from 1920. 
By 1919, therefore, the extremists were finally in control of the Congress machinery. 
Without delving too deep into historical detail, it is important to note some of the 
important political developments of the 1914-1919 period in the Indian National 
movement.  
The Home Rule Leagues had their ideological roots in the Theosophical 
society, essentially an Anglo-American Hindu revivalist organization that professed 
the spiritual superiority of Hinduism and Indian tradition. The League was a network 
of linguistically organized regional branches, an organizational strategy that derived 
from its founder, Annie Besant‟s belief that Indian politics “should be based upon the 
revival of ancient literature and language” (Kumar 1981, 64). Its agitational-
propagandist style, and Besant‟s aggressive campaigns for “Home Rule” for Indians 
saw the organization attract a young and activist generation, sections of which had 
already been mobilized along similar lines by regional extremist leaders like Tilak and 
Bipin Chandra Pal.  
By the time Mahatma Gandhi made his first forays into Indian politics around 
1919, important political developments were taking place in India. In particular, the 
period saw two major developments:  first, were the beginnings of political 
liberalization through an expanded franchise and considerable decentralization under 
the Montague-Chelmsford reforms of 1919; and second was the parallel emergence of 
new competitors in the party system as the predominantly rural peasant castes began to 
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mobilize against the Brahmin-dominated Congress organization. The challenge before 
Gandhi was not only to establish himself as a leader of consequence in Indian politics 
(and, more specifically, in the Congress), but also to devise a way for the Congress to 
make the most of the emerging political circumstances. 
For the British, the electoral reforms were a strategic response to the agitations 
launched by the Home Rule League through most of the second decade of the 1900s. 
They represented both an attempt to placate an increasingly restive colonial populace 
as well as a calculated strategy to bring an emerging rural elite into active cooperation 
with the government as a counter to the apparently expanding appeal of the Congress 
and Home Rule League. The task before the Congress was to build on the Home Rule 
League‟s incipient organizational structure so as to expand the Congress‟s base of 
support as a counter to both government and party competitors‟ attempts to gain the 
political allegiance of the “dominant rural strata” (Low 1977, 2).  
Like so many aspiring leaders before him, Gandhi turned to the political 
strategy that he understood the best: the cultural appeal. In his dramatic rise to the 
helm of the Congress organization, Gandhi not only co-opted the Home Rule League‟s 
organizational network, but also made concrete attempts to form new bases of support 
which could help him in his struggles against more established party leaders. Gandhi‟s 
first attempt at peaceful mass mobilization in 1919 was essentially still-born in the 
wake of violence, leaving him in an “embarrassing position” vis-à-vis established 
Congress leaders including Tilak and Besant who had staunchly opposed his strategy 
of passive resistance (Gordon 1973, 128). In the wake of the failure of his first non-
violent Satyagraha [“Struggle for truth”], Gandhi had to resurrect his reputation both 
among activists who were disappointed with his decision to call off the movement as 
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well as among established leaders who were now even more skeptical than before of 
the value and effectiveness of his methods.  
Gandhi‟s strategy was to co-opt the extremists‟ support base among Hindu 
revivalists; he had already attended the launch of the Hindu revivalist organization 
“Hindu Mahasabha” in 1915 and participated in various cow-protection events over 
the years, eventually becoming a prominent figure in the Hindi literary society in 1919 
(Gordon 1973, 132).
16
 Meanwhile, he also allied himself with Muslim religious 
leaders who were increasingly estranged from the largely loyalist Muslim League 
party in the wake of the allies abolishment of the Turkish Caliphate after World War I. 
By bringing Hindu and Muslim religious conservatives together, Gandhi managed to 
wrest control of the party organization at the 1920 Calcutta Congress.
17
   
He immediately sought to placate rural elites by pushing for the reorganization 
of the provincial Congress committees along linguistic lines, in a move that was 
designed to counter government attempts at decentralization within the existing 
provincial boundaries. The use of a program of regional linguistic cultural nationalism 
was also an important tool with which to eat into the support base of new political 
parties like the “Justice Party”, a self-consciously loyalist “non-Brahmin” party that 
sought to mobilize lower caste groups against the Brahmin-dominated Congress.
18
  
Historians of India‟s freedom movement have noted that the various groups 
that the Congress‟s national leadership courted frequently joined the movement for 
                                                          
16
 The protection of the cow from slaughter was a hot-button issue in Hindu revivalist discourse. 
17
 It is interesting to note the parallels between the tactics used by Gandhi‟s supporters at the 1920 
Congress and the extremist strategies of the early 1900s. Akbar notes that “leaders like Besant were 
shouted down” by Gandhi‟s supporters and that “anti-Gandhi leaders [including Jinnah] were booed off 
the rostrum” even as Gandhi sat by and watched. (Akbar 1988, 138-140) 
18
 The Justice Party drew primarily on rural elites in south India who had benefited from British 
economic policies and now aspired to more “respectable” jobs in the government civil service that they 
quickly found were monopolized by upper-caste groups like Brahmins.  
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their own reasons, reflecting local issues, local concerns and personal political 
calculations rather than the larger concern for “swaraj” or self-rule. They consequently 
refer to the movement as a “rag-tag coalition of groups” rather than a coherent and 
coordinated national struggle for freedom. However, it is evidence of Gandhi‟s 
political skill that he formulated a national manifesto that was both broad enough (and 
vague enough) to allow a wide variety of interests to hitch their wagons to the 
Congress horse.
19
 It is to this program for national regeneration that we now turn. 
 
Gandhian Philosophy and Strategy: Culture, Morality and the Subordination of the 
Individual  
As much as historical accounts have increasingly revealed Gandhi‟s skill as a 
politician, there are important reasons to believe that he did, in fact, strongly believe in 
many of the (sometimes conflicting) values he espoused. As a young law student in 
London, Gandhi came to be introduced to the Hindu faith through the Hindu revivalist 
Theosophical Society, an organization whose views appear to have stuck with him 
well after he left Britain. Yet, he did also study other religious doctrines and was an 
ardent follower of the prominent “moderate” social reformer Gokhale, even as he 
appeared to support the extremist stand on the need to take a stronger stand against the 
colonial government. In many ways, then, Gandhi appears to be a composite product 
                                                          
19
 For instance, Jawaharlal Nehru noted that Gandhi was “delightfully vague” about what the term 
swaraj [freedom/self-rule] really entailed (quoted in Akbar 1988, 143). The word swaraj had been an 
important rallying call for the nationalist movement since the time of the partition of Bengal in 1905, 
although its precise policy implications morphed depending on the leader who used the term. Gandhi 
continued in this tradition of lack of clarity. This allowed Hindu revivalists, socialists, and lower caste 
groups to inject their own meanings of the term, based on their own needs. This served the purposes of 
all the groups concerned. Smaller groups were able to claim prestigious links to the Congress, while the 
Congress was able to use smaller allied organizations for their own political mobilizations.  
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 centuries.  
In his book, Hind Swaraj [Indian Self-Rule], Gandhi laid out in fair detail his 
social and political philosophy, a set of ideas that do not appear to have changed very 
much over the years of his involvement in Indian politics. Hind Swaraj was, at its root, 
a romantic critique of modernity. Gandhi criticized modern politics for lacking a “high 
and earnest purpose” and an “appreciation for culture more than potatoes” (Parel 1997, 
xlvi). It is for this reason that Gandhi saw religion and politics as inseparable; it was 
because he believed that religion, as a moral and ethical system, was essential for 
responsible politics.  
Gandhi‟s desire to resurrect an appreciation for an Indian cultural ethos in the 
minds of his followers is well-documented. This desire was, however, built on 
foundations that closely resembled Hindu revivalist discourse and possibly explains 
why Hindu conservatives felt so comfortable having Gandhi at the helm of the 
Congress organization, at least initially. His belief in the corrupting influence of 
Western modernity and culture is reflected in passages where he extols India‟s 
resistance to cultural change: 
“I believe that the civilization India has evolved is not to be beaten in the 
world. Nothing can equal the seeds sown by our ancestors…India remains 
immovable, and that is her glory. It is a charge against India that her people are 
so uncivilized, ignorant and stolid, that it is not possible to induce them to 
adopt any changes. It is a charge really against our merit. What we have tested 
and found true on the anvil of experience, we dare not change. Many thrust 
their ideas upon India, and she remains steady. This is her beauty…” (Gandhi 
1997, 66-67).  
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The way to make sure India continued to remain steady was to “touch all Indian 
languages with the spirit of patriotism”, a deeply held belief that fed into his 
reorganization of the Congress along linguistic lines in 1920 (Gandhi 1997, 103fn). 
The challenge, according to Gandhi, was that even as western civilization encouraged 
Indians to be self-critical, it simultaneously propagated a “godless” “immorality”, 
leading to the spiritual degeneration of Indians and the consequent neglect of their 
cultural and spiritual heritage (Gandhi 1997, 71). This led to a renewed focus on the 
regeneration of the individual as this was understood to be the ultimate source of a 
larger national spiritual regeneration (Parel 1997, lxii).  
Once again, the nineteenth century Hindu revivalists‟ concern with the 
regulation of individual morality in the larger interest of the nation appears to have 
found its most persuasive advocate in Gandhi. It was this idea that was behind the vast 
majority of Gandhi‟s more high-profile campaigns, such as the use of the spinning 
wheel as well as mass campaigns for prohibition, through which he was able to target 
the British as the source of the corruption of Indian morals through the propagation of 
the use of alcohol and other intoxicants. However, the most explicit articulation of 
Gandhi‟s ideas about the position of individuals relative to cultural groups is made in 
his “note to the British” where he says: 
“We consider our civilization to be far superior to yours. If you realize this 
truth, it will be to your advantage; and if you do not, according to your own 
proverb, you should only live in our country in the same manner as we do. You 
must not do anything that is contrary to our religions. It is your duty as rulers 
that, for the sake of Hindus you should eschew beef, and for the sake of 
Mohammedans, you should avoid bacon or ham…The common language of 
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India is not English but Hindi. You should, therefore, learn it. We can hold 
communication with you only in our national language” (Gandhi 1997, 114) 
It was this aggressively assimilationist streak in Gandhian philosophy that endeared 
him to the supporters of former “extremists” like Tilak, thereby allowing him to rise 
quickly through the Congress ranks. This policy came to be reflected in the Nehru 
Report of 1928, discussed at greater length in chapter five, which allowed for the 
assimilation of a linguistic minority by a regional linguistic majority.  
However, as is evident from the quote above, Gandhi‟s was a more broad-
based nationalism, one that recognized Indian society as consisting of a variety of 
religious and cultural groups, rather than merely as a Hindu civilization. The “note to 
the British” is interesting because it listed Islam as one of “our religions” explicitly 
acknowledging that Muslims were as much an integral part of Indian society as 
Hindus. This was primarily because Gandhi was concerned as much with larger issues 
of “Indian” national unity as with narrow issues of Hindu cultural revivalism. In 
particular, his proposed restrictions on British activities were extended to all 
individuals in India, advocating that Hindus and Muslims accept restrictions on each 
other‟s activities in the interests of their “sentiments”:  
“The unity we desire will only last if we cultivate a yielding and a charitable 
disposition towards one another… the Mussalman should, therefore, 
voluntarily accommodate his Hindu brother... Every Hindu should voluntarily 
respect his brother‟s sentiment. This, however, is a counsel for perfection. 
There are nasty Hindus as there are nasty Mussalmans who would pick a 
quarrel for nothing. For these, we must provide Panchayats [village 
governments] of unimpeachable probity and imperturbability whose decisions 
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must be binding on both parties. Public opinion should be cultivated in favour 
of the decisions of such Panchayats so that no one would question them”20 
It was this Gandhian version of  “multiculturalism” that, as will be argued in the 
following chapters, appears to have served as a reference point in identity politics in 
India, in that, it is the individual who is expected and directed to show her tolerance 
and respect for cultural groups through enforced conformity. It is also notable that 
although he did not believe in the necessity for a “state” or a legal system in the 
modern sense, Gandhi‟s opinions on the role of government in the enforcing of mutual 
respect of sentiment was easily adapted by India‟s more modernist and statist founders 
into the creation of an activist and interventionist state. As will be argued in the 
following chapters, this norm came to be “democratized” over time as more groups, 
beyond just Hindus and Muslims, were granted the “right” to have their “sentiments” 
accommodated  by individuals with active state support.  
 
The Entrenchment of Congress Strategy: Learning and Emulation by Congress’s 
Competitors 
By the mid-1920s, Gandhi had established himself as a charismatic leader with 
“mass appeal” by successfully tapping into and encouraging cultural revivalist 
sentiment, both regional and religious, across India. The Congress Party‟s electoral 
victories at this time amid political liberalization and growing competition only served 
to entrench the Gandhian strategy of the cultural revivalist appeal as the most likely to 
pay electoral dividends. This is evident in the fact that two political parties that were 
opposed to the Congress and that were formed explicitly to represent particular class 
                                                          
20
 Mahatma Gandhi in “Khilafat – the chance of a life-time for unity” in Young India, May 11, 1921. 
Compiled in Judith Brown (ed) Mahatma Gandhi. The Essential Writings. Pp. 191-2.  
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or economic interests, the Justice Party in the Madras Presidency, and the Communist 
Party of India (CPI) quickly adopted similar tactics in the face of electoral decline.  
 
The Justice Party in South India: From Economic Opportunity to Cultural Revivalism  
The Justice Party was formed in the city of Madurai in the erstwhile Madras 
Presidency in 1917. It has already been mentioned previously that the Justice Party 
was formed at least in part in response to the Home Rule agitations. For non-
Brahmins, the prospect of the replacement of a British administration by an upper-
caste Brahmin administration was a threat, particularly since Brahmins had already 
monopolized so many government jobs that educated individuals belonging to rural 
lower castes aspired to. The Justice Party has sometimes been referred to as a “lower-
caste” party but, as Washbrook has suggested, this wasn‟t an identity-based party as 
much as a class-party. In fact, the party had its roots in a progressive movement that 
sought to encourage individuals belonging to lower castes to use western education as 
a way to rid themselves of Brahmin dominance in the spheres of economics and 
politics. So even as upwardly mobile rural elites identified Brahmins as a barrier to 
upward mobility, their political activism was targeted very explicitly at opening up 
economic opportunities for themselves rather than to demolish Brahminical religion 
altogether. Further, the Justice Party‟s support base was activated by the flow of 
patronage to cliques of rural elites rather than through cultural appeals (Washbrook 
1973). 
In the early years of electoral reforms beginning in 1920, the Justice Party 
thrived politically, due in part to the Congress Party‟s vacillation on whether or not to 
contest elections. By 1920, however, Gandhi had incorporated the Home Rule 
111 
 
League‟s linguistic organizational structure into the Congress and a new era of 
participatory expansion, often using cultural-revivalist propaganda had begun to 
incorporate large sections of the Justice Party‟s ostensible electoral base into Congress 
activities. The Justice Party immediately began to decline, a trend that was cemented 
with the routing of the party in the 1925 elections, when the Congress-allied Swarajya 
Party under C. Rajagopalachariar decided to enter the electoral arena.  
Among the Gandhian Congress‟s early non-Brahmin activists in Madras was 
E.V. Ramaswami Naicker, the son of rural peasant artisans who had made a name for 
himself locally as an activist politician of social reformist leanings. Naicker rose 
rapidly within the regional Congress organization until he quit in 1925 in the face of 
Brahmin animosity in response to his campaign to open Hindu temples to 
“untouchables” (Hardgrave 1965, 25-6). Naicker then founded the Self-Respect 
movement that advocated women‟s equality, the abolishment of the caste system and 
the rejection of the dominance of north Indian “Aryan” Hinduism. After a period of 
imprisonment for sedition in the early 1930s, Naicker joined the Justice Party, which 
was already in deep crisis in the wake of Congress participation in electoral politics.  
Notably, Naicker‟s social and political commentary incorporated many of the 
same themes and concerns of Hindu revivalism as well as Gandhian Congress policy. 
For instance, one of his major critiques of Hindu religious doctrine was to question the 
moral character of Hindu deities like Ram, as well as the fidelity and faithfulness of 
his wife, Sita, two individuals that were held up in Hindu mythology as “ideals” for 
human beings to emulate. The use of a moral critique of Hinduism‟s paradigms of 
human virtue demonstrates an underlying acceptance, or at least the strategic 
deployment, of Hindu revivalism‟s obsession with moral character and sexuality 
(Naicker 1972).  
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Naicker played up the racial differences between the “Hindu” Aryan North and 
the authentic southern “Dravidian” culture that had been corrupted by the advent of 
the “barbaric” Aryan Brahmins into southern societies. His advocacy for a revival of 
ancient Tamil or “Dravidian” culture essentially adopted many of the arguments put 
forward by Theosophists and Congress leaders like Annie Besant and Gandhi himself. 
By adopting Congress programs of regional cultural revivalism and taking them just a 
little step further, Naicker was easily able to out-play the Congress at its own game, 
especially because he wasn‟t constrained by a pan-Indian party organization.  
Naicker and the Justice Party got the perfect cause when the Brahmin-led 
Congress ministry in Madras passed a new law in 1937 making the study of Hindi (the 
“national language”, according to Gandhi) compulsory in the Madras presidency. The 
Justice Party launched a violent agitation against the Aryan-Brahmin assault on 
Dravidian culture. Rajagopalachariar quickly changed the policy, making the study of 
Hindi optional in schools, but the damage had been done. By the end of 1938, the 
Justice Party was advocating a separate state of “Tamilnad” that would remain under 
the British Raj as the only bulwark against “Aryan” attempts to subvert Dravidian 
culture (Hardgrave 1965, 27).  
The campaign against Hindi gave the Justice Party a new lease of life, one that 
has continued till this day in the state of Tamil Nadu in South India, where no 
“national” party has been able to make any significant inroads. The Justice Party‟s 
strategic adoption and inversion of the Congress Party‟s political discourse and 
strategy is discussed here to illustrate two important points: First, Naicker, as a former 
Congressman, appears to have taken Congress mobilizational strategies with him to 
the Justice Party, using them, in turn, to beat the Congress at its own game. Second, 
the success of Naicker‟s campaign demonstrates the deep-seated acceptance of so 
113 
 
much of Hindu revivalist (and Gandhian) discourse about the importance of 
“morality”, “chastity” and fear of “sexual perversion” even among individuals and 
groups that were ostensibly rallying against it. Connected to this, the success of the 
Justice Party in its new avatar as the Dravida Kazagham [Dravidian Federation] after 
1944 demonstrates the widespread popular acceptance of the so-called “linguistic 
principle” as was first institutionalized by leaders like Besant and Gandhi.  
As mentioned before, historians have argued that, rather than representing a 
kulturkampf, the Justice Party campaigns were “more about economic rivalries among 
small cliques…Cultural labels served  as convenient covers for the combatants, but the 
labels had little substance” (Spodek 1979,696). While this may certainly be true for 
political elites in the Justice Party (although it may be questionable in the case of 
leaders like Naicker), it is important think about why “cultural labels served as 
convenient covers”, particularly because this appears to be one of the points of 
continuity between pre- and post-independence politics in India.  
But it is also important to remember that these labels were not used 
consistently right through the life of the Justice Party. An explicit appeal to Tamilian 
regional nationalism (and the adoption of Hindu revivalism‟s concern with morality) 
was made when the Justice Party was at its political nadir in the wake of an 
overwhelming electoral defeat at the hands of the Congress in the 1937 elections.  So 
even as we think more closely about why culture became such a convenient cover for 
“baser” political interests, it is equally important to keep in mind that political elites 
drew on such “covers” strategically, when their political support and prospects for 
political survival were especially low.  
The Justice Party‟s political choices over time serve to demonstrate that 
phenomena that political scientists have identified as peculiarities of contemporary 
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Indian politics in fact have deeper historical roots, demonstrating a degree of 
continuity with the past that is often ignored. The following example of Communist 
Party strategy in the years leading up to and immediately following independence 
demonstrate that these strategic considerations impelled even parties that were driven 
by a distinctly materialist world-view.  
 
The Communist Party of India: The Culture of Class Conflict  
The state of Kerala in the south-west of India is widely known as the “outlier” 
among Indian states, particularly on social indicators such as literacy, access to 
healthcare, the status of women, and economic equality. This outlier status is 
attributed to the early mobilizational and electoral successes of the Communist Party 
of India in that state, where the Communists formed the first popularly elected 
Communist government anywhere in the world in 1957, just ten years after India 
attained independence.  
The experiences of the Communist Party in Kerala are particularly interesting 
for the argument being made in this project for two reasons: The first is that most of 
the earliest leaders of the Communist Party in Kerala had been members of the 
Congress Party until at least 1938. The second is that it was the Communist Party that 
spearheaded the movement to form the state of Kerala as a linguistically homogenous 
administrative unit with Malayalam as the official language, beginning in the year 
1942.  
What is today the state of Kerala did not exist as a single administrative unit 
before 1956. During the colonial era, it consisted of two “princely states”, Cochin and 
Travancore, which were under British tutelage, and the region of Malabar, that fell 
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under direct British rule under the Madras presidency. In the Home Rule era, a 
Malayalam linguistic cell was established in the Malabar region and struck deep roots 
in the area. It was one of the more active areas even during the early years of the 
Gandhian era.  
By 1938, however, the tensions between socialists and Gandhians  in the 
“Kerala Provincial Congress Committee” were growing considerably, particularly as 
Gandhi‟s unwillingness to make any decisive moves against landlords became 
increasingly clear. In that year, a section of left-leaning Kerala Congressmen began a 
program of propaganda outside the Congress organization, and ultimately broke away 
completely to form the Communist Party of India in 1940, which was promptly 
banned by the colonial government. This was the era of World War II, a war which the 
Congress had steadfastly refused to support without British assurances that India 
would be repaid for its loyalty with decisive moves toward independence once the war 
was over. The Communists had initially supported the Congress withholding of 
support, but changed their minds when the Soviet Union formally joined the war effort 
in 1942.  
In the wake of Communist support for the Allied forces, the ban on the party 
was lifted in 1942, but, as Namboodiripad, one of the most prominent Communist 
ideologues of the time noted, a number of Communist Party members and 
sympathizers became alienated from the party in the wake of what they saw as a 
compromise with the colonial regime: 
“The right-wing bourgeois leadership of the national movement, which had 
always appeared to the rank and file anti-imperialists as compromising, now 
assumed the role of uncompromising fighters against imperialism, engaged in a 
last-ditch battle with the enemy; while the Communists who had always been 
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regarded to be the best fighters appeared as compromisers. The hitherto solid 
unity of the left elements was thus broken, a section of the leftists allying 
themselves with the right-wing Congressmen” (Namboodiripad 1952, 152) 
Namboodiripad‟s account suggests that the Communist Party organization was in the 
throes of a crisis, as all its major organizational-offshoots faced splits, with 
independent “nationalist” wings forming in the face of the communists‟ compromise 
with colonial authorities. The crisis appears to have led to a high level of introspection 
within the party, with leaders looking for a way to reclaim their credibility as a mass 
party worthy of popular support. As he noted in his 1952 account,  
“Various mistakes were no doubt committed in assessing the anti-imperialist 
content of the 1942 upsurge…The essence of these mistakes consisted, no 
doubt, in the under-estimation of the national factor in working out the tactics 
of revolution, in the failure to realize that the Communists in a colonial 
country can fulfil their class tasks only if they take proper account of the fact 
that national aspirations are the decisive political factor in a colonial country” 
(Namboodiripad 1952, 154; emphasis added) 
The apparent recognition by Communist leaders of the indispensability of the 
acknowledgement of “national aspirations” in competitive politics in India was a key 
step in the evolution of the Communist Party. By the end of 1942, the Party had 
launched the “Aikya Kerala” [United Kerala] movement, demanding the formation of 
a Malayalam-speaking linguistically homogenous province by uniting the princely 
states of Cochin and Travancore with the Malabar region of the Madras presidency. 
The Party had decided to take “national aspirations” seriously, and the strategy 
appears to have worked. They followed similar strategies in Telugu-speaking areas at 
around the same time and, just in case that proved to be insufficient, they also tapped 
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into Hindu revivalism‟s “moral-panic” about overt sexuality by denouncing heterodox 
writer Sadaat Hasan Manto‟s novel Bo (c. 1944) for being obscene and sexually 
explicit (Kumar 1997, 134).  
According to Nossiter, an “important source of support for the CPI [in Kerala] 
was its identification with the movement for a linguistically defined Kerala state and 
the associated Malayali cultural renaissance.” The party fanned Malayalee nationalism 
through newspapers, pamphleteering, and the establishment of “reading rooms” across 
the region staffed by “communist party sympathizers” who stocked books with 
communist-sympathetic themes. (Nossiter 1982, 94-95). By virtue of its own stated 
policy of encouraging regional linguistic revivals, the Congress was forced to respond, 
and by 1946-47, it had organized a “United Kerala Committee”. The Congress went a 
step further than the Communists, however, demanding that the boundaries of Kerala 
include Tamil-, Tulu- and Kannada-speaking areas in the north and south that had 
supposedly once been under the rule of the last “Malayali” empire in the region. 
Where the Communists were merely demanding a union of Malayalam-speaking 
areas, the Congress essentially upped the ante, playing with what was essentially an 
imperialist-nationalism, demanding a province of “Akhanda Kerala” [Greater Kerala] 
as a way to meet the Communist‟s “United Kerala” challenge.   
As it turned out, the conflict over the boundaries of the proposed Kerala state 
reflected the electoral interests of the two parties, as the Congress support base was 
strongest in the non-Malayalam majority areas of Travancore, Coorg, and some areas 
north of Malabar. With the coming of independence the policy of linguistic provinces 
was deliberately ignored by national leaders like Nehru and Patel who were fearful of 
unleashing divisive tendencies in the wake of partition. After the first general elections 
of 1952, it became clear to the Communists that the chances of gaining power required 
118 
 
that the Aikya Kerala demand be revived. It was at this time that Namboodiripad 
published his monograph “The National Question in Kerala” (1952) in which he 
tapped quite explicitly into regional cultural revivalism and drew (selectively) on local 
mythology to make a case that Malayali culture and history showed strong affinities to 
the communists‟ economic and social program in yet another overt attempt to use 
cultural arguments to buttress the communist cause (Namboodiripad 1952, 23).
21
  
According the Nossiter, this reflected a policy decision on the part of the 
Communists to “to swing the CPI from a limited conception of the „united front of 
leftist forces‟ to the broader (and more flexible) notion of the „national democratic 
front‟ which would incorporate the national bourgeoisie…The soundest course was to 
proceed cautiously with a  programme on which all progressive and patriotic forces 
could agree, including the national bourgeoisie” (Nossiter 1982, 109-110; emphasis 
added).  
The program on which a diverse set of political forces could agree on was one 
that was enshrined within India‟s new constitution to be discussed in greater detail in 
the following chapters: the idea of the rights of a cultural group to develop “according 
to its own genius”.  According to Communist Party propaganda, the implementation of 
communist policies would merely be a part of the revival of a long-suppressed (but not 
forgotten) aspect of Malayali culture. It is, of course, to the credit of the communists 
like Namboodiripad that they constructed and propagated a conception of Malayali 
identity that was inherently inclusive of all caste and religious groups and did not 
target an “ethnic” other in the way that the Justice Party/Dravida Kazagham did when 
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 For instance, Namboodiripad summarily dismisses the myth of Parasurama, which claimed that local 
Brahmins were migrants from other parts of the country, while he supported the historical aspects of the 
myth of Mahabali, in which he found “evidence” for the existence of a “primitive communism” in pre-
historical Malayali culture (Namboodiripad 1952, 23-23). He concluded that “It becomes clear that pre-
historic Kerala was a country of primitive communism” (Namboodiripad 1952, 23) 
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faced with an electoral challenge from the Congress at around the same time. In doing 
so, they incorporated both the cultural rights as well as the broad-based social and 
economic rights of the Indian Constitutional document into their political program, an 
effort that many political entrepreneurs both at the time and since do not appear to 
have concerned themselves with. However, the strategy of arguing for the existence of 
an inherently egalitarian and “communistic” Malayali culture through a selective 
appeal to regional mythology once again demonstrates the extent to which political 
elites in India, regardless of their political leanings, recognized the efficacy of the 




This chapter has demonstrated the ways in which political appeals to cultural 
revivalist sentiment were firmly entrenched in Indian politics by the time the country 
gained independence in 1947. British responses to Hindu tradition and practice led 
groups within Hindu society to internalize both the laudatory responses of Orientalism 
as well as the moralistic critiques of Anglicism as they attempted to reclaim a lost 
golden age of Hinduism.  
Suruchi Thapar Bjorkert (2006) has argued that as early as the beginning of the 
20
th
 century “nationalist discourse…centered on the dichotomy of the „inner‟ and 
„outer‟ domains…The outer domain represented…the [external] world dominated 
western science, technology and methods of statecraft, while the inner or spiritual 
domain represented the true identity of the Indian people…Whereas in the material 
domain the colonizers had subjugated the colonized non-European people…the 
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spiritual domain, which embodied the culture of the nation, had to be 
protected…Tradition was seen not only as a legitimating source of national identity, 
but also as a way of differentiating between the indigenous culture of the nation and 
the influence of the alien imperial culture” (Thapar-Bjorkert 2006, 48).  
The wide-appeal of Hindu revivalist movements, particularly among urban 
Hindus, encouraged the earliest political entrepreneurs to tap into those sentiments as 
early as the last quarter of the nineteenth century, a practice that came to be emulated 
and progressively “decentralized” by future generations of politicians as they battled 
for political influence in various regionally focused political and social organizations 
as well as for control over the Indian National Congress. Over time, then, cultural 
revivalism was brought, through the Congress, to almost every part of India, in the 
realization of Gandhi‟s vision of infusing “Indian languages with the spirit of 
patriotism” (Gandhi 1997, 103).  
Political liberalization, the expansion of the electorate, and increasing political 
competition served to bring cultural appeals more firmly into the arena of popular 
politics, and the Congress‟s regional and national competitors soon found that the 
adoption of cultural revivalist strands of Congress strategy had to be a component of 
any counter-strategy. An outright rejection of revivalist sentiment was not an option. 
The Congress‟s stunning electoral victories in 1937 pushed parties like the Justice 
Party and the Muslim League to make much more explicit appeals to regional and 
religious revivalist sentiment in an appeal to counter the Congress‟s apparent 
dominance. Newer parties like the Communists also soon recognized the political 




There is evidence to suggest that even liberal and reformist leaders like India‟s 
first Prime Minister Nehru recognized the political costs of opposing the revivalist 
social program. For instance in May 1928, Nehru was reported to have said “I always 
feel irritated when anybody talks of our immortal past…Much is said about the 
superiority of our religion, art, music, and philosophy. But what are they today? Your 
religion has become a thing of the kitchen, as to what you can eat, and what you 
cannot eat, as to whom you can touch, and whom you cannot touch, whom you could 
see and whom not” (Akbar 1988, 189). This comment met with an uproar not only 
among Hindu conservatives but even within the Congress. Twenty years later, in the 
Constituent Assembly, Nehru appeared to have climbed down from his position 
claiming that “If India had not stood for something very great, I do not think that India 
could have survived and carried on its cultural traditions…It carried on its cultural 
tradition, not unchanging, not rigid, but always keeping its essence”22  
He also censored his own book Glimpses of World History, when a fellow-
Congress politician pointed out that intellectuals in Maharashtra were angered by a 
passage in the first edition (released in 1934) in which he said that some of the acts of 
the much-mythologized medieval emperor, Shivaji, “lower him in our estimation”. 
The passage was removed, with profuse apologies, in subsequent editions of the book 
(Kumar 1997, 431).
23
  Even his staunch opposition to Hindu conservatives appears to 
have wavered in the years after independence. Nehru was bitterly opposed to his 
daughter‟s decision to marry a man from the minority Zorastrian religious community 
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 Jawaharlal Nehru in Constituent Assembly Debates Vol IV, July 22, 1947, pp. 741.  
23
 Similarly his positions on prostitution appear to have changed dramatically over the years. As 
Chairman of the Allahabad municipality in 1923, Nehru had argued that the abolishment of prostitution 
was “unrealistic” and suggested policies aimed at the welfare of prostitutes instead (Akbar 1988, 168). 
But in 1947, he didn‟t publicly voice support for the only delegate in the Constituent Assembly who 
spoke out against articles in the Constitution aimed at the abolishing prostitution. 
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and only agreed to the wedding on the condition that her husband Feroz, would be 
converted to Hinduism according to Hindu revivalist rites (Akbar 1988, 301).  
In short, politicians from across the political spectrum in India came to 
acknowledge and exploit the apparent electoral appeal of cultural and moral causes. 
The upshot of these developments was that generations of Indian voters were 
mobilized into politics along explicitly revivalist lines, where concern with cultural 
protection, public (and private) morality, and the need for individual conformity to 
social and cultural norms dominated political campaigns as well as broader political 
discourse. Ideas about anti-colonialism and independence came to be dominated by 
issues relating to cultural, spiritual, and civilizational regeneration. Further, strategies 
of silencing and coercion had come to be widely used in the realm of political 
competition, as politicians with a wider popular base frequently used the force of 





REVIVALISM, RIOT AND REALPOLITIK: 
NEGOTIATING DIVERSITY AT INDIA‟S FOUNDING 
 
“There is hardly any place where his influence has not been felt and felt well indeed. 
That influence has permeated our life to an extent which probably we do not ourselves 
quite appreciate and fully realize; and the greatness of the Mahatma lies in this, that as 
time passes, as ages pass, the influences which he has exercised not only on our lives 
but on the current of world history will be more and more appreciated and more and 
more realized” 
 
-  Rajendra Prasad,  
First President of India,  






The Constitution of India is, more often than not, described as representing a 
largely western and liberal-minded elite consensus. However, such representations 
gloss over the wide variety of views that were represented in the Constituent 
Assembly during its sessions between May 1946 and November 1949. Within the 
Congress itself, in addition to the more secular-minded leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru 
and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, there were Hindu revivalists and conservatives, 
represented by the likes of K.M. Munshi, Rajendra Prasad, and Vallabhbhai Patel. 
Non-Congress points of view were represented by the likes of prominent Dalit 
politician B.R. Ambedkar, who was made head of the Drafting Committee; there were 
also Communists like Somnath Lahiri, socialists like Professor K.T. Shah, 
“independent” Gandhians such as B.H. Khardekar, and representatives of various 
religious groups, a number of whom were elected through “separate electorates”. 
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Many of these members were given important positions on committees appointed by 
the Assembly, in a sign that serious attempts were made to accommodate, or at least 
give a hearing to, non-Congress points of view (Chaube 2000, 97-98).  
However, regardless of the range of ideologies represented in the Assembly 
and its various committees, one would be hard pressed to trace their direct translation 
into the Constitution because of two important facts: First, the Constituent Assembly 
functioned simultaneously as India‟s first legislature at a time of tremendous 
administrative challenges; and second, it was composed primarily of politicians who, 
as the previous chapter has argued, appeared to see revivalist cultural appeals as 
efficacious political strategy. 
A fact that is not acknowledged often enough is that the Constituent Assembly 
acted simultaneously as a national legislature from 1947 until the first general election 
in 1952, frequently debating constitutional principles in the morning and matters of 
administration in the afternoons. In such a context, none of India‟s founders were 
insulated from the ground realities of governing a large, poor and, especially at the 
time, disorderly country. As will be discussed in greater detail below, the seemingly 
uncontrollable religious violence that surrounded the partition of India led to very 
explicit compromises by all factions within the assembly but, in terms of the interests 
of this project, none more consequential than those made by India‟s liberals. As Nehru 
noted in a 1961 interview to journalist Norman Cousins, “you don‟t have to try very 
hard if you want to catch me in an inconsistency. This is the occupational disease of 
any philosopher who finds himself in the position of an operating leader” (Akbar 
1988, 507).  
The liberal agenda was compromised further by another fact: that the vast 
majority of India‟s founders, including Nehru himself, were politicians. India‟s 
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founders are frequently portrayed as being largely unrepresentative of the mass of 
Indians and disconnected from popular opinion, and this is not entirely untrue. 
Although the majority of members were elected indirectly from among popularly 
elected provincial legislatures, they were certainly not elected on a universal adult 
franchise. That said, however, the vast majority of them were active members of the 
Indian National Congress, with a long history of involvement in politics and protest 
during the colonial era. Furthermore, these were politicians who faced the prospect of 
contesting an election on universal adult franchise in a political arena which, as the 
previous chapter has described at length, appears to have been dominated by the 
Gandhian appeal to cultural revivalist sentiment.  
But no single fact influenced the content of India‟s constitution more 
decisively from the standpoint of this project than the partition of India. The 
widespread religious violence, and particularly the apparent impotence of state 
authority in its wake, had a profound impact on the minds of India‟s founders. The 
events created doubts in the minds of the framers about the ability of the new state to 
maintain law and order without the explicit cooperation of the feuding communities. 
While they believed that the state had the capacity to exercise its authority over the 
individual, the members of the Assembly were unsure that it could do so equally 
effectively over communities. The present chapter focuses on how these realities 
translated into a rather peculiar negotiation of India‟s cultural diversity. First, it argues 
that, particularly in the wake of partition, individual liberties were severely 
compromised and made subject to law as laid out by legislative majorities. Second, for 
precisely the same reasons, minority cultural rights were relatively expansive in 
principle and, in particular, allowed for the state facilitation of intra-group coercion. 
However, these group rights were granted selectively, depending upon the extent of 
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the threat that the group was deemed to pose to public order and to the legitimacy of 
the Assembly in its claims to represent all strands of Indian opinion. Finally, the 
chapter argues that the most expansive rights to cultural preservation were granted to 
Hindu revivalists, who were entitled to impose Hindu religious concerns with the 
banning of cow slaughter on all individuals in society in a sign of the constitutional 
order‟s Gandhian multicultural leanings.  
 
Partition and the Liberal Compromise 
Even a cursory reading of India‟s Constitution makes it evident that the 
individual and her liberty are hardly accorded a pride of place in the document. 
Despite a fairly lengthy and comprehensive list of individual fundamental rights that 
include the freedom of speech and expression, the freedom to reside anywhere in the 
country, and the freedom of association, the vast majority of commentators and 
experts agree that “the liberty contemplated by the constitution is ordered liberty” 
(Chitale and Appu Rao 1979, 9). In fact, far from seeing these liberties as comprising 
a set of intrinsic or natural rights of man, the Indian founding order envisioned these 
individual fundamental rights to be what the head of the Drafting Committee, B.R. 
Ambedkar, referred to as “a gift of the state”.2 The result is that all the individual 
“fundamental rights” are made subject to security of the state, public decency and 
morality, public order, and/or general public interest in the constitution itself, all of 
which, notably, it was left to legislatures to define.  
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 Ambedkar‟s exact words were: “fundamental rights are the gift of the law. Because fundamental rights 




These limits that were placed on fundamental rights did not go uncontested. As 
K.T. Shah, a vocal member of the non-Congress opposition noted, “there is, in my 
opinion, no chapter more painful to read, no chapter more disappointing in this 
Constitution, than that dealing with the Fundamental Rights and Civil Liberties of the 
people.”3 However, these criticisms were invariably dismissed by the more influential 
members of the assembly such as member of the drafting committee and prominent 
lawyer, T.T. Krishnamachari, who retorted, “fundamental rights are intended only for 
the people who represent a certain class of persons usually called the vested interests. 
It is the vested interests that are afraid of the future parliament elected on adult 
suffrage which might want to democractize, socialize, and equalize…”4 Individual 
liberties were seen by some as an elitist defense against democratizing forces. 
But individual freedoms were not restricted only for ideological reasons. 
Earlier draft lists of fundamental rights had allowed for far fewer constitutional 
restrictions on individual liberty. However, events beyond the Assembly walls appear 
to have sealed the fate of individual liberties in the discussions. The violent partition 
of the subcontinent, which led to the displacement and murder of millions of innocents 
in the course of devastating outbreaks religious conflict, left a profound impact on the 
minds of India‟s founders, regardless of their ideological leanings. In internal 
communications, delegates noted that the violence that accompanied the partition of 
the sub-continent in 1947 pointed to the need to place greater restrictions on individual 
liberties “though such a provision may to some extent neutralize the effect of the 
fundamental rights guaranteed under the constitution”.5 It is then not surprising that 
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delegates like the Communist from Bengal, Somnath Lahiri, noted that “many of the 
fundamental rights have been framed from the point of view of a police constable.” 6  
 
Collective Rights: The State’s Facilitation of Group Preservation  
Article 29 of the Indian Constitution, one of two “cultural and educational 
rights,” provides that “Any section of  the citizens residing in the territory of India or 
any part thereof having a distinct language, script, or culture of its own shall have the 
right to conserve the same”. There are two aspects about these rights to which most 
legal experts refer: First, unlike clauses relating to freedom of speech or freedom of 
religion, this right applies explicitly to groups rather than individuals. Further, unlike 
individual liberties, this group right is absolute, not subject to any restrictions 
whatsoever, either by the legislature or the judiciary. There is, however, one more 
aspect of these cultural and educational rights that is less widely acknowledged – the 
fact that these have been conceptualized as requiring positive or facilitative action by 
the state.  
In his “Notes on Fundamental Rights” circulated to members of the 
Constituent Assembly in September 1946, the chief framer of the draft Constitution, 
B.N. Rau, made an explicit distinction between rights which merely require that the 
state abstain from prejudicial action, and those which require “positive action by the 
state” (Shiva Rao, Vol 2, 33-34). Rau suggested that the latter category of rights ought 
to be placed in a section of the Constitution called “The Directive Principles of State 
Policy” – a collection of goals which all future governments ought to aspire to, but 
would not be accountable for in a court of law. Rau was concerned primarily with the 
practicality of giving all citizens something like a fundamental right to work given the 
new Indian state‟s financial and administrative weaknesses.  
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Significantly, Rau suggested that the protection of culture, language, script, etc 
of different communities be placed in the same category as the right to work. He 
understood them as requiring positive action on the part of the state and therefore 
suggested that they be a part of the non-justiciable directive principles of state policy. 
(Shiva Rao, Vol 2, 34). For Rau, one of the principle drafters of the Indian 
constitution, cultural rights, by definition, required active agency on the part of the 
state for their recognition. 
However, against Rau‟s advice, the members of the constituent assembly did 
not place cultural rights in the section on Directive Principles, choosing instead to 
make them justiciable fundamental rights belonging to “any section of citizens in 
India”. The granting of these rights to cultural communities was not without 
precedent. In fact, Khilnani suggests that democracy was introduced into India when 
liberalism in Britain was at its most collectivist. He argues by the end of the 19
th
 
century (around the same time that the Indian National Congress was founded) 
colonial understandings saw Indian society as “composed of permanently feuding 
„communities‟ that had each to be represented and paternally protected by the British 
Raj (Khilnani 2004, 21). Later, in 1931, the All India Congress Committee passed a 
resolution which declared that the “culture, language, and script of minorities of 
different linguistic areas shall be protected” (Shiva Rao, Vol 2, 337), reflecting and 
broadening the scope of the colonial government‟s own beliefs about the state and its 
relationship to cultural communities in India.  
Indeed, the members of the constituent assembly were themselves elected 
under separate or “communal” electorates instituted by the British colonial 
government. Each delegate therefore, represented a specific religious community, and 
even where they were elected in the so-called “general category”, it is evident from the 
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proceedings that they saw themselves as representing various linguistic groups.
7
 There 
is ample evidence to suggest that the delegates shared the British colonial 
government‟s beliefs about the necessary relationship between state and communities. 
For instance, K.T. Shah, in a memorandum on minority rights circulated to the entire 
assembly, wrote: 
“The term „minorities‟ in this connection refers not to political minorities, but 
those fixed and unchanging entities distinguished by religion or nationality, 
culture or language, which make small grounds in the midst of larger 
populations. They have fundamental differences regarding the ways of life 
which demand special safeguards and protection with reference to those items 
which they prize specially, namely religion, culture or language. Rights of 





The proceedings of the Assembly indicate that, in many respects, the debates 
on constitutional clauses often took the form of an inter-group negotiation.
9
 As 
mentioned previously, there was significant pressure on the Indian National Congress 
to prove that the Constituent Assembly genuinely represented all strands of Indian 
opinion. However, in addition to concerns with their legitimacy, there is ample 
evidence to suggest that India‟s founders saw the satisfaction of minority demands as 
vital to the maintenance of peace and stability. For instance, a prominent Christian 
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 For instance, when passing a resolution on the national flag, every representative got up and claimed 
allegiance on behalf of her/his group/community. (CAD, Vol IV)  
8
 It is important to note that Shah was an educationist and a socialist and not a member of the Congress 
Party. His views on the issue demonstrate the widespread acceptance of such a view even outside 
Congress circles. 
9
 For instance, Chairman of the Minorities Sub-Committee, Dr. H.C. Mookherjee noted that prominent 
Congress leader and Gandhian, K.M. Munshi was “running from one group to another” to coordinate 
their demands (CAD, Vol V, 208) 
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representative and Congressman, Dr. HC Mookherjee, noted that “it is necessary for 
the sake of peace, for the sake of future progress of the country that every attempt 
should be made to meet the wishes of the minorities” (CAD, Vol V. 208). These 
sentiments were echoed time and again during the course of the House proceedings.
10
  
The House did not rely on words alone. The “Ad hoc committee on 
Fundamental Rights, Minorities, etc” a body created with the explicit purpose of 
drafting the sections of the constitution dealing with these issues was dominated by 
members of various religious and caste communities, with a minority of members (12 
out of 50) belonging to “general sections”. In talking about the composition of the 
committee, Nehru said, “…the voice of the minorities and the representatives of 
excluded and tribal areas will preponderate in this committee…So this committee will 
fully reflect the opinion of the minorities and the backward tracts and will, I hope, be 
able to reach decisions which will fully secure their position and ensure the protection 
of their rights” (CAD, Vol II, 310). In fact, it was the sub-committee on minority 
rights that included the two cultural and educational rights in the fundamental rights 
section of the draft constitution, a move which was allowed to stand even though some 
other members questioned its practicality (Shiva Rao, Vol 2, 206, 279). Further, 
decisions made by the committee were often pushed through the House on the grounds 
that since a particular community had accepted a certain clause, the House ought not 
to have anything to add.
11
  
                                                          
10For instance, Govind Ballabh Pant: “the question of minorities everywhere looms large in 
constitutional discussions (310)…unless the minorities are fully satisfied…we cannot even maintain 
peace in an undisturbed manner. So all that could be done should be done…We have subordinated 
every other consideration in order to secure contentment and satisfaction” (CAD, Vol II, 311) 
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 For instance, Patel would put forward a motion on Anglo-Indians and say, “This is an agreed solution 
so far as the Anglo-Indian community is concerned and I do not suppose anyone can make an 
amendment to this because as the community is satisfied with the proposal and as the Advisory 
Committee has accepted it unanimously, I recommend this for acceptance of the House” (CAD, Vol V, 
239). This strategy was used successfully multiple times in the session.  
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While the procedures of constitution-making do provide some circumstantial 
evidence regarding the way India‟s founders understood the nature of cultural and 
educational rights of groups, there is still a need to substantiate these claims using 
more direct evidence about the content of these rights.  
The Sub-committee on Minorities circulated a questionnaire to all its members 
regarding what they believed minority rights ought to encompass. Their responses are 
informative when thinking about the “original intent” of India‟s framers. For instance, 
the prominent Dalit Congressman, Jagjivan Ram, in his response, noted that 
“fundamental rights should include provisions for the protection of the language, 
culture, etc, of the minorities” and safeguards must protect “religious and racial 
minorities… from destruction” (Shiva Rao, vol 2, 330-334, Italics added). The 
committee also solicited “memoranda” from various communities regarding the same 
issues. Every single memorandum made a call for “protection” or “preservation” or 
“development” of the community in question. The colonial government‟s belief that 
Indian society consisted of various communities that need paternalistic protection 
from government appears to have been widely accepted. A particularly informative 
memorandum from the Jain community (a community that was not represented 
through the separate electorate system) said that:  
“The community has been declining in numbers…[and] their ancient culture 
and civilization will need special care and protection…The denial of minority 
status to the Jains will mean their death warrant as a distinctive cultural group 
especially when all other minorities are going to be recognized.” (Memo from 
Jain representatives sent in March/April 1947 in Shiva Rao, Vol 2, 375) 
 
This particular memo provides clear evidence of what minority status meant in 
terms of the relationship between the state and the group in question. The assumption 
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is that cultural communities cannot survive without the help of the state, and that 
attaining minority status is the way to ensure state support. Furthermore, being 
classified as a cultural minority meant that the state had to do everything in its power 
to ensure that your group would survive as a distinct entity. One delegate interpreted 
the clauses as follows: 
 “I do feel there is provision in this constitution wherever there are such classes 
or linguistic communities or sub-communities, the state shall provide all 
facilities to them. If the state were to deny that, the state will not be discharging 
their duty. I am quite clear that the Constitution has made provision to that 
effect” (R.K. Sidhwa in CAD, Vol VII, 906, Italics added) 
 
B.R. Ambedkar, one the primary framers of the constitution, confirmed R.K. 
Sidhwa‟s interpretation by arguing that the wording of the clause as it stands in the 
constitution today frees minorities from a reliance merely on the goodwill of the 
state.
12
 This appears to confirm that the conceptualization of cultural rights was 
intended to ensure positive action on the part of the state, making it a group 
entitlement (CAD, Vol VII, 923). 
 
The Content of Group Rights 
Scholars like Mahajan (2008) have noted that “the Constitution did not adopt a 
proactive approach. That is, it did not direct the state to ensure that the culture and 
language of these communities survives and is protected, yet it assumed that the 
minorities would like to „conserve‟ their culture and identity. In other words, it 
legitimized the desire of minority communities particularly to preserve their culture” 
(Mahajan 2008, 308). This suggests that these collective rights didn‟t go quite as far as 
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 Note the contrast with his view of individual liberties as the gift of the state. 
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this project suggests that they did. However, Mahajan (2008) also notes, somewhat 
contrary to this earlier assertion, that Indian conceptions of secularism placed “certain 
obligations” on the state with respect to religious communities, without saying very 
much about exactly what these obligations were.  
One of the primary reasons why the existing discussions of group rights fail to 
recognize just how far these rights went in placing obligations on the state is that they 
tend to view these group rights exclusively as rights accorded to religious minorities. 
While the status of religious minorities was certainly a fundamental concern for the 
members of the constituent assembly, it is extremely important to think about the 
state‟s approach to other cultural groups and what that can tell us about the ideas that 
animated conceptions of group rights in India at independence. In fact, as is evident in 
K.T. Shah‟s definition of minorities quoted previously, India‟s founders understood 
the term “minority” to include not only religious groups but also language, aboriginal 
and previously subordinated caste groups.
13
 
The status of linguistic groups and the preservation of their languages, scripts 
and cultures was of as much, if not more, concern to India‟s founders as was the status 
of religious minorities. It is significant that the earliest attempt by Indian politicians to 
create a constitution for free India (what came to be called the “Nehru Report” of 
1928) paid significant attention to the rights of linguistic groups. This report explicitly 
acknowledged “the linguistic principle” for the reorganization of the provinces of 
British India. It is worth quoting one passage at length: 
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 Just to refresh the memory, K.T. Shah noted that: “The term „minorities‟ in this connection refers not 
to political minorities, but those fixed and unchanging entities distinguished by religion or nationality, 
culture or language, which make small grounds in the midst of larger populations. They have 
fundamental differences regarding the ways of life which demand special safeguards and protection 
with reference to those items which they prize specially, namely religion, culture or language. Rights of 
minorities are not of the individual, but of the group…” (Shiva Rao, vol 2, 38-39. Italics added) 
135 
 
“If [a province] happens to be a polyglot area difficulties will continually arise 
and the media of instruction and work will be two or even more languages. 
Hence, it becomes most desirable for provinces to be regrouped on a linguistic 
basis. Language as a rule corresponds with a special variety of culture, of 
traditions and literature. In a linguistic area all these factors will help the 
general progress of the province…The mere fact that the people living in a 
particular area feel they are a unit and desire to develop their culture is an 
important consideration even though there may be no sufficient historical or 
cultural justification for their demand. Sentiment in these matters is often more 
important than fact. Thus we see that the two most important considerations in 
rearranging provinces are the linguistic principle and the wishes of the majority 
of the people” (Nehru Report 1928, 62-63. Italics added) 
 
There are a few important points that need to be highlighted for the purposes of 
this discussion. The first is that the document sees linguistic diversity as 
fundamentally problematic both for the state and for society. It suggests that progress 
can only be achieved through linguistic homogeneity. Secondly, it entirely ignores the 
ground realities of mixing of various linguistic groups in “linguistic areas”, a feature 
which was particularly true of the more industrialized provinces of Bengal and 
Bombay. Finally, it explicitly endorses a view of linguistic majoritarianism where a 
linguistic majority is allowed to form a linguistic province and then impose its own 
language on linguistic minorities living in that province. The underlying assumption 
here is that linguistic communities can only “develop their culture” if they have 
control over of a state administration. Explicit state support and the imposition of a 
majority group‟s language on linguistic minorities are therefore assumed to be 
imperative for a community‟s cultural survival as well as for administrative 
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convenience. The consequences of such a conception of group rights will be discussed 
in greater detail below. 
As mentioned before, scholars have tended to look only at religious groups in 
their analyses of the meanings and implications of the collective rights in India‟s 
constitution. They have subsequently suggested that the granting of group rights to 
cultural preservation was more a grudging acceptance of the limits of state capacity 
rather than evidence of the members‟ active interest in protecting cultural groups from 
destruction. It is very likely that rights were granted to Muslims quite grudgingly, 
particularly given the atmosphere that surrounded India‟s partition in 1947. However, 
as is evident in the proceedings of the assembly, questions of cultural rights were 
targeted as much (if not more) to linguistic and cultural groups than to religious 
groups. Taking note of this important fact allows for a more accurate understanding of 
how these collective rights were actually conceived.  
This project argues that the obligations of the state to cultural groups went 
much further than merely facilitating religious practice or not preventing the use of 
one‟s language. As will become clearer below, there is evidence to suggest that India‟s 
founders saw the state as a guarantor of the survival and perpetuation of groups and 
their cultures, with very specific consequences for the liberties of individuals. In 
particular, the cultural and educational rights granted formally to “all sections of 
citizens of India” allowed for the entrenchment of “thick multiculturalism” – a 
political arrangement under which the state became party to the attempts of groups to 
restrict the autonomy of their individual members in pursuit of group preservation.   
There is strong evidence to suggest that various groups interpreted the clauses 
on minority rights as ensuring that individuals would not easily be able to defect from 
the group. The state should do nothing that could encourage an individual to leave the 
group to which s/he is deemed to belong. Negotiations between Congress leaders and 
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Sikh delegates are particularly informative in this regard. Sikhism is essentially an 
egalitarian religion, a religion that grew in popularity in north-west India partly due to 
its repudiation of the oppressive Hindu caste system, and particularly the practice of 
“untouchability”. However, when the framers were contemplating affirmative action 
for former untouchables belonging to the Hindu community, Sikh leaders demanded 
similar measures for former untouchables who had converted to Sikhism. While these 
leaders could have justified these demands on claims of economic backwardness, they 
chose another line of argument. Vallabhbhai Patel, while accepting their demands, 
noted that Sikh leaders “feel that if these Scheduled castes who have been converted to 
Sikhism are not given the same benefits as the scheduled castes have been, there is a 
possibility of their reverting to the Hindu scheduled castes and merging along with 
them” (CAD, Vol VIII, 271) 
A reasonable conclusion one can draw from the preceding discussion is that 
community rights were intended to obligate the state to preserve and protect a cultural 
community by preserving not only its language, script, and culture, but also its 
membership.
14
 This latter conclusion is supported not only by the discussion of Patel‟s 
negotiations with Sikh leaders but also from discussions regarding the provision of 
state aid to minority-run educational institutions. Delegates were concerned that 
religious minority-run educational institutions may compel children belonging to other 
faiths to attend religious instruction in the minority faith. They, therefore, had a clause 
that preempted this possibility. What they explicitly allowed, however, was for 
minority run educational institutions to compel children belonging to their own faith 
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or sect to attend religious instruction, even when these institutions were provided with 
state aid (CAD, Vol VII, 884). The implications of this for individuals‟ choice 
regarding their religious education ought to be immediately evident, but will be 
discussed at greater length below. The bottom line is that the founders made the state a 
party to the coercion of individual members within cultural groups.  
This conclusion is further confirmed by discussions that talked about the 
state‟s obligation to “develop” cultural communities. This occurred primarily in 
discussions about conflicts around the recognition of regional languages. (CAD, Vol 
VII, 905-923). A number of delegates who had actively supported calls for the 
linguistic re-organization of states believed that the articles on cultural and educational 
rights would satisfy their demands. As one delegate put it,  
 “the article 23 [now Article 29] gives an assurance to the minorities that their 
languages will be guarded, the minorities will be able to conserve their own 
languages and not only conserve, but a definite development can also be made 
by them. The minorities will find no discrimination made in the matter of 
government aid for the protection and development of their languages…I think 
the voice that has risen in India about the immediate re-districting of provinces 
on linguistic basis will be consoled to a large extent” (Mihir Lal 
Chattopadhyay in CAD Vol VII, 905) 
 
The Selective Grant of Minority Rights 
Articles 29 and 30 formally obliged the state to facilitate the “development” 
and preservation of all cultural, linguistic and religious groups equally. The state was 
not permitted to discriminate between different minority groups, for instance, when 
granting state aid to their educational institutions. However, despite the expansive 
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nature of these rights of groups to cultural preservation, they were not granted equally 
to all communities in practice; rather, these entitlements were to be enjoyed only by 
groups that were “recognized” by the state. So the founders drew up a list of “official 
languages” that were eligible to receive state patronage in their own linguistically 
organized provinces, while others were left to fend for themselves. For instance, even 
as languages like Marathi and Malayalam were granted official status, others like 
Konkani and Udipi with their roots in roughly the same geographical regions were 
ignored for many decades. Similarly, religious minorities like the Jain community, 
whose memorandum was quoted previously, were repeatedly denied minority status, 
despite being a distinct religious faith.
15
  
As will be discussed in greater detail in the following sections, the granting of 
group recognition, at least in the 1947-1950 period revolved primarily on questions of 
“public order” and “national unity”; the recognition of groups was predicated on the 
extent to which a rejection of their demands was likely to lead to outbreaks of rioting 
and violence or to a decline in the legitimacy of the Constituent Assembly. The 
extensive rioting in the wake of partition between Hindus and Muslims virtually 
guaranteed that Muslims were granted recognition. Similarly, it was the regional 
concentration, long history of political mobilization, and threat to boycott the 
Constituent Assembly by the Sikh community that led to the granting of special 
privileges with respect to “Sikh untouchables”. The Jains, by contrast, were regionally 
dispersed and internally divided between two primary sects, leading to a lack of 
coordinated political action and, consequently, political neglect. 
What this meant, in effect, was that collective rights to cultural preservation 
were granted only to communities that were politically mobilized and influential at the 
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 The Jain community had to wait until December 2008 before it was granted status as a national 
minority. Prior to that, it had been granted the status in some states in India, beginning in the 1980s. 
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time of the founding. It is significant that all the languages recognized as official 
languages at independence were the languages that the Indian National Congress had 
used in order to broaden its mass appeal in the pre-independence era. The 
representatives of these language groups within the Congress Party had since become 
very demanding, routinely pressing demands for their separate homelands where they 
would be allowed to flourish or develop.  
In fact, as early as the 1920s, the Congress Party made it its own prerogative to 
decide which language groups ought to be granted linguistic provinces of their own. 
For instance, the Nehru report, despite its permissive language regarding which 
linguistic groups ought to be granted their own territorial homelands, ended the issue 
by saying that “we who talk of self-determination on a larger scale cannot in reason 
deny it to a smaller area, provided of course this does not conflict with any other 
important principle or vital question” (Nehru Report 1928, 63. Italics added). The 
authors of the document were, however, silent on what these principles and questions 
were.  The arbitrariness of the conditions for Congress Party recognition for linguistic 
groups is further evidenced by the fact that while some demands for linguistic 
provinces were initially rejected by the Nehru Committee because of their “small 
area” (such as the demand for a Malayalam speaking state), other demands (such as 
the demand for Kannada speaking state) were deemed “sufficiently large” (Nehru 
Report 1928, 63-64). Notably, as was discussed in detail in Chapter Four, the 
Congress quickly changed its stand on a Malayalam-speaking state of Kerala once the 
Communist Party in the region began using the issue as a mobilization strategy to 
support its own flagging political fortunes. 
It is vitally important to consider what this selective recognition of groups 
entailed for the relationship between the state and communities in Indian politics. It 
opened up opportunities for previously neglected groups as well as counter-elites to 
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mobilize cultural nationalist sentiment against the state‟s neglect of its constitutionally 
mandated obligation to protect and “develop” a group‟s culture. It was only through 
the establishment of what the Christian activist in Mumbai referred to as a group‟s 
“nuisance value” that a community could gain state recognition and the constitutional 
entitlements that came with it.  
 
The Cultural Rights of Majorities: Hindu Revivalism in the Founding Order 
If the granting of group rights to minorities was conditional on perceptions of 
their threat to public order and the extent of their political mobilization, it seems to be 
highly unlikely, given the electoral arena in the run-up to independence, that the 
cultural concerns of majority Hindu community would have been ignored altogether. 
In fact, proponents of the Hindu revivalist agenda in the assembly had received a boost 
by the decision to partition India. The Constituent Assembly had met for the first time 
in May 1946 before the partition of the subcontinent was a settled fact. In the interests 
of keeping the country together, the Assembly‟s earliest Objectives Resolution, 
announced by Nehru in the opening session, proposed a number of measures that were 
designed to assure Muslims of their security in what would have been a Hindu 
majority country. These included a particularly decentralized federal structure, 
separate electorates for religious minorities, and a compromise solution on the future 
country‟s “national” language. However, once the decision to partition India was taken 
in June 1947, Hindu revivalists began to demand a re-think. As R.V. Dhulekar, a long-
time Congressman and, notably, a former member of the revivalist Home Rule 
League, noted: 
“we find that India has now been divided into two and we have to see whether 
the Constituent Assembly should stick to the views it adopted at the time of its 
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inception or whether it should change them. … The first thing that we have to 
note in the proceedings of the past few months is that we promised in the 
Objectives Resolution, which was moved in the House, that the people residing 
in India would be protected in every way and their culture, language and 
civilization would be fully safeguarded… In my opinion, it is necessary now to 
change our point of view and I think it necessary to amend the resolution that 
we have passed” (CAD Vol. IV, 549)  
The call was echoed by others, such as the noted Hindu conservative and a key 
Gandhi confidant, K.M. Munshi, who asserted that “we are now a homogenous 
country” (CAD Vol. IV, 545).  Even when it was not overt, the revivalist influence 
was pervasive in the Assembly. Nigam (2008), for instance, notes that Muslim 
speakers were frequently ridiculed and marginalized in the course of proceedings. 
However, aside from the more rabid sections of revivalists, there was a strong strand 
of concern with the protection and preservation of “Indian” culture, civilization and 
spirituality. For instance, the prominent women‟s rights activist, writer and Gandhian, 
Mrs. Hansa Mehta noted that “we have great traditions to maintain, traditions that 
made India so great in the past. It is the duty of every man and woman to preserve 
these traditions so that India may hold her spiritual supremacy over the world.”16  
The delegates in the assembly had particular ideas about the source of India‟s 
past greatness as well as the sources of its more recent failures, and saw the reclaiming 
of an endangered spiritual-cultural core as the secret for the restoration of India‟s 
status as a leading nation. Nehru, for instance, attributed the “survival of India” to the 
survival of the “essence” of its cultural traditions (CAD Vol IV, 741). The vast 
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majority of the delegates, therefore, saw the constitution as a valuable tool with which 
to reconstitute all Indians in line with this cultural essence. 
It went beyond placing restrictions on the actions of individuals to prescribing 
an active role for the state in re-shaping individuals so as to build a morally upright 
and spiritually sound society. The spirituality of the Indian nation, which Gandhi had 
exalted as the source of India‟s greatness and superiority, was to be rejuvenated with 
the help of the modern state apparatus. In effect, individuals were to be fundamentally 




Notably, there are only three delegates on record who brought up the 
possibility that this could degenerate into the protection of orthodoxy. The vocal leftist 
economist and independent, K.T. Shah, in a written memorandum to the sub-
committee on fundamental rights, warned that: 
“champions of the established order would find much in the new thought at the 
time which might be considered by them as open to objection on grounds of 
public morality. If this is not to degenerate into a tyranny of the majority, it is 
necessary either to define more clearly what is meant by the term „morality‟ or 
to drop this exception altogether” (Shiva Rao, Vol 2, 157) 
 
Another was B.R. Ambedkar, who noted on December 17, 1946 that 
“fundamental rights are subject to law and morality, but both are determined by 
Executive of the day and makes the position of rights uncertain.”18 It was barely two 
years later that Ambedkar, now Chairman of the Drafting Committee, dramatically 
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 An early court case dealing with what morality meant in the Constitution decided that the word 
morality “has reference to that morality which the law makes it its concern to maintain” (Chitale et al 
1970, 452) 
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changed his line, referring to individual liberties as “gifts of the state.”19 Ambedkar‟s 
turnaround is particularly intriguing given that he was not a member of the Congress 
Party (he had, in fact, been a bitter critic of Gandhian ideology and politics), although 
he had won election to the Assembly with Congress support. It also points to the 
likelihood that there was a degree of unspoken pressure within the Assembly on issues 
like public morality. In the third instance, when during a debate about whether the 
state ought to have the power to sanction public amusements in the interests of 
morality, one delegate, the independent, leftist H.V.Kamath, declared that “you cannot 
legislate people into moral beings”20, a Congressman, Brajeshwar Prasad, retorted: 
“[Mr. Kamath‟s] political doctrines are a strange mixture of individualism and 
philosophical anarchism. Both these doctrines have no place in our life.” (CAD, Vol 
IX, 931). 
A particularly revealing exchange took place between delegates KM Munshi 
and Mahavir Tyagi. In a discussion of restrictions on freedom of expression, KM 
Munshi read out a clause containing his proposed amendments to the restrictions on 
free expression. Mahavir Tyagi misheard and asked, “May I take it that the word 
„morality‟ has been taken out?” Munshi tellingly replied, “I read the word 
morality…The House will not permit me to do anything of the sort” (CAD, Vol VII, 
page 730-731). Further, when one lone delegate rose to suggest that the legalization of 
prostitution would allow for its effective regulation so as to prevent the spread of 
disease as well as exploitation that is born of driving the business underground, a 
prominent Congressman and Hindu revivalist observed that: 
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 “at a time when we are directing our efforts to raise the moral standard of 
society and want to create a new social order based on morality, I am surprised 
to find that there are even now persons amongst us who want to retain the 
institution of prostitutes. We, who have worked under the leadership of 
Mahatma Gandhi for the last 30 years had formed new ideas about the standard 
of morality and had expected that…we would try to create a new moral order 
in which such institutions as prostitutes, bars and gambling would become 
extinct” (Seth Govind Das, CAD, Vol IX, 957) 
 
However, it was not only in the overt concern with public morality that the 
revivalist agenda entered India‟s founding order. Indeed, this was one point on which 
representatives from many religious groups could agree.
 21
 Rather, it is evident in 
clauses such as that which made Hindi the “national” language for all of India.22 One 
could argue that the revivalist influence is also evident in the fact that the extent of 
accommodation of minority cultural rights varied so greatly across religious minorities 
and linguistic groups, the latter being seen as still within the largely Hindu cultural 
fold. However, it is evident in its most overt and potentially repressive form in one of 
the Directive Principles of State Policy, Article 48, which encouraged the government 
to adopt a law banning cow slaughter, a Hindu revivalist concern dating back to the 
mid-19
th
 century, and one that Gandhi also appears to have cared about deeply.  
The Directive Principle on cow slaughter went further than the rights granted 
to any religious or cultural minority in that it allowed governments to impose a Hindu 
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religious tenet on all citizens, regardless of their religious affiliation. Consequently, it 
introduced yet another level of inequality in the allocation of group rights, setting a 
precedent whereby groups that were powerful and politically influential enough were 
understood to be entitled to place limits on the rights of all citizens in India, a mark of 
what this project refers to as “Gandhian multiculturalism”.  
As was discussed in the preceding chapter, Gandhi had long recommended that 
Hindus and Muslims abstain from performing any action that hurt the sentiments of 
the other. He noted that the “unity we desire” was dependent upon the cultivation of 
this mutual respect and suggested that, since that voluntary abnegation was a “counsel 
of perfection” governing bodies be established to enforce compliance. The Indian 
Constitution began to comply with one half of Gandhi‟s plan in that it allowed for the 
constitutional protection of Hindu sentiment. For minorities like Muslims, on the other 
hand, similar protections were conditional upon the expression of anger and the ability 
to generate public disorder in the wake of offense.  
In a revealing exchange that took place within the Constituent Assembly, some 
Muslim members took issue with the fact that the state had reserved the right to 
legislate changes to religious personal laws in the larger interests of social reform. In 
response, Ambedkar, the Chairman of the Draft Committee noted: 
 
“No one need be apprehensive of the fact that if the state has the power, the 
state will immediately proceed to execute or enforce that power in a manner 
that may be found objectionable by the Muslims or by the Christians or by any 
other community of India…Sovereignty in the exercise of that power must 
reconcile itself to the sentiments of different communities. No government can 
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exercise its power in such a manner as to provoke the Muslim community to 
rise in rebellion. I think it would be a mad government if it did so”23 
 
Conclusions  
This chapter has sought to understand the development of India‟s particular 
multicultural arrangement as it evolved in the early days of the country‟s 
independence. Through an examination of the proceedings of India‟s Constituent 
Assembly as well as communications exchanged amongst its members, it has argued 
that India‟s negotiation of diversity was shaped by two factors: the first was the 
violent partition of the subcontinent; and the second was the apparent political 
entrenchment of (Hindu) cultural revivalism. The two factors are themselves not 
entirely unrelated. Indeed, the partition of India may well have proved to be decisive. 
It buttressed Hindu revivalists, both the more moderate as well as the extreme, who 
went so far as to declare that India had now become a “homogeneous” country. A 
homogenous, “Indian” culture could now flower with the help of the state that was 
freed of the obstacles created by intransigent Muslim demands. However, the violence 
that surrounded partition led all members in the Assembly, even the most committed 
of Hindu revivalists, to accept compromises that would otherwise have seemed 
distasteful. Among the principles that were compromised, and central to the broader 
concerns of this project, were those relating to the liberties of individuals, which came 
to be made subject to the whims of legislative majorities fearful of public disorder.  
The document that emerged from this process was, consequently, a rather 
peculiar multicultural arrangement. According to formal Constitutional principle, the 
state claimed to represent all Indians and all cultural minorities were entitled to equal 
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privileges, as articulated in Article 29. In practice, however, these rights were granted 
unequally, determined by the threat the group posed to the Assembly‟s concern with 
public order and the legitimacy of the founders‟ claim that the Assembly represented 
all shades of opinion within Indian society. But the granting of cultural rights was also 
determined by revivalist concerns with the preservation and revitalization of 
“homogenous” Hindu culture and spirituality. Because the revivalist agenda appeared 
to have an upper-hand in electoral politics, Hindus were granted the most extensive 
privileges by the Assembly, allowing for concerns with their “sentiment” to place 
limits on the liberties of all citizens of India, as evidenced in the restrictions in the 
interest of public morality on individual freedoms, in the cow slaughter clause, and in 
the anointing of Hindi as India‟s “national” language. 
The political preponderance of Hindu concerns with the protection of Indian 
civilization and spirituality meant that they quickly became enmeshed with state 
policy. This is particularly evident, as the next chapter will demonstrate, in the realm 
of state censorship policy as the individual freedom of speech and expression was 
made subject to public order, decency, and morality as defined by legislative 
majorities. This served to expand the realm in which concerns of the Hindu political 
elite were allowed to infringe upon the liberties of all citizens in India. The ability to 
legislate cultural sentiments into state policy, in effect, has become a mark of a 
group‟s political empowerment. In the wake of increasing pluralism, emerging elite 
groups, rather than challenge the practices of incumbents have chosen to adopt them, 
demanding similar concern from the state apparatus. In short, although as Austin 
(1966) noted, India‟s Constitution cannot be said to be particularly “Gandhian”, it did 
contain the seeds of Gandhi‟s approach to multiculturalism. Contemporary trends in 
censorship demand-making in India, far from representing the triumph of “Hindutva” 
politics, may well represent the broader-based adoption of the strategic appeal to 
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Gandhian multiculturalism. The probability that the Gandhian multiculturalism was 
politically motivated rather than the result of a deeply held commitment to Gandhian 
principles more broadly is buttressed by the observation of a prominent non-Congress 
Gandhian, B.H. Khardekar. Khardekar noted with disdain during the proceedings of 
the Constituent Assembly: 
“What do you think is the essence of Gandhism? The essence of Gandhism is 
love, toleration; its essence is non-violence, search for truth and all these 
important things. The externals of Gandhism or the outward trappings of 
Gandhism are khaddar [home-spun cloth] and prohibition. Unfortunately, the 
followers of Gandhi, some of them, have been giving more importance to the 
outward trappings…than to the essence of it”24 
This selective and strategic adoption of what Bhargava refers to as “vulgar 
Gandhianism” had important spill-over effects in the politics of the Indian republic, 
particularly in the state‟s negotiation of the liberties of individuals relative to the 
cultural rights of groups. It is to an examination of the evolution of Gandhian 
multiculturalism in the Indian state‟s censorship policy that we now turn.  
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WHOSE SENTIMENT COUNTS? 
REALIZING THE POTENTIAL OF GANDHIAN MULTICULTURALISM 
 
The previous chapter has argued that India‟s Constituent Assembly laid the 
foundations of a particular negotiation of cultural diversity whereby the state 
undertook to preserve and develop cultural communities through the preservation of 
their language, script and culture. Placing restrictions on the liberties of individuals in 
pursuit of this goal of cultural regeneration was not considered particularly 
problematic in light of the fact that these liberties were thought to be “gifts of the 
state” rather than pre-existing natural rights that the state was morally obliged to 
protect. However, the Constitution of India also established a hierarchy of cultural 
rights: As is evident in clauses legitimating laws banning cow-slaughter and, to a 
lesser extent, the regulation of individual morality, it created a realm in which the 
liberties of all citizens could be made subject to Hindu revivalist sentiment.   
Censorship in India was never explicitly made the prerogative of a particular 
cultural or religious group. Like anywhere else in the world, it was the prerogative of 
the state. As Khilnani (2005) notes, the Indian constitutional order made individual 
liberties subject to the state‟s purposes. However, this leaves the important question of 
how the state‟s purposes are formulated and understood unaddressed. State censorship 
was understood by India‟s first parliamentarians as having a constitutive role in the 
shaping of “ideal” citizens who were morally upright and infused with an appreciation 
of India‟s “superior civilization”. As Lilavati Munshi, member of India‟s Upper House 
of Parliament and wife of noted Hindu revivalist K.M. Munshi, noted during a debate 
on new censorship rules in 1953: 
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“We have to think in terms of our own nature, our own genius, our own ideals, 
of the ideal nation that we want to build, and that is why it is important that, 
when we choose our censors, we choose people who want to make the films… 
a means of helping this country once again to become a land of culture for 
which India once was so famous. If we want to build India, we must build it 
culturally, and the film itself is one of the greatest forces for the spreading of 
culture, and we must reorient the whole thing, our rules and regulations, 
everything, from that point of view”1 
 
This chapter is an attempt to look at how the state‟s purposes in the arena of 
censorship policy, as well as the conceptualization of “Indian culture” that these 
purposes represented, evolved over the years since 1947, adapting to emerging 
dynamics in the arena of popular politics. In particular, it argues that the predominance 
of Hindu revivalism in electoral politics in the early post-independence years 
translated into a powerful influence on early censorship policy in India. Revivalist 
concerns, particularly with “obscene” and “morally degrading” trends and the 
“objectionable” portrayal of Hindu deities in Indian cinema translated into the 
formulation of censorship policy in the so-called “Nehruvian” era of post-
independence Indian politics. However, it is important to note that this influence of the 
state‟s censorship policy almost always took the form of appeals for the protection of 
“Indian” rather than “Hindu” culture and morality. This discursive trope is significant 
because it highlights the significant disjuncture that existed in this policy arena 
between formal principle and informal practice.  
                                                          
1
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pp 4209. Italics added.  
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The state in India, as is evident in the Constituent Assembly debates, was 
projected as representing all Indians, regardless of their cultural or religious 
affiliations. Roy (2007), for instance, goes so far as to claim that “India since its 
foundation as a sovereign nation-state in 1947 has been represented in terms of its 
intrinsic and inalienable subnational diversity – nationhood called up as a mosaic of 
ethnocultural fragments” (Roy 2007, 7). More significantly, she notes that  
“the State [was] imagined as a neutral institutional entity located at a safe 
distance from the rough and tumble of politics, and imbued with the unique 
ability to address the many needs and problems of citizens, subnational groups, 
and the nation as a whole” (Roy 2007, 20-21). 
 
The notion of the state‟s neutrality is important because it implied that the 
state‟s censorship policy would represent the interests of a “composite” “Indian” 
culture that was defined by its inherent diversity. However, formal constitutional 
principle frequently came up against the realities of political practice. It has already 
been argued that the granting of group cultural entitlements was predicated on the 
state‟s recognition, which was in turn shaped primarily by realpolitik.2 Censorship 
policy was one arena in which this disjuncture between formal policy and informal 
practice was most evident, primarily because it allowed some groups‟ cultural 
concerns to impinge of the freedom of expression of all Indian citizens.  
As the following discussion will demonstrate, the political power of Hindu 
revivalists in the early 1950s translated quite explicitly into a particular set of 
censorship “guidelines” and, consequently, shaped the “state‟s purposes” in this policy 
arena. Further, in the mid-to-late 1950s, as political power in India gradually moved 
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identity, with regionally concentrated linguistic and cultural groups being included and religious 
minorities being excluded. 
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away from the central government and toward linguistically re-organized provinces, 
more and more groups began to demand the equalization of what could be called the 
“right to censor”. In short, having a group‟s “cultural sentiments” represented in 
official censorship policy came to be seen as an important symbol of its substantive 
political empowerment. The symbolic significance of contemporary demands for 
censorship and claims of offense can only be understood in light of this larger 
understanding of the entitlements that came with a group‟s political influence. It is in 
this context that claiming state neglect of a group‟s “sentiment” allows for the 
discrediting of incumbents‟ larger claims of representativeness.   
However, before an argument can be made about how censorship out of 
respect for group sentiment came to represent that group‟s political empowerment, the 
prior question of how the state come to be viewed as a guardian of a group‟s cultural 
sentiment in the first place must be addressed. It was already discussed in Chapter 
Four that Gandhian multiculturalism provided for a governing authority to enforce 
individual conformity to a group‟s cultural sentiment. But this still leaves the question 
of how Gandhi‟s ideas came to become a principle of state practice, especially given 
the fact that, despite references to local community governments, Gandhian 
philosophy explicitly rejected the notion of the modern state.  
 
Censorship Demands in Colonial India: The Case of Mother India  
The British colonial government had always reserved the right to proscribe 
materials thought to militate against its interests in India. However, as Barrier (1974) 
notes, the zeal with which it pursued the program of proscription varied over time, 
depending upon perceptions of internal and external challenges. In 1898, in the face of 
growing militancy within the incipient national movement in the country, it introduced 
Sections 124 and 153 to the Indian Penal Code. The former allowed for the 
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proscription of “seditious” materials while the latter allowed for prosecution of 
speeches and writings inciting “class hatred”, both of which were intended to protect 
Britishers from the strident criticisms of Indian nationalists. But the Colonial 
government was also concerned with violent conflict between religious groups and 
frequently banned “particularly virulent” materials that were likely to instigate 
violence and rioting (Barrier 1974, 6-7, 59-60). 
It was in the summer of 1927 that a book called Mother India written by 
American journalist Katherine Mayo was published first in the United States and then 
in Britain. Mother India contained a scathing critique of Hinduism, condemning Hindu 
society (and Hindu men in particular) for its inherent sexual perversion and moral 
depravity, as manifest in the plight of its child brides. The book created a storm of 
protest in India which lasted for over a year. As a report in the New York Times 
observed: 
 “it has whipped Hindu India into a frenzy. The pages of the Indian press 
bristle with denunciations of the book. No week passes without an indignation 
meeting called to register protests against it. It has been the indirect cause of 
scores of libel actions…An outcry has been raised for the proscription of the 
book in India.”3  
Indian representatives in the Central Legislative Assembly made persistent and 
vocal demands that the colonial government proscribe the book in light of “the 
resentment that has been caused among the public.”4 What is particularly interesting 
about the demand for a ban on Mother India is that, as Barrier (1974) points out, it was 
among the only times that Indian representatives in colonial era legislatures demanded 
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 See “Book by Miss Mayo rouses Hindu India” in The New York Times, October 6, 1927, page 6. 
4
 Congressman and Hindu, Mr. K.C. Neogy, in Central Legislative Assembly Debates, September 20, 
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155 
 
rather than opposed Government censorship.
5
 So why did Mother India create such a 
stir?  
Mother India, for all its overtly racist and prejudicial overtones, appears to 
have been swept up in the larger current of colonial-era politics. In 1922, the colonial 
government had withdrawn a number of its strict censorship laws in the wake of 
political liberalization in India, a move which made banning a publication next to 
impossible, except on grounds of sedition. But the 1920s was also a time of increasing 
religious extremism, particularly in North India as extremists among all religious 
communities regularly used accusations of government bias to instigate militancy and 
violence. It was in this context that a controversial tract titled Rangila Rasul [The 
Merry Prophet] was published by a Hindu bookseller named Rajpal in 1924. Rangila 
Rasul mocked the Prophet Mohammed, paying particularly close attention to his 
sexual affairs and generated extensive animosity among Muslims, prompting the 
government to initiate criminal proceedings against Rajpal under Section 153A of the 
Indian Penal Code for “inciting religious hatred”.6  
However, at the end of the three year trial, an Indian Christian justice in the 
Lahore High Court acquitted Rajpal on the grounds that Section 153A was intended 
“to prevent attacks on a community „as it exists at the present time‟ and not to stop 
„polemics against deceased religious leaders‟” (Barrier 1974, 101). A wave of Muslim 
protest prompted the government to pass a new law in August 1927, Section 295A, 
which made it an offense to “insult the religion” or “outrage the religious beliefs of 
any class”. Despite its faith-neutral language, the context in which the law came to be 
framed led a number of Hindu Members of the Legislature to accuse the Government 
                                                          
5
 Barrier notes that “The most dramatic confrontation [between Indian legislators and the colonial 
administration on the issue censorship] came, not over what the British did, but what they did not do – 
ban Kathernie Mayo‟s Mother India”(Barrier 1974, 97fn). 
6




of making concessions to Muslims (Barrier 1974, 102).  The first references to Mother 
India appear in the Central Legislative Assembly on September 19, 1927, the very day 
that Section 295A was passed (Thursby 1975, 70).  However, the book was never 
banned. The perceived discrimination appears to have been seized upon by Hindu 
extremists with Gandhi reportedly expressing concern that the protests were “in 
danger of being overdone” (Emilsen 1987, 74-75).7 
In a sign that the government‟s unwillingness to proscribe the book was 
increasingly being seen as an abdication of its responsibility toward its colonial 
subjects, one Member of the Legislative Assembly asked pointedly, “Is not the good 
name of the people of India a matter of concern for the Government?”8  
Scholars who have studied the Mother India controversy have noted that it 
marked a pivotal moment in the evolution of the Indian national movement. Sinha 
(2000), for instance, notes that “the massive controversy over Mother India was itself 
an important event with long-term implications for the future development of modern 
nationalism as well as of middle-class feminism in India” (Sinha 2000, 1).  Given this 
broader significance of this controversy, it does not appear unreasonable to conclude 
that it may also have had long-term implications for the way the role of the state in the 
protection of group sentiment came to be understood.  
 
“Public Sentiment” in Censorship Policy in the “Nehruvian” Era 
Jawaharlal Nehru, India‟s first Prime Minister, was no revivalist. Even when 
he did make references to the “essence” of India‟s “cultural tradition”, he always made 
it a point to remind his audience that a part of this tradition was its openness to outside 
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 However, Nehru was also a politician, and one who, at least in the early 
years after independence was very much under siege from Hindu conservatives 
through most of the 1950s, regardless of his personal popularity (Akbar 1988, PAGE). 
This is evident in the fact that, even in the wake of a massive victory for the Congress 
Party in independent India‟s first general election with adult suffrage, he appointed a 
conservative, Dr. B.V. Keskar, to the position of Minister of Information and 
Broadcasting, the ministry with control over the formulation of the state‟s censorship 
policy. Among Keskar‟s early policy initiatives was the imposition of a complete ban 
on the playing of popular film music on state-owned radio because of its corrupting 




In 1952, just before that first general election, the government of India passed 
the Cinematograph Act of 1952 which was plugged as a “dignified effort to model an 
effective medium of healthy entertainment, national culture and mass education” 
(quoted in Bose 2005, xiv). In a significant move for the argument being made here, 
the Government abolished regional censor boards that had been established during the 
colonial era, establishing one Central Board of Film Certification (popularly referred 
to as the “Censor Board”) in its place, whose duty was to monitor and rate films prior 
to public exhibition so as to ensure that they were suitable for Indian audiences. 
By 1953, the Nehru government felt the need to give the Central government 
additional powers of censorship, as the limitations of the existing Act became 
increasingly evident. As the Minister for Information and Broadcasting, Dr. B.V. 
Keskar explained to Parliament: 
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 Nehru in CAD Vol. IV, pp 741.  
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 See Parliamentary Debates. Council of States. Official Report. Vol III No. 37. Tuesday, April 28, 
1953, pp 4265-4266. 
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“Now we found after going through the Act very carefully, that there was no 
provision by which we could suspend the working of any film even for a 
day…Now this brought the fact before us that there are occasions when it is 
absolutely essential for Government to have power to stop the exhibition of 
any particular film immediately, and, as the Act exists now, it is not possible 
for us to do so.”11  
 
The “occasions” that Keskar referred to were apparently numerous instances of 
provincial governments protesting against the approval the Censors granted to various 
“provocative” films that were “against state governments.”12 On April 25, 1953, the 
Cinematograph (Amendment) Act 1952 was introduced (and passed) in the lower 
house of parliament, the Lok Sabha [House of the People], following which, it went to 
the upper house, the Rajya Sabha [Council of States] on April 28, 1953. Among other 
minor provisions, the new Amendment gave the executive the power to impose a ban 
on a film for up to two months even after it had been passed by the newly instituted 
Censor Board. According to member of Parliament, T.T. Krishnamachari, who 
introduced the Bill in the Lok Sabha, 
“The whole thing has arisen because it often happens that some such thing 
escapes the attention of the censors. Some particular passage might cause a lot 
of complication and an injury would be done to public sentiment…There may 
be an innuendo or a reflection on certain groups of people which may have 
missed the Board of Censors. It is only in such cases, when new facts come to 
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 In Council of States. Official Report. Vol III No. 37. Tuesday, April 28, 1953, pp 4193-4. 
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 Lilavati Munshi in Council of States. Official Report. Vol III No. 37. Tuesday, April 28, 1953, pp 
4199. Among the films temporarily banned in the wake of state government objections was the Hindi 
language film, Barsat, which the government of Kashmir deemed to be derogatory to Kashmiri people.  
159 
 
light, when urgent action is called for Government propose to take action 
[sic]”13  
 
The conceptualization of the role of government as the guardian of “public 
sentiment,” therefore, appears to have carried over from the colonial era. It is 
interesting to note, however, which group of people the government of India was 
concerned about in this particular instance. As it turned out, the move to formulate the 
amendment was precipitated by a complaint against a film titled Peking Express, 
which released in India around the end of 1952.  According to Keskar,  
“At that time we had protests from the Government of China and its 
representatives here that the film was highly derogatory to the people and 
culture of China who were shown in a very unfavourable light and that it was a 
libel on the them [sic]. Therefore the Government of India took steps to see the 
film. We had the film examined by competent persons and we also came to the 
conclusion that the film was really derogatory to the people of China…”14  
 
The idea that the government ought to have the power to stop the screening of 
a film in India if it was found, even by Chinese government, to be “derogatory” and 
tantamount to “group libel” did not meet with any opposition. And yet this 
justification highlights the fact that early Indian censorship policy was motivated by 
the interests of a small national elite, concerned with national reputation and 
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perceptions about India. As freedom fighter and member of the Congress Party, Violet 
Alva noted with disdain about Indian films of the time: 
“we shall always see our village belles sex-starved – paniharis going round the 
well singing love songs. These films showing sex-starved village belles will be 
shown to foreigners. What a picture you are presenting to foreigners!...The 
racketeers in the industry show to the foreigners something which is unnatural 
in Indian life. I have never seen village belles going around a well singing love 
songs as we hear them singing in our films”15 
 
However, alongside this concern with India‟s reputation, there was a strong 
cultural revivalist streak evident in Parliament. For the legislature‟s revivalist 
contingent, the debate quickly morphed into questions of whether or not the Censor 
Board was doing enough to protect Indian society from moral degradation and 
corruption. In fact, most of the representatives who spoke during the debate strongly 
condemned the censors for not doing enough to check the proliferation of “obscene” 
images on the silver screen. As Lilavati Munshi, a prominent proponent of a stricter 
censorship regime, noted in the Rajya Sabha:  
“Foreign films, from any country, are allowed to be exhibited. They show 
drinking, gambling, dancing and many other inappropriate things. You allow 
films like this to be screened but then say that we shouldn‟t copy them. Our 
filmmakers say that if we do not copy those movies then we can‟t make ends 
meet. Women‟s bodies are shown in such filthy ways that are inappropriate for 
our country. When our people watch these movies, they copy what they see…I 
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wonder why these movies, which are not worthy of our country, are allowed to 
be screened here at all?”16  
 
The vast majority of parliamentarians in 1953 voiced strong support for greater 
government intervention in the process of censorship, particularly of films, and all of 
them were concerned with the compromising effects the “proliferation” of “obscene” 
images on Indian society and culture. The primary cause of concern was with the 
allegedly bad influence of western culture and norms of behavior, a concern that had 
been expressed by the earliest cultural revivalists in the nineteenth century. The broad-
based acceptance of this idea of the need to protect Indian culture, society and 
spirituality from the decadence and commercialization of the west is reflected in the 
fact that even parliamentarians like K.K. Basu who were critical of giving such 
sweeping powers to the executive, still noted that the standards of films showed a 
“definite deterioration” and identified American movies in particular for depicting 
“many things against our national feeling and our national events”.17 The idea was put 
succinctly by one of the most vociferous proponents of a pro-active censorship policy, 
Violet Alva who, even as she noted that there were some very good foreign films, 
promptly added that “the Hollywood type of film generally does harm to us as a 
nation.”18 Notably, Alva was not a Hindu; she was a protestant Christian from the then 
province of Bombay, a Gandhian and a journalist. Her position on the issue points to 
the fact that the concern with “morality” was not the preserve of Hindu conservatives 
alone. 
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What is particularly interesting about these debates is that even as 
parliamentarians condemned filmmakers for not keeping “public sentiment” and 
Indian culture in mind when making their movies, they still acknowledged that the 
movie-going public watched these movies quite happily, blatantly ignoring the ways 
in which this reality clearly contradicted their claims of representing public opinion 
and sentiment on the issue. As member of the Rajya Sabha, Professor R.D. Sinha 
Dinkar, noted with respect to objectionable “religiously themed” movies:  
 “There is a united voice in the country today that the effect of films is bad and 
everyone‟s eyes are now on the government and the censors. But the 
government and censors cannot be fully responsible. There are some things 
they can do. The rest has to be done by the people. Films which portray Hindu 
deities so crudely are watched quite happily by Hindus without the slightest 
irritation. They pay movie makers so that they can do more disrespect of the 
gods...”19 
 
From the very beginning, then, censorship in India was more about imposing 
elite views of decency, propriety and morality on the public, but in the name of the 
public itself. Censorship in India, as anywhere else, was about packaging of a 
particular set of elite interests and values as representing “public sentiment”, even 
when these interests, as the complaints against religiously-themed movies 
demonstrate, were not based on any explicit articulation of public opposition.
20
 
Nevertheless, members of both houses of parliament claimed to be speaking in the 
                                                          
19
 Professor R.D. Sinha Dinkar in Council of States. Official Report. Vol III No. 37. Tuesday, April 28, 
1953, pp 4218-9. 
20
 Other cases - such as the temporary ban imposed on the Hindi film Barsat by the government when 
the government of Kashmir complained that “the picture depicted the Kashmir people in a very wrong 
light”- were also discussed during the sessions, with members of parliament using these instances to 
suggest that state governments ought to be given more authority to act when they found films to be 
“objectionable”. See Begum Aizaz Rasul in Council of States. Official Report. Vol III No. 37. Tuesday 
April 28, 1953, pp 4269. 
163 
 
interests of “Indian society” and “the nation” as a community whose core values 
needed to be preserved in the wake of the assault of a corrupting and morally depraved 
western commercialism, demonstrating the extent to which ideas of cultural revivalism 
and the role of the state in facilitating this process was widely accepted across the 
political spectrum at the time of the founding, as discussed in the previous chapter. 
21
 
The goal for almost every single representative who spoke during the debate was to 
mould Indian society and public opinion so as to create a greater sensitivity to the 
need to protect tradition and culture.   
The most important way to achieve this was to make sure that members of the 
Censor Board were more in tune with elite conceptions of Indian culture and 
spirituality and therefore equipped to take on their transformative role in Indian 
society. In fact, the Board quickly became a target of the Hindu elite. From the very 
beginning of the debate, it was criticized for being too westernized and cosmopolitan 
in its outlook. One representative and former member of the Board remarked that her 
erstwhile colleagues were “big/important people [“bade log”] who, even when they 
get the time to watch movies, tend to watch English language movies.”22 These 
criticisms of members of the board quickly led to demands for the body to be, in 
effect, “nativized”, in order that the “real” cultural traits of India were reflected in its 
cinema: 
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“Who are the people who certify our films? Who are our censors? Are they 
chosen from amongst those who represent the real culture of our country? … It 
is not possible for the modern mentality to censor our films properly, because 
the modern mentality is based upon the Western outlook.”23  
 
By the mid-1950s, according to Derek Bose (2005), the Censor Board was 
already paying attention to the demands of India‟s first representatives.24 The 
increased vigilance of the censors quickly elicited a reaction from filmmakers, with 
the Bengal Motion Pictures Association issuing a statement in 1954 stating that: 
“…we deplore any attempt on the part of anyone to exploit the lower emotions 
of man but we cannot agree that the female anatomy should be tampered with 
to please the neo-moralist that is the Indian film censor….The common boy or 
girl does not pay as much attention to the dress or contour of a woman as the 
censors do”25  
 
Notably, the idea that censorship policy should conform to India‟s cultural 
heritage has been regularly voiced by the Indian Supreme Court in as late as 1989 in 
so-called “landmark” anti-censorship judgments such as the decision which overturned 
a ban on the Tamil-language film titled Oru Oru Gramathile (1989). In that case, the 
judges ruled that: 
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“The Censors Board [sic] should exercise considerable circumspection on 
movies affecting the morality or decency of our people and cultural heritage of 
the country. The moral values in particular should not be allowed to be 
sacrificed in the guise of social change or cultural assimilation. Our country 
has had the distinction of giving birth to a galaxy of great sages and 
thinkers…Besides we have the concept of „Dharm‟ (righteousness in every 
respect) a unique contribution of Indian civilization to humanity of the world. 
These are the bedrock of our civilization and should not be allowed to be 
shaken by unethical standards. We do not, however, mean that the censors 
should have an orthodox or conservative outlook…All we wish to state is that 
the Censors may display more sensitivity to movies which will have a 
markedly deleterious effect to lower the moral standards of those who see it”26 
 
Political Pluralism and the Pluralization of Censorship Authority  
In 1956 the national elite had finally given in to the persistent demands for the 
reorganization of India‟s states on a linguistic basis in the wake of persistent protest 
and the death of a prominent Gandhian activist who had vowed to fast until the 
government decreed the formation of a separate province for Telugu-speakers in the 
(then) Tamil dominated Madras state in southern India.
27
 And by 1959, the Censor 
Board, which had been centralized under the Cinematograph Act of 1952, began to be 
decentralized, with Regional advisory boards being set up in Bombay, Madras and 
Calcutta.  
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The fact that the decentralization of censorship policy occurred in parallel with 
the reorganization of India‟s states along “cultural” lines ought not to be surprising in 
light of the discussion in the previous chapter. Indeed, the linguistic principle voiced 
as early as 1928 in the Nehru Report had noted that the goal of the linguistic 
reorganization of states was to allow regional cultures to develop “according to their 
own genius”. However, the national elite in New Delhi were unwilling to let go of the 
power to censor. The central government reserved the exclusive right to make 
appointments to regional boards, despite a number of demands in Parliament to grant 
the power of appointment to state governments. As one member commented: 
 “I want to stress that regarding the nomination of regional advisory councils, it 
is but proper that the State Governments are consulted. It is really sad and 
disappointing that the State Governments would have no say in the matter. 
Without the consultations with the State Governments, the proper functions 
that are contemplated under this Bill cannot be fairly and justly fulfilled.”28 
 
What becomes evident early on in the debates is that representatives from what 
were now linguistically organized states adopted the language that was used by Hindu 
conservatives during the debates of 1953. As one representative from the southern 
state of Kerala noted: 
“I am only pointing out for the consideration of the minister that so far as the 
choice of persons for these advisory panels is concerned, let us do it in 
consultation with the respective State Governments. Supposing a Malayalam 
film is to be ajudged – I am taking the case of Malayalam because I come from 
a Malayalam country – and the advisory panel consists of Tamilians or 
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Northerners, then the genius of the Malayalam language cannot be understood 
by them; and there is every likelihood of those persons coming to a wrong 
conclusion”29  
The official justification for retaining central government control over 
appointments to the Censor Board confirms Roy‟s assertions that the state in India was 
portrayed as a neutral, a-political arbiter and mediator in the face of the country‟s 
inherent cultural diversity. As Keskar, back in his second term as Minister of 
Information and Broadcasting, noted: 
“The regional centers are not there in all the states. For example, there are only 
three regional centres, namely, in Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta. If we consult 
only the state government in whose territory the regional centre is located, that 
also will not be very fair. The persons in the panel even today are taken on the 
basis of their knowing the various languages, and it would be certainly helpful 
to us and convenient also, if we could get suggestions in regard to the names, 
form also the state governments as from other sources and we shall certainly 
take steps in that behalf.”30  
 
In the face of growing pressures from regionally concentrated sub-national 
groups, the national government portrayed itself as the guarantor of a fair distribution 
of the right to censor across all recognized cultural groups. Notably, even though the 
establishment of regional advisory boards and the central government‟s retention of 
the right to appoint of members were justified as a way to make censorship more 
receptive to the “genius” of linguistic minorities in the states, one of the main purposes 
of the amendment was to strengthen central government control over censorship by 
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transforming what used to be informal directives or guidelines into legal clauses that 
were subject to sanction and punishment.
31
 Furthermore, the Amendment of 1958-59 
also gave the central government “revisional powers” that allowed them to override 
the proceedings of either the central or the regional censor boards.
32
 The formal 
“decentralization” of censoring authority, therefore, masked attempts at greater 
centralization. In short, even as regionally concentrated linguistic communities‟ “equal 
right to censor” was formally acknowledged by the national elite in the wake of the 
official recognition of linguistic provinces, this right was granted conditionally and 
almost entirely on the latter‟s terms.   
There is no better illustration of this pattern of group recognition than the 
accommodation of demands from sections of the women‟s movement in India for 
what came to be the Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act in the 
1980s. It was in the early years of that decade that women in India began to mobilize 
in large numbers around issues such as the procedures by which cases of rape were 
tried in courts of law. However, as part of this larger drive for greater political 
attention to the realities of women‟s social and legal status, sections of the women‟s 
movement also mobilized against the “obscene” representation of women in the 
media.  
By the early 1980s, women‟s rights groups had begun to mobilize against 
sexual imagery in the media and films more broadly, with protests against films like 
Satyam Shivam Sundaram, Red Rose, and Pati Parmeshwar for their “derogatory”, 
“insulting” and “demeaning” portrayal of women. Their efforts led to the 
promulgation of the Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act of 1986 by 
Rajiv Gandhi‟s Congress government which, although it was focused on the portrayal 
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of women in the print media, was quickly adapted and incorporated by the government 
into the Censor Board‟s “guidelines”.   
These debates in the Indian parliament around the Bill are significant because, 
as late as the 1986 there does not appear to have been a single parliamentarian who 
actively opposed the idea behind the law, even though there was some opposition on 
procedural grounds. Although the parallels with the debate from 1952 at the beginning 
of this chapter are impossible to miss, there were also some subtle shifts. For instance, 
Dr. Phulrenu Guha a veteran Congress leader and Gandhian noted that:  
“it is a very laudable bill which is to protect the value of culture. … Nowadays, 
sir, in the name of culture we find that fashion, freedom of expression, 
obscenity, nudism and sex have become rampant. Unless firm steps are taken 
to curb the indecent manifestation, the value of our society and the dignity of 
women would be ruined further. … The image of woman is the image of the 
society. So it is not concerning women only but the society as a whole…We 
should not forget that it concerns society as a whole”33 
 
The arguments for the censorship of “obscenity” that in the 1950s were made 
in the name of cultural protection came to be broadened to include the “dignity of 
women” in the 1980s. For India‟s parliamentarians, protecting the dignity of women 
was understood as part of the larger political project to protect Indian culture and 
society from moral decay and corruption. For instance, Aladi Aruna alias V. 
Arunachalam noted that, 
 “The object of the bill is laudable which is to protect the traditional values of 
our culture and legacy…Encouragement of nudism and relaxation in our moral 
values have damaged our society further. Unless firm steps are taken to curb 
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the indecent…and derogatory manifestation, the traditional values of our 
society, of our civilized society, and the dignity of women would be impaired 
considerably. It is not merely protecting the dignity of women at large but 
safeguarding the previous values of a cultured society.”34  
 
Further, representatives of women‟s organizations at the debate explicitly 
compared the state‟s neglect of women‟s “right to censor” to its stated willingness to 
accommodate similar demands made by cultural groups. One of the proponents of the 
Bill, Ms. Ela Bhatt, explicitly put the comparative neglect of issues relating to the 
portrayal of women in the media relative to the attention paid to other group‟s 
sentiments to these groups‟ willingness to take an aggressive stance in the face of 
offense. In addition to noting that “Public display of the women‟s body is the most 
blatant kind of indecency”, Ms. Bhatt also added that: 
“By showing women in stereotype roles of mother, housewife and wife only 
they show women as unequal to men. They treat women as lesser beings…If 
any other community had been portrayed so negatively and insultingly, people 
would have been up in arms, but when it comes to women even progressive 
newspapers and magazines do not shy away from demeaning women purely for 
the sake of profit.”35  
 
The Bill passed in parliament and became law in 1987. However, what is 
notable is that Ms. Bhatt‟s proposed amendment to the Bill, that the depiction of 
women in “servile” ways be included in the definition of “indecent representation” 
was expressly rejected by parliament, demonstrating the ways in which just like in the 
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case of linguistic groups in the 1950s, women‟s demands for the “right to censor” 
were ultimately subordinated to the interests of, this time, the conservative elite.
36
 This 
selective grant of women‟s rights organizations‟ demands for new censorship rules is 
significant because it demonstrates the limited receptivity to such demands by groups 
that do not fit in with the dominant discourse of the state. Indeed, it is important to 
keep in mind that there was strong opposition to the Bill from other sections of the 
women‟s movement who saw the new law as giving the government yet another 
means to regulate female sexuality. However, as one activist who, at the time, 
supported the new legislation noted in retrospect, “the group that talks about morality 
always wins”.37  
 
Religious Groups and the Right to Censor  
The idea of restricting individual speech and expression in the interest of the 
sentiments of religious minorities has a long history in Indian law. Section 295 of the 
Indian Penal Code, discussed previously, explicitly prohibits “insults” to religion with 
“deliberate and malicious intent” and was held to be constitutional as early as 1957 in 
Ramji Lal Modi v. State of Uttar Pradesh.
38
 Although S. 295 can be read as providing 
religious minorities with some version of the right to censor, it is significant that 
judicial interpretations of the law have tied its protections to a desire for public order, 
mirroring the considerations of India‟s founders when they were deliberating the issue 
of the rights of these groups. In Ramji  Lal Modi, for example, the justices noted that: 
“Insults to religion offered unwittingly or carelessly or without any deliberate 
or malicious intention to outrage the religious feelings of that class do not 
come within the section. It only punishes the aggravated form of insult to 
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religion when it is perpetrated with the deliberate and malicious intention of 
outraging the religious feelings of that class. The calculated form of insult is 
clearly to disrupt the public order…”39 
 
Protection against offense was therefore made conditional upon violent 
mobilization by the group concerned. Section 153A of the Indian Penal Code, another 
law that allows for the prosecution of speech or expression that incites “enmity” 
among different groups is, likewise, predicated on the likelihood of that enmity 
resulting in violence.
40
 The tying together of the proscription of offense with the threat 
of violence and the disruption of public order was reiterated again in 1976, in a case 
involving the Hindi language translation of Tamil nationalist Periyar‟s Ramayana: A 
True Account: 
“The state in India is secular and does not take sides with one religion or other 
prevalent in our pluralistic society. It has no direct concern with the faiths of 
the people but is deeply obligated not merely to preserve and protect society 
against breaches of the peace and violations of public order but also to create 
conditions where the sentiments and feelings of people of diverse or opposing 
beliefs and bigotries are not so molested by ribald writings or offensive 
publications as to provoke or outrage groups into possible violent action. 
Essentially, good government necessitates peace and security and whoever 
violates by bombs or books societal tranquility will become target of legal 
interdict by the state.”41 
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The recognition among activists and political groups of this legal precedent is 
evident in Christian activists‟ belief that the state was more responsive to offenses to 
Muslims because “they are more aggressive”.42 Campaigners for the rights of the Jain 
religious minority also noted that the community‟s religious commitment to ahimsa or 
non-violence was one of the major reasons why they were not as successful as 
Muslims when it came to getting governments to acquiesce to their concerns.
43
 The 
threat of public disorder in the face of offense has led the Supreme Court to pass 
judgments that go quite clearly against established precedent. For instance, in the case 
of James Laine‟s Shivaji: Hindu King in Islamic India, the court reserved its judgment 
and told the author‟s counsel that they would lift the ban on the book on the condition 
that the offensive portions were expunged, even though the State government had not 
met the required criteria for banning the book under S. 153.
44
  
In the run-up to the release of The Da Vinci Code in 2006, a number of 
governments imposed bans on the film under S. 295A, on the grounds that it was 
offensive to Christian beliefs and that it was likely to threaten public order. As was 
discussed in Chapter Two, Christian activists understood the pattern of the bans to 
coincide with state-level patterns of Christians‟ political and economic influence, with 
states such as Kerala, Goa, and Tamil Nadu, among others, imposing bans on the film. 
However, when Sony Pictures contested the ban in a number of these states, they were 
invariably lifted. One of the judgments, made in the High Court in the state of Andhra 
Pradesh, noted that “the Constitution does not confer or tolerate such individualized, 
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hyper-sensitive private censor intrusion into and regulation of guaranteed freedoms of 
others.”45   
Significantly, while the Judge talked at length of the significance of the 
freedom of speech and expression for a democratic society, he also pointed out that 
one of the reasons why the state government‟s ban was unconstitutional was that the 
Censor Board had already passed the film.
46
 The existence of the Censor Board has 
been an important factor in judicial decisions on censorship. More specifically, the 
existence of the Censor Board as a pre-release vetting and certifying authority has 
been a major reason why judges have routinely struck down governments‟ attempts to 
impose bans on films after they have received a green signal from the censors. So, in 
response to an appeal from the government that it sometimes needed the power to 
impose a ban on a film after its release in order to respond to “public outrage”, a bench 
of the Supreme Court ruled in 1991 that:  
“We fail to understand the apprehension expressed by the learned counsel that 
there may be a law and order situation. Once an Expert Body has considered 
the impact of the film on the public and has cleared the film, it is no excuse to 
say that there may be a law and order situation. It is for the concerned state 
government to see that the law and order is maintained. In any democratic 
society there are bound to be divergent views. Merely because a small section 
of the society has a different view from that taken by the Tribunal, and choose 
to express their views by unlawful means would be no ground for the executive 
to review or revise a decision of the Tribunal. In such a case, the clear duty of 
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the Government is to ensure that law and order is maintained by taking 
appropriate actions against persons who choose to breach the law”47 
 
The Judiciary‟s consistently tough stand on post- Censor certification bans has 
led governments to encourage regional Censor Boards to appoint “advisory panels” 
which consist of members of the community likely to be offended by a film to a 
special screening in order to consider their recommendations.
48
 The Supreme Court is 
not oblivious to the fact that members of the Censor Board are not always attentive to 
the government-issued guidelines. For instance, in 1979, while dismissing a case 
relating to a demand for a post-certification ban on the film Satyam, Shivam, 
Sundaram, the Court ruled: 
“Prosecutions like this one may well be symptomatic of public dissatisfaction 
with the Board of Censors not screening vicious films. The ultimate censorious 
power over the censors belongs to the people and by indifference, laxity or 
abetment, pictures which pollute public morality are liberally certificated. The 
legislation meant by parliament to protect the people‟s good morals, may be 
sabotaged by statutory enemies within. Corruption at that level must be 
stamped out.”49 
 
It appears then that despite concern for public order and outrage, the 
established legal precedent with respect to imposing a ban on a film after it receives 
Censor certification has placed constraints not only on governments, but on justices 
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too. However, the courts have compensated for this handicap by frequently demanding 
that the Censor Board appoint representatives from a particular group when that group 
goes to court with complaints against an offensive movie. For instance, when the 
Mumbai-based Christian group, the Catholic Secular Forum, went to court to demand 
a ban on the film Sacred Evil (2006), the Court directed the Censor Board to organize 
a special screening for activists belonging to the Forum before granting the film 
certification. It appears that the Catholic Secular Forum had a veto in the case as the 
film was never released in India.  Since that time, one of the primary members of the 
Catholic Secular Forum said that he could not think of a single instance when the 
group made a demand either for a complete ban on a film or for the excision of an 
“offensive” scene or dialog that was not enforced by the Censor Board.50  
It is important to keep in mind, however, that the legal precedent for this 
approach to censorship policy was set in arenas beyond the freedom of speech per se. 
More importantly, it represents the democratization of other judicial decisions which 
upheld similar entitlements to the majority Hindu community. For instance, in 2004, 
the Supreme Court upheld a law in the State of Uttar Pradesh that banned the sale and 
consumption meat, fish, and eggs around the Hindu shrine of Rishikesh on the 
grounds that “most people in Rishikesh come for religious purposes and members of 
several communities are strictly vegetarian”51 This move to protect the sentiments of 
Hindus itself had a legal precedent in the upholding of various “anti-conversion laws” 
in states like Madhya Pradesh and Orissa by the Supreme Court in the 1970s.
52
  
                                                          
50
 Among the movies that faced the CSF‟s ire were Sacred Evil, Sins, Elizabeth: The Golden Age, and 
Naughty Nun.  
51
 Om Prakash and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others 2004(3) SCC 402.  
52
 Yuritha Hyde v. State [(‟73) A. Or. 116] and Rev. Stanislaus v. M.P. [(1977) 2SCR 611].These laws 
placed severe restrictions on the ability of Christian missionaries to proselytize and convert individuals 
to Christianity. It is important to keep in mind that missionary activity had been a major bone of 
contention for Hindu revivalist movements since the 19
th
 century. Similarly, various laws restricting 
cow slaughter have been upheld as Constitutional over the years, despite placing severe restrictions on 
predominantly Muslim butchers‟ rights to livelihood. 
177 
 
By 2008, the Supreme Court had also upheld a law in the state of Gujarat that 
banned the production and sale of meat (and, as the court itself acknowledged, in 
effect, banning the consumption of meat) for a nine-day period during a religious 
festival of the minority Jain community, on the grounds that “since India is a country 
of great diversity, it is absolutely essential if we wish to keep our country united to 
have tolerance and respect for all communities and sects.”53 The court went on to 
argue that  
“These days, unfortunately, some people seem to be perpetually on a short 
fuse, and are willing to protest often violently about anything under the sun on 
the grounds that a book or painting or film etc has „hurt the sentiments‟ of their 
community. These are dangerous tendencies and must be curbed with an iron 
hand. We are one nation and should respect each other and have tolerance”54  
 
However, with a distinctly “Gandhian multicultural” logic, the court put the onus of 
tolerance and compromise on individuals rather than on groups, ruling that “In a 
multicultural country like ours with such diversity, one must not be over touchy about 
a short restriction when it is being done out of respect for the sentiments of a particular 
section of society.”55  
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has attempted to demonstrate how the incipient Gandhian 
multiculturalism that is evident in the Indian constitutional order – and as manifest in 
the “right to censor” – began to realize its full potential in the years after 
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independence.  It has argued that the “right to censor” out of respect for group 
sentiment came to be progressively “decentralized” since the mid 1950s as politics in 
India has become more pluralistic and more competitive.  
The “right to censor” was established as a legitimate group entitlement well 
before the formulation of India‟s constitution, however. The present chapter noted that 
it had deeper roots going back to the colonial era when high profile controversies like 
those surrounding publications like Rangila Rasul and Mother India led to the 
dissemination of the idea that the state had a responsibility to protect the sentiments 
and reputation of its citizens. Since the 1950s, linguistic groups, religious groups, 
women, and most recently lower caste groups have all, to a greater or lesser extent 
been incorporated into the state‟s censorship regime.  
As Roy (2007) has argued, the state in India has long positioned itself as the a-
political unifier of India‟s cultural diversity. However, this diversity was 
acknowledged and recognized almost exclusively on the elites‟ terms. So all groups 
were only recognized if they posed a distinct threat to public order or if they fit into 
the larger community of “Hindus”. Groups that could do neither were left to fend for 
themselves. Having “the right to censor” has consequently been established as a 
signifier of a group‟s substantive political empowerment and its acceptance as a full 
and equal member in the “composite” Indian culture. Demands for censorship in the 
wake of group offense are, in effect, components of a larger demand for political 
equality. It may not be the offensiveness of a book or film itself, but what the 
existence and public circulation of offensive materials implies about the offended 
group‟s political status in India that has allowed “seeking offense” to become such a 






 In his book titled The Future of Freedom, Fareed Zakaria, the author who was 
among the first to use the term “illiberal democracy,” makes a special reference to the 
evolution of democracy in India. In particular he notes that “India is a genuinely free 
and freewheeling society. But looking under the covers of Indian democracy one sees 
a more complex and troubling reality. In recent decades, India has become something 
quite different from the picture in the hearts of its admirers. Not that it is less 
democratic: in important ways it has become more democratic. But it has become less 
tolerant, less secular, less law-abiding, less liberal. And these two trends – 
democratization and illiberalism – are directly related” (Zakaria 2003, 106). This 
project has sought to understand the reasons for this apparent resurgence of 
illiberalism in Indian politics in an era of increasing democracy, with a particular 
focus on the issue of censorship.  
 The need for a closer examination of this phenomenon was justified in Chapter 
One on the grounds that Zakaria‟s somewhat blunt association of democratization with 
illiberalism is tempered by evidence from countries such as Mexico, Romania, Bolivia 
and South Africa which suggests that increasing political competition that is 
associated with democratization need not deterministically lead to increasing 
illiberalism (Coppedge 1993; van Cott 2005; McLaughlin 2007; Birnir 2007). The 
preceding chapters have argued that the persistence of censorship in India is at least 
partly due to the fact that having the “right to censor” has come to symbolize a group‟s 
substantive political empowerment in the Indian constitutional order‟s negotiation of 
socio-cultural diversity. Consequently, seeking offense has become a useful strategy 
for political entrepreneurs looking to discredit political incumbents‟ claims of group 
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representativeness and attempting to establish themselves as actors of consequence in 
the political arena. Consequently, although Zakaria is right to identify increasing 
political competition with the exacerbation of illiberalism, this association has deeper 
roots in India‟s political history than he acknowledges and is not simply a 
contemporary manifestation of the tyranny of the majority.  
This project has consequently focused on the question of how and why the 
strategy of seeking offense has come to be a part of the tool-kit of political strategies 
available to politicians in India. Chapter Two drew on media reports and interview 
data to uncover the role that the symbolic strategy of seeking offense plays in a 
political context in which electoral outcomes are said to be determined primarily by 
material considerations. It was an attempt to understand how actors who deploy the 
strategy of seeking offense understand the function that the strategy serves, 
particularly given that theories of political economy of ethnicity routinely suggest that 
identity has no innate value to voters (Chandra 2004, 11). The chapter concluded that 
the symbolic claim of offense is understood to serve a number of different functions in 
the context of clientelistic or patronage democracy, depending upon who is deploying 
it. For small, patronage poor political parties and candidates, the symbolic appeal 
serves as an apparently efficacious substitute for material or distributive strategies, 
allowing such parties to last longer than much of the literature would lead us to expect. 
However, these appeals also serve vital internal functions for India‟s personality-
driven political parties. In particular, they allow charismatic political leaders to “keep 
party workers engaged” with a party that may not otherwise provide them with 
avenues of substantive participation in decision-making. Finally, given India‟s 
particularly strong incumbency disadvantage, it was argued that the symbolic appeal 
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provides even patronage-rich incumbents with a way to signal their credibility as 
sources of patronage and other material benefits after the election.  
However, the chapter also noted that political parties are not the only actors 
who mobilize against offensive materials. Using the case of a Christian lay 
organization‟s mobilization against the film The Da Vinci Code, it was argued that 
mobilization against offensive materials allows politically under-represented or 
marginalized groups to galvanize an internally-divided community, and consequently 
signal their credibility as a “vote-bank” for politicians who incorporate them into their 
patronage networks. The fact that claims of offense are used by groups to symbolize 
their broader political marginalization in democratic politics points to one reason why 
the strategy may be particularly potent in identity politics: it is one way in which 
political outsiders may discredit incumbents‟ claims of group representativeness. The 
findings of Chapter Two suggest that symbolic and material strategies in democratic 
politics may be much more closely tied together than much of the literature on party 
politics assumes; but they also suggest that, contrary to the assertions of much of the 
literature on the political economy of ethnicity, identity may well have value in itself, 
if for no other reason than that politicians in India believe that it does. 
The findings of Chapter Two suggested a number of hypotheses regarding the 
conditions under which demands for censorship were likely to arise in democratic 
politics in India as well as the conditions under which these demands were likely to be 
redressed by incumbent politicians. These were as follows: First, claims of offense and 
demands for censorship are more likely to be made by resource-poor and politically 
marginal political parties and candidates. Second, outside the realm of parties, they are 
likely to be made in contexts in which the “offended” group is relatively socially and 
politically marginalized. Third, given anti-incumbency effects across India‟s states, all 
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incumbents would be expected to respond to censorship demands in their attempts to 
defeat anti-incumbency. Chapter Three attempted to see if these hypotheses applied to 
an unconnected case, the banning of a Bollywood musical called Aaja Nachle [Come, 
Let‟s Dance] in late 2007 on the grounds of its offensiveness to the Dalit community, 
former “untouchables” in the Hindu caste hierarchy. The censorship of Aaja Nachle 
was interesting because it was only banned in three of India‟s thirty two states and 
Union Territories. The unfolding of events in the case of Aaja Nachle largely aligned 
with the hypotheses generated from the cases discussed in Chapter Two. However, the 
case also led to the addition of nuance to these hypotheses, by demonstrating that 
incumbent responsiveness to an emerging controversy was more a function of 
competition for the vote of the offended group rather than merely the result of anti-
incumbency effects. More specifically, the chapter demonstrated that in states with 
tighter electoral contests, incumbents may unilaterally impose a ban on a film, without 
even waiting for protest to emerge in the state in question.  
Having identified some of the conditions under which the censorship demand 
is deployed and redressed as an electoral strategy in democratic identity politics in 
India, the rest of the project was an attempt to understand how seeking offense came 
to be a part of the “tool kit” of strategies available to Indian politicians. The need for 
an explanation for this phenomenon was justified on the grounds that the association 
between identity politics and illiberal political strategy that is manifest in India does 
not appear to be natural, obvious or self-evident when examined in a broader 
comparative perspective.  
Among the critiques that this project offered of existing explanations for 
censorship in India was that their almost exclusive focus on censorship in 
contemporary era neglected the continuities between the present and the past. Chapter 
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Four consequently took a step back into colonial India to demonstrate how illiberal 
political strategy and the generation of cultural controversy were routinely deployed 
by politicians across the political spectrum well before independence, partly in 
response to the colonial administration‟s evolving social and cultural policies. As early 
as the late 1890s, anti-colonial and nationalist discourse had come to be closely tied to 
cultural revivalism, with political strategies during mobilizations such as those against 
the 1905 partition of Bengal frequently forcing conformity from individuals in the 
pursuit of group goals. The advent of Mahatma Gandhi on the political scene around 
1919 only buttressed the popular political conception of the efficacy of the cultural 
revivalist appeal in Indian politics to the extent that, by the 1940s, even the Congress 
Party‟s class competitors were routinely deploying cultural revivalist appeals in the 
political arena.  
Chapter One had suggested that a long-standing democracy‟s particular 
negotiation of diversity, as manifest in its constitution, may produce a particular 
“culture of rights” which privileges certain kinds of political demands while 
discouraging others. However, as Horowitz (2002) has argued, constitutional designs 
are, more often than not, improvisations and practical responses to historical and 
contemporary events. Chapter Five demonstrated that Horowitz‟s assertions accurately 
describe the unfolding of events in the Indian Constituent Assembly. In particular, it 
argued that the horrific violence surrounding the partition of India in 1947 as well as 
the more long-term entrenchment of cultural revivalist sentiment in Indian politics had 
a profound effect on the way in which India‟s founders negotiated the country‟s 
inherent socio-cultural diversity. In particular, it argued that this context in which the 
Indian Constituent Assembly met led to extensive restrictions being placed on the 
liberties of individuals. These restrictions on individual liberties were justified on the 
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grounds that, contrary to much liberal philosophy, civil liberties were “gifts of the 
state” rather than natural rights. Further, relatively extensive rights were granted to 
cultural groups because, in the wake of partition, India‟s founders recognized that the 
country‟s stability depended upon the placation of cultural sentiment. However, these 
group entitlements, although expansive and universal in principle were granted 
selectively, depending upon the group‟s political prominence, its alignment with a 
broader (Hindu) revivalist program, as well as the degree of the threat the group‟s 
potential disaffection posed to the legitimacy of the Constituent Assembly. As a result, 
although all groups were entitled to state support for cultural development and 
preservation, these rights were granted selectively to some groups but not to others; 
they were granted more extensively to Sikhs, for instance, than to Muslims or 
Christians. Furthermore, the cultural concerns of Hindus over-rode (and partly 
determined) the grant of all other cultural rights. This was partly due to the fact that 
the Hindu revivalist agenda received a boost in the wake of partition, but also because 
items on the revivalist agenda, such as the demand for a ban on cow slaughter, allowed 
for the imposition of Hindu revivalist precepts on all individuals, regardless of group 
membership.  
Chapter Six demonstrated the ways in which the unequal grant of group 
entitlements in India‟s Constitutional order was reflected in the state‟s censorship 
policy in the years after independence.  It argued that early censorship policy, although 
implemented by an ostensibly a-political and identity-neutral state apparatus in the 
name of “Indian” society and culture, in practice reflected the cultural concerns of 
politically dominant and influential groups. In the early 1950s, censorship policy was 
dominated by Hindu revivalist elites‟ concerns with the corruption of Indian culture by 
western influences as well as “obscene” Indian cinema. As new cultural groups came 
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to be empowered with the linguistic reorganization of states in the mid-to-late 1950s, 
they began to demand that the “right to censor” be decentralized. This right of cultural 
groups to impose restrictions on the liberties of individuals has been frequently upheld 
even by the Indian judiciary, as justices have ordered that representatives of cultural 
and religious groups be granted representation on the Indian censor board whenever a 
film is deemed to be potentially offensive and likely to create a breach of public order. 
In short, the evolution of Indian censorship policy since independence reflects the 
gradual equalization and decentralization of Gandhian multicultural group 
entitlements, whereby the state apparatus enforces individual conformity to the 
sentiments of cultural groups.  
 
Re-thinking shifts in Indian Politics: The Constitutional Order and Contemporary 
Developments 
The Constitution of India is not the first place scholars would begin their 
search for the roots of censorship practices in contemporary democratic politics. 
Indeed, beginning with the work of Granville Austin (1966) much of the scholarly 
literature on India‟s constitutional history has tended to coalesce around the argument 
that the document itself is, despite all its internal tensions, liberal in nature (See, for 
instance, Austin 1966; Bhargava 2000, 2008; Mahajan 1998, 2008; Khilnani 1999, 
2005). Given this agreement about the philosophical underpinnings of the Indian 
constitution, Bhargava notes that “the fact that [the idea of individual rights] has not 
gone deeper [in India] requires explanation” (Bhargava 2000, 35). In short, India‟s 
contemporary “age of intolerance” and the larger trend toward political extremism are 
usually seen as being in fundamental tension with the Indian constitutional order. The 
conclusions of this project, therefore, go against much of the literature on the nature of 
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the Indian constitution, by suggesting that India‟s founding constitutional principles 
have played an important role in shaping patterns of (illiberal) political action in the 
years since independence. 
Re-thinking the philosophical foundations of India‟s founding order also 
allows for the recognition of the continuity between India‟s past and present beyond 
the realm of censorship policy. As has been mentioned previously, the dominant trend 
in the literature on Indian politics has been to see India‟s founding order as 
representing a liberal, secular consensus that was somehow divorced from popular 
politics. It is a thesis that has led a number of recent studies on Indian politics to see 
the contemporary incidence of religious intolerance and drives for cultural conformity 
as challenging India‟s founding principles (Kohli 1990; Corbridge and Harriss 2000; 
Hasan 2005; Nussbaum 2007). For instance, authors such as Zoya Hasan (2005) and 
Atul Kohli (1990) suggest that the rise of identity politics and political fragmentation 
has “damaged” the Constitution (Kohli 1990, 6) or put “the whole constitutional legal 
order…in difficulty” (Hasan 2005, 15). 1  
Arguments such as these reflect a broader tendency in the literature toward the 
periodization of post-independence politics in India ( For instance, see Corbridge and 
Harriss 2000, Kohli 2002, Ray and Katzenstein 2005; and Yadav and Palshikar 2006). 
The contemporary rise of Hindu nationalism in particular is understood to represent a 
dramatic shift. So Yadav and Palshikar (2006), for instance, note that the “transition 
from the Congress system to the post-Congress polity was neither gradual nor smooth. 
It was the product of a systemic shock, a cataclysmic transformation…This period was 
                                                          
1
 To the extent that some scholars have begun to take a closer look at these principles and their political 
consequences (such as Hansen 2000), they have often looked only in passing at one particular source of 
tension (such as individual versus group rights) without providing a whole lot of evidence to support 
their contentions. This has often opened their arguments to undeserved and flippant dismissal. For 
instance, see Bhargava‟s (2008) rebuttal of Hansen‟s contentions about the relative priority accorded to 
individuals and groups in the Constitution.  
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marked by a fundamental reconfiguration of the party political space.” They go on to 
argue that the rise of Hindu nationalism in particular has “altered the terms of the 
political discourse. It has pushed the secular democratic character of the nation-state 
into an arena of contestation” (Yadav and Palshikar 2006, 99, 101).  
The findings of this project suggest that the shift to the “Hindutva” political era 
may not be as dramatic as much of this literature suggests. In doing so, they build on a 
small but significant body of work by scholars like Hansen (2001) and Roy (2007) 
who have begun to identify the roots of contemporary Hindu nationalism in the secular 
discourse of India‟s “Nehruvian” past. A study of Nehruvian era censorship policy 
suggests that these continuities may, in fact, be more overt than the existing literature 
suggests.  
 
Censorship and the Formality of the Informal in the Indian Constitutional Order 
This project suggests that part of the reason for the relative neglect of the 
Indian Constitution‟s illiberal characteristics is that much of the literature has chosen 
to focus on the realm of written constitutional clauses, consequently ignoring the 
interpretations that many of India‟s founders gave to these ostensibly liberal tenets. 
The tendency to focus on the Constitution‟s written clauses is shared by much of the 
literature in comparative politics which sees constitutions as “formal” institutions that 
are enforced by official organs of the state, consequently placing them in opposition to 
“informal” institutions: unwritten rules that are enforced primarily “outside officially 
sanctioned channels” (Helmke and Levitsky 2004, 727). This focus on the 
Constitution as written word has meant that scholars look at the list of Fundamental 
Rights in the document and, while acknowledging the way they have been restricted in 
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the document itself, suggest that their existence reflects the significant liberal leanings 
of India‟s founding order. But this neglects the important fact that was noted in 
Chapter Five, namely, that these rights were described in the Constituent Assembly by 
no less the head of the Drafting Committee, B.R. Ambedkar, as “gifts of the state” 
rather than as “natural rights”, marking a significant and under-appreciated departure 
from liberal principle.  
Taking a closer look at the “original intent” behind ostensibly liberal 
constitutional clauses allows for a more accurate understanding of what these written 
words actually implied to India‟s founders. But incorporating publicly available 
interpretations of written (formal) constitutional clauses into analyses of a country‟s 
constitutional order requires that the apparently clear heuristic distinctions between the 
“formal” and the “informal” institutional arenas be challenged.  Scholars like Helmke 
and Levitsky tend to focus on constitutions as sources of formal rules of the game, 
such as the separation of powers between legislatures, executives and judiciaries, or 
electoral rules where there is likely to be a high degree of clarity in written 
constitutional clauses; however, it is unclear that the same degree of clarity exists once 
we move into the realm of civil liberties and philosophical principles embodied in 
constitutions, which are much more open to influences from the “informal” realm over 
time even when enforced by state institutions. For instance, Feldman (2008) has 
argued that Supreme Court justices in the United States were heavily influenced by 
political developments in the public sphere as they gave the First Amendment 
increasingly liberal interpretations beginning in the 1940s. Scholars like Jon Gould go 
to the extent of suggesting that when it comes to constitutional principles like the 
freedom of speech, “informal understandings of speech rights have as much, if not 
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more, sway in ordering civil speech norms than do judicial interpretations” (Gould 
2005, 44). 
One could posit, therefore, that with respect to civil liberties clauses, as with 
the negotiation of cultural diversity, the boundaries between the formal and the 
informal rules of the game are frequently fuzzy, with the two more often than not 
being mutually constitutive. The blurring of the distinction between the formal and 
informal arenas in the Indian case is exacerbated by the fact that much of the country‟s 
negotiation of diversity and individual liberty took place at its founding, in a 
Constituent Assembly in which the distinction between the formal and the informal 
can hardly be said to have been well-established. In such a context, formal procedures 
and informal arrangements frequently overlapped, to the extent that leaving the 
negotiation of diversity and individual liberty to the informal arena became one of the 
formal rules of the game.  
The paradoxical formality of the informal in India‟s negotiation of diversity is 
also evident in censorship policy and practice in India. For instance, Section 5(3) of 
the Cinematograph Act of 1952 posits, somewhat vaguely, that “The [Censor] Board 
may consult in such manner as may be prescribed any advisory panel in respect of any 
film for which an application for a certificate has been made.” The membership on 
such “advisory panels” has frequently included members of cultural or religious 
groups who the Board (or the government) believes are likely to be offended by a 
particular film. The vagueness of this “guideline” is significant; it is for precisely this 
reason that politicians like Ramdas Athavale, mentioned in Chapter Three, could use a 
demand for the formal representation of Dalits on the Censor Board as a way to out-
bid his political competitors in the wake of the controversy around Aaja Nachle.  
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The formality of the informal in Indian censorship policy was similarly evident 
when, in December 2007, the Minister of Information and Broadcasting in the 
governing center-left coalition, Mr. Priya Ranjan Dasmunshi, told parliament that 
“[The] Government‟s policy is that nothing should be done in the country which will 
offend any community, caste or religion.”2 Notably, neither Dasmunshi, nor any 
written constitutional clause to date, has laid out any formal standards by which 
offensiveness is to be determined.  
 
Liberalism and Illiberalism in Indian Politics 
It is not the intention of this project to argue that Indian politics allows no 
space for the freedom of expression or for public debate. Indeed, as was mentioned in 
the preceding chapters, there is significant evidence of genuine pluralism, public 
debate and liberalism within Indian society. Further, and as was noted in the 
introduction itself, one other thing that this project does not argue is that Indian 
politics allows no room for liberal politics, or even that illiberalism always or 
inevitably triumphs in the political arena. What it does argue, however, is that the 
Indian constitutional order‟s illiberal elements have provided powerful ammunition to 
conservative, revivalist, or illiberal sections of the political elite, making the task for 
any liberal or “progressive” opposition that much harder. For instance, in as early as 
1958, a number of members of parliament decried attempts by the central government 
to tighten censorship rules by transforming the “guidelines” of the preceding years 
into punishable offences. In response, Mr. B.V. Keskar, the then Minister for 
Information and Broadcasting stated that:  
                                                          
2
 Priya Ranjan Dasmunshi in the Lok Sabha, December 1, 2007. 
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“we must remember that in this matter the Constitution itself recognizes 
censorship. It is in the schedule and the Central government has been 
considered the proper authority regarding this matter. The Constitution also 
recognizes the right to put reasonable restrictions in the interest of various 
subjects important to the community, which for the sake of clarification, we 
have mentioned in a clause of the Bill itself”3  
But it is also important to note that the Indian Constitutional order more broadly 
speaking is not composed exclusively of clauses on cultural rights and (restricted) 
freedoms of individuals. This project has emphasized these particular aspects of the 
constitutional order because they have tended to be neglected in much of the literature 
on the subject and because they are relevant to the more specific phenomenon under 
examination, namely, the use of censorship demands in democratic identity politics. 
Similarly, the Indian national movement cannot be said to be defined exclusively by 
cultural revivalism. For instance, in response to the controversy surrounding the book 
Mother India in the late 1920s, discussed briefly in Chapter Six, Gandhi actually 
encouraged debate and reform on issues like the status of women in Indian society 
(Emilsen 1987, 74-75). Similarly, it is impossible to neglect the fact that Nehru, along 
with a significant section of Congress leaders, was socially progressive and committed 
to the promotion of social and economic equality. The Constitution‟s non-justiciable 
Directive Principles of State Policy, while containing Hindu revivalist elements such 
as the declaration of the desirability of a ban on cow slaughter, also contains clauses 
that encourage the state to provide free education and ensure a minimal standard of 
livelihood to all Indian citizens. So what happened to this strand of Indian politics? 
                                                          
3
 Lok Sabha Debates Second Series Volume XXIV, No. 24  – December 19, 1958, pp 6424 
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One could posit that although these other strands of politics have not 
disappeared, the policies that emerged from the Constituent Assembly made these 
broader concerns with the welfare of individuals conditional on group membership. 
For instance, economic benefits were not granted to all of India‟s poor, but only to the 
poor belonging to particular caste or religious groups. Members of so-called 
“scheduled castes” who convert out of the Hindu tradition consequently lose their 
entitlements under the country‟s affirmative action programs even though the fact of 
their religious conversion does not change the reality of their social and economic 
marginalization. Such policies, reflecting once again a concern with maintaining the 
size and strength of the Hindu “community,” have facilitated the continued 
marginalization of poorer sections of religious minorities like Muslims and Christians, 
who have routinely been ignored by the state‟s affirmative action programs.  
The fact that individual rights and entitlements were conditional upon group 
membership also provides a possible reason for the perpetuation of the politics of 
identity as opposed to class in the years since Indian independence. If access to state 
support is conditional upon the identity group one belongs to, it is in the interest of 
individuals to organize along identity-based cleavages in order to make demands on 
the state, because that may be the only language that state institutions understand. The 
Indian state‟s selective receptivity to individual demands was evident most obviously 
in a 2009 Supreme Court decision that responded to eunuchs‟ (transgenders) demands 
for state support to compensate for their social and economic marginalization with the 
question: “What are kinnars [transgenders]? A caste, or a community?”4  
                                                          
4
 In “Transgenders get sympathy from SC, but no relief” in The Times of India online, February 17, 
2009. Available online at: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/Transgenders-get-no-relief-from-
SC/articleshow/4138450.cms. Last accessed on: February 17, 2009. The petitioner, Sonam Singh, was 
asking for an economic rehabilitation package similar to that given by the state to historically 
marginalized groups referred to as “scheduled castes” and “scheduled tribes”.  
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Of course, this is not to suggest that change is impossible or even unlikely. 
Indeed, there are already signs that India‟s social pluralism is beginning to be reflected 
in the country‟s politics. For instance, the transition from a relatively closed society to 
one in which Baywatch could be watched daily in the comfort of your own home has 
occurred in parallel with important shifts within the Indian public sphere. It is 
interesting, for instance, to note that some of the women‟s rights activists who helped 
to usher in the Indecent Representation of Women Act in 1986 today campaign 
vociferously against the Indian state‟s attempts to target “bar dancers” – women who 
dance, fully clothed, at bars targeted at low and middle income customers – for the 
obscenity and immorality of their actions. Similarly, the English language print media, 
a large section of which actively supported a ban on The Satanic Verses in the late 
1980s, today decry attempts at censorship almost reflexively.  
Aside from events in the cultural sphere, the 1990s have also produced a spate 
of movements for what could be called secular citizenship-enhancing rights: the right 
to work, the right to education, and the right to information – rights that are guaranteed 
explicitly to individual citizens, in theory, regardless of group membership. As has 
already been noted, many of these rights were always a part of the constitutional order, 
but as non-justiciable “Directive Principles of State Policy” for which the state was not 
accountable in a court of law. The era of liberalization has produced movements both 
at the rural grassroots as well as in urban metropolises for the transformation of these 
principles into concrete and justiciable rights to which all Indian citizens are entitled, 
and for which the state will be held accountable. Such mobilization has the potential 
(even if in the very long term) to lead to a paradigmatic shift in the relationship 
between the individual and the state in India, where access to public services and 
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resources may no longer be dependent upon ascriptive identity or attachment to a 
political patron.  
Furthermore, generational effects and debates within the public sphere may 
also stimulate changes in political perceptions of public opinion on issues such as the 
enforcement of individual conformity to traditional cultural norms. For instance, if one 
looks close enough, it is possible to identify the beginnings of a subtle shift in political 
party strategy over the years. In the early 1990s, when Hindu fascism was at its height, 
the Shiv Sena party in Mumbai began a campaign against Valentine‟s Day on the 
grounds that it was corrupting Indian culture by encouraging young people to mingle 
across the sexual divide. As the years have gone by and a younger generation of voters 
has become decisive in electoral contests, however, the party has begun moderating its 
stance, encouraging Indianized versions of the celebration,
5
 even as opposition parties 
in the city began mobilizing their cadres to prevent the Sena‟s cadre from attacking or 
harassing couples on Mumbai‟s streets.6  
In a similar vein, persistent efforts by gay rights activists in India to push for 
the repeal of Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, which criminalizes consensual 
homosexual sex, led the Delhi High Court to declare in July 2009 that the law is 
inconsistent with constitutional principles of equality and personal liberty. Notably, 
the court‟s decision was based on the recognition of homosexuals as a group that was 
entitled to benefit from the Indian constitution‟s commitment to “recognize, protect, 
and celebrate diversity.”7 However, while demonstrating consistency with founding 
principles in this respect, the judgment also made a significant departure from the 
                                                          
5
 See “Thackeray suggests Indian version of V-Day” in Times of India, February 13, 2006. Available 
online at: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1413273.cms. Last Accessed on July 14, 2009. 
6
 See “Valentine‟s Day: It‟s Shiv Sena vs NCP in M‟rashtra” by Shiv Kumar in The Tribune, February 
11, 2009. Available online at: http://www.tribuneindia.com/2009/20090212/nation.htm#1. Last 
accessed on July 14, 2009.  
7
 Naz Foundation v. Government of NCT of Delhi and Others, WP(C) No. 7455/2001, pg 65 
195 
 
original intent of India‟s founding order with respect to its conceptualization of the 
sources of individual liberties. Far from thinking about individual rights as “gifts of 
the state”, Justice S. Muralidhar noted that 
“fundamental human rights …belong to individuals simply by virtue of their 
humanity, independent of any utilitarian consideration. A Bill of Rights does 
not „confer‟ fundamental rights. It confirms their existence and accords them 
protection”8   
This final case is yet another instance of how the informal arena frequently shapes and 
informs developments in the formal arena, demonstrating some of the reasons why 
even though India‟s founding order has profoundly shaped patterns of politics in the 
country in the years since independence, it has not entirely blocked off avenues for the 
expression of social pluralism in the country‟s politics. However, to the extent that 
illiberal principles continue to be entrenched in constitutional-legal discourse, one 
might expect that change is more likely to take place in response to pushes from civil 
society rather than from unilateral initiative on the part of India‟s political elites.  
 
The Lessons from the Indian Experience  
It was argued at length in Chapter Five that India‟s particular negotiation of 
diversity was primarily a product of historical and conjunctural factors rather than the 
result of a general psychological proclivity towards illiberalism. It reflected the 
interests of elites who confronted daunting administrative challenges in the form of 
widespread disorder and violence as well as the prospect of an election based on full 
                                                          
8
 Ibid, pg. 98; An appeal against the court‟s decision, on the grounds that it injured public morality, was 
accepted by the Supreme Court of India within a few days after this judgment was passed.  
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adult franchise for the first time in history. It was in this context that India‟s founders 
formulated the particular hierarchy of individual and cultural rights that characterizes 
the Indian founding order. This underlying desire for stability in the face of overt 
challenges to the capacity of the state to maintain order can hardly be said to be a 
feature unique to the Indian founding.  
Indeed, as was mentioned in the opening chapter, this is a challenge that has 
confronted the vast majority of what Kymlicka (1996) refers to as “multinational 
states” that emerged out of colonialism in the decades following the end of the Second 
World War. This raises the question of what lessons, if any, the Indian case can 
provide for new or aspiring democracies in the so-called developing world that are 
confronted with the reality of seemingly unmanageable socio-cultural diversity. The 
arguments in the preceding chapters have frequently drawn upon particularities of the 
Indian case: Indian society‟s particular experience with colonialism and the 
subsequent politicization of questions of social and religious reform; the political 
entrenchment of a particular set of ideas regarding the importance of cultural 
protection and revitalization; and the political strategizing of prominent politicians in 
the face of electoral competition. Such arguments appear to militate against 
generalization or even the generation of “lessons” for other new democracies 
considering moves to institutionalize rights to cultural protection.  
To the extent that one is still concerned with the implications of the adoption 
of particular models of multiculturalism, however, the Indian experience does suggest 
that the goal of long-term democratic stability may sit only uneasily with the quest for 
the institutionalization of respect for individual liberties. An extensive body of 
literature in the sub-field of political philosophy has developed around the Rawlsian 
notion of “political liberalism,” the idea that democracies may be able to 
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accommodate their social and cultural diversity without compromising liberal 
principles. It is essentially a search for “a political common ground” (Forst 2004, x) in 
the face of an often extreme diversity of moral points of view within single polities. 
Notably, the primary concern of the political liberal project is with the stability of the 
liberal democratic order (Gray 2000; Young 2004). The stated reason for this focus on 
stability is that it is deemed to enable individuals to “have the opportunity to pursue 
and realize their chosen vision of the good life” (Young 2004, 4). The idea of political 
stability as allowing individuals to pursue their desired ends freely, and as therefore 
inherently desirable, goes back to the Renaissance ideas of thinkers like Machiavelli.  
Even scholars who find fault with the Rawlsian project for various reasons, see peace 
and stability as necessary and important goals (Gray 2000, Klosko 2003). Without 
denying the importance of stability, this study‟s findings about the Indian experience 
with multiculturalism suggest that scholars of political liberalism ought to pay closer 
attention to the precise conditions under which such an accommodation of diversity is 
more or less likely to meet these high expectations.  
This project suggests that much may hinge on the content of cultural rights to 
which groups are entitled as well as the context in which diversity is negotiated. The 
co-constitution of the formal and informal in the realm of civil liberties and 
multiculturalism suggests that proponents of group rights to cultural protection ought 
to pay close attention to the history of the polity concerned, with a particular focus on 
the ways in which questions of cultural protection and the roles and responsibilities of 
individuals in their respective cultural communities are discussed in the public sphere 
prior to the granting of formal recognition of group cultural rights. In contexts in 
which local cultural politics in imbued with a particularly revivalist or supremacist 
fervor, as was the case in pre-independence India, making the state responsible for 
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cultural protection and preservation is likely to severely compromise the liberties of 
individuals. The only way to counter these tendencies may be to redefine the state‟s 
relationship with individual citizens, as the case on the rights of homosexuals cited 
above has done in India. Unless the grant of cultural rights takes place alongside the 
recognition of an active role for the state in the protection and encouragement of 
individual liberty, the consequences of their adoption are more than likely to be 
illiberal.  
However, it is unclear exactly how much agency a country‟s founders have 
when it comes to making these kinds of choices regarding the allocation and content 
of individual and group rights. Indeed, perhaps the single most significant lesson of 
the Indian case is that it is unrealistic to talk of “models” of constitutions or 
multicultural arrangements that can simply be transported from one context to another. 
As Horowitz (2002) has argued, every constitutional negotiation involves 
improvisation and adaptation to proximate and historical circumstances rather than the 
blind adoption and application of “models” or ready-made institutional designs. In 
India, it was the political-historical context in which cultural rights were negotiated 
that led to the institutionalization of “thick multiculturalism” and “Gandhian 
multiculturalism” as well as the hierarchy of multicultural entitlements across different 
types of groups. The historically contingent association of political autonomy with 
cultural revival that was such an important part of nationalist discourse in India  
exercised significant influence on decision-making within the country‟s Constituent 
Assembly. Along with the violent partition of India in 1947, it led the resulting 
document to be imbued with its peculiarly illiberal content with respect to the relative 
prioritization of individual and group rights.  
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In short, constitutional orders and the patterns of democratic politics that they 
engender may well be path dependent, the product of historically contingent choices 
rather than coherent political and philosophical visions. To the extent that we seek 
explanations for phenomena like democratic stability and consolidation or the 
association (or lack thereof) between democratic practice and liberal principle, it 
behooves us to pay attention to the context in which these choices were made in the 
past, as well as the reasons why what were once historically contingent choices may 
continue to be made well after the passing of a democracy‟s founding moment.  
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